Henry L. Doherty was one of the primary proponents of unitization in the oil and gas industry the early 1900s. His goal was the prevention of waste, improvement in reservoir management, and serving the public interest in the conservation of a critical national resource. The key realization that unitization enabled was the treatment of a reservoir as a single mechanical unit, regardless of the division of its ownership. Cooperation between these ownership interests enabled joint operation of the common mechanical unit: the reservoir. This approach is similar to Elinor Ostrom’s approach, identified in her 1965 doctoral dissertation, and her work with common pool resources. In her work, she suggested that organizations formed to address groundwater issues in southern California resembled public entrepreneurs combining to form a more effective enterprise. As such, Doherty and Ostrom relied on similar foundations and theories but in different contexts.

Determination and redetermination are critical components of a unitization agreement. The negotiation and renegotiation of the share allocation system enable parties to update the agreement as new information or technology appears. Several accepted methods of redetermination have developed in the oil and gas context, but none currently exist for aquifers. Some examples do appear to approach direct and indirect methods of aquifer redetermination. Examples of direct methods would involve the proven availability of groundwater or available rights to storage within the aquifer. Examples of indirect methods include allocations determined by modeling of geologic conditions, pooled reductions in groundwater extraction, or refinements in a management plan that allocates extraction rates.

Groundwater management appears to be reaching the end of its theoretical development. Principles of resource governance are increasingly expanding the social elements incorporated into groundwater policy, akin to social externalities. What is missing is the inclusion of additional physical externalities resulting from groundwater extraction, like subsidence, storage space development, water quality, biology, geothermal heating and cooling, and other aquifer properties. Like the increasing application of transdisciplinary approaches to groundwater policy, the application of a transresource approach could include these additional resources indirectly associated with groundwater use. This approach complicates the traditional perception of groundwater as a public resource, as aquifers are a combination of public and private property rights. Several examples represent the inclusion of transdisciplinary approaches, but none appear to include transresource approaches that signify a transition to aquifer governance.

The Harney Valley in eastern Oregon could suffer from the same groundwater issues experienced in many places across the globe. The Oregon state government has begun efforts to investigate and determine whether regulatory action is needed to conserve groundwater in the region. As a theoretical example, an aquifer unitization agreement for the Harney Valley would include the same components as those found in the oil and gas context. Unitization of the Harney Valley’s aquifer resources could enable expanded development of transresources or collective solutions that state regulation alone could not achieve.

The myths of aquifer science have been mostly dispelled, but the mysticism of governance still lurks behind current approaches to sustainable groundwater use. Aquifers are combinations of both public and private rights, physically bound, and must be treated as elements in a complete aquifer system. The examples described in this book show that progress has been made to move from groundwater management to groundwater governance, but in only some cases has governance reached the aquifer. Unitization of oil and gas fields provides a valuable analogy to aquifers, showing an approach that bridges the science with the social and legal context, forming a negotiated, often voluntary governance system. As shown in this book, the unitization contract system could potentially be applied to aquifers across the United States and abroad.

Unitization agreements require specialized professionals who can navigate the complex legal and scientific issues presented by each application. Robert Hardwicke described such an individual as a “lawgineer.” These professionals act as experts and mediators when parties disagree and require an objective party to resolve disputes. They assist in the determination of equity shares, resource conditions, technological solutions, and technical analysis. A similar field of professionals may emerge for similar work in aquifer unitization.

Groundwater negotiators and professionals often encounter informational impasses, whereby the parties cannot find a common understanding of data and information. These disputes often end with each party “agreeing to disagree” and never resolving the underlying misunderstanding. Collaboration compacts may facilitate the negotiation of an aquifer unitization agreement by adopting common guiding principles and context for subsequent negotiation. These compacts can identify conceptual models, analytical methods, and goals before positions become entrenched.

The litigation between the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians and several water districts in southern California may address the unclear ownership of aquifer pore spaces directly. In this case, the tribal parties have claimed a federally reserved right to aquifer pore spaces as a component of the mineral estate of their reservation. This directly addresses whether parties may have exclusive rights to store water in an aquifer or must share storage rights with others. The resolution of this question has important implications to aquifer unitization, including defining the necessary parties to the agreement and the allocation of shares. The court has several potential methods of resolving this question, which would determine the basis of public and private rights to the use of the aquifer.

The suggested shift in policy perspective from groundwater to aquifers challenges the traditional approach to groundwater as a public resource issue. The legal issues involving aquifers are a complex combination of public rights and private property. Groundwater is traditionally a publicly held resource, yet the aquifer’s storage space appears to be considered private property. Although these resources are interconnected, courts have taken different approaches to addressing conflicts that involve indirect effects of groundwater extraction, like subsidence and subterranean trespass. Some states and courts treat pore spaces akin to a mineral right and protect private uses, like carbon sequestration. In other cases, courts have treated pore spaces as a public resource and refused claims of trespass and nuisance when adjacent aquifer uses interfered with private property rights. There is no clear consensus as to the ownership of aquifer pore spaces.

Serious gaming is an emerging approach to conflict resolution. Serious games provide a structured environment in which learning, research, and joint fact finding occur. Several serious games focus on water and groundwater. The Unitization Simulation Game, included here, provides a tool for mediators to show how collective governance of an aquifer can create win-win scenarios for players. This game includes resource management decisions, transresource effects, divergent interests, and collaboration components. These aspects of the game are intended to simulate how groundwater issues develop and how aquifer unitization could provide a solution.

Unitization agreements have several common components and principles that enable them to effectively govern collective resources. These agreements represent a governance system with several phases of development. Several key components work to separate the rights to extract from the right to a benefit, protecting private rights yet enabling collective governance. Private interests are protected as equity shares in the unitization agreement. A unit operator makes resource management decisions for the collectively held resource. As more information is gathered about resource conditions, private interests, represented as shares, are redetermined regularly to ensure accuracy and improve resource management over time. Thus, the methods of determining private shares in the unitization agreement are critical to the unit’s success.