“Time for Change”; “For Real Change Let's Vote for NLD”

On 8 November 2015, in Myanmar's sixth multiparty general election (hereafter GE2015) since independence in 1948, voters’ desire for “change” swept away the conservative forces associated with more than five decades of military dominance in the politics of Myanmar. That simple catchy C-word, reminiscent of Barak Obama's U.S. presidential campaign battle cry in 2008, proved more effective than the “goodies” delivered during the five years of USDP (Union Solidarity and Development Party) rule under President U Thein Sein, as well as the last-minute deluge of amenities, goods and services brought in by powerful USDP candidates to their designated constituencies to garner votes from the weary public. The National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the charismatic daughter of Myanmar's martyred independence hero, “Bogyoke” (general) Aung San, clinched supermajorities in both houses of parliament, stunning pundits, competitors, detractors, supporters and the NLD itself, not only in Myanmar but also in the international community. Thus, GE2015 appeared to herald the dawn of a new era in Myanmar politics, whose troubled experiment in parliamentary democracy was truncated by the military coup of 2 March 1962. However, both powerful agencies and rigid structures stand in the way of “real change” as envisaged by the NLD leadership and aspired to by those who voted in the popular party led by their beloved hero's daughter.

The Bumpy Road to GE2015

One could say that the re-entry of the NLD, especially its chairperson Aung San Suu Kyi, into the mainstream political playground through the by-elections in April 2012 set the stage for the race to win GE2015. People took notice of the NLD's comeback when it won forty-three of the forty-fives seats it then contested. It allowed the party and its leader to play a high-profile role in and out of the parliamentary system and capture the imagination of a public apathetic to electoral politics since the huge setback when the junta ignored the results of the 1990 general election.

Meanwhile, the government of President U Thein Sein, formed in March 2011, carried out significant political and economic reforms as well as administrative restructuring and attempted to achieve performance legitimacy and overcome its image as a quasi-civilian government comprising many retired military officers and serving generals.

“Time for Change”; “For Real Change Let's Vote for NLD”

On 8 November 2015, in Myanmar's sixth multiparty general election (hereafter GE2015) since independence in 1948, voters’ desire for “change” swept away the conservative forces associated with more than five decades of military dominance in the politics of Myanmar. That simple catchy C-word, reminiscent of Barak Obama's U.S. presidential campaign battle cry in 2008, proved more effective than the “goodies” delivered during the five years of USDP (Union Solidarity and Development Party) rule under President U Thein Sein, as well as the lastminute deluge of amenities, goods and services brought in by powerful USDP candidates to their designated constituencies to garner votes from the weary public. The National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the charismatic daughter of Myanmar's martyred independence hero, “Bogyoke” (general) Aung San, clinched supermajorities in both houses of parliament, stunning pundits, competitors, detractors, supporters and the NLD itself, not only in Myanmar but also in the international community. Thus, GE2015 appeared to herald the dawn of a new era in Myanmar politics, whose troubled experiment in parliamentary democracy was truncated by the military coup of 2 March 1962. However, both powerful agencies and rigid structures stand in the way of “real change” as envisaged by the NLD leadership and aspired to by those who voted in the popular party led by their beloved hero's daughter.

The Bumpy Road to GE2015

One could say that the re-entry of the NLD, especially its chairperson Aung San Suu Kyi, into the mainstream political playground through the by-elections in April 2012 set the stage for the race to win GE2015. People took notice of the NLD's comeback when it won forty-three of the forty-fives seats it then contested. It allowed the party and its leader to play a high-profile role in and out of the parliamentary system and capture the imagination of a public apathetic to electoral politics since the huge setback when the junta ignored the results of the 1990 general election.

Meanwhile, the government of President U Thein Sein, formed in March 2011, carried out significant political and economic reforms as well as administrative restructuring and attempted to achieve performance legitimacy and overcome its image as a quasi-civilian government comprising many retired military officers and serving generals.

INTRODUCTION

Myanmar is a multi-cultural, multi-racial and multi-religious society. There are eight main ethnic groups, with the Bamar (formerly known as Burman) being the largest, comprising over 60 per cent of the total population. There are four officially designated faiths (Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Islam), and although Myanmar is a secular state, Buddhism, with 90 per cent following, enjoys support from the ruling elite.

Administratively, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar is divided into seven states (named after the major non-Bamar ethnic group that resides in the area) and seven regions (areas with the Bamar ethnic group comprising the majority). There are also six self-administered zones comprising several townships where a substantial population of a non-Bamar ethnic group (which does not belong to the majority non-Bamar ethnic group if it is an ethnic state) resides. The new national capital called Nay Pyi Taw (meaning “Abode of Kings”) was established in November 2005, to replace Yangon (Rangoon). The English name “Burma” was dropped in favour of “Myanmar” on 18 June 1989.

POLITICAL SYSTEM

On independence, the country was a parliamentary democracy. After the coup on 2 March 1962, direct military rule was practised by the junta, known as the Revolutionary Council (RC). From January 1974, a one-party (Burma Socialist Programme Party or BSPP) socialist system was in place until 18 September 1988 when it reverted to military rule under the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in the midst of a popular uprising that had paralyzed the government for many weeks. The SLORC held a multi-party general election (for a unicameral legislature) in May 1990 but refused to hand over power to the National League for Democracy (NLD; the main opposition party led by Aung San Suu Kyi, who is the daughter of Myanmar's national hero General Aung San) which won some 80 per cent of the seats. The junta that reconstituted itself in 1997 as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) oversaw the drafting of a new constitution by way of a fourteen-year long process in which a handpicked National Convention was tasked to formulate its detailed principles.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. • The reformist government in Myanmar is in the process of trying to consolidate ceasefires with contentious ethnic groups and to move towards political dialogue. This is part of a long history of interethnic strife in the country.

2. • After many failed attempts by successive Myanmar governments to achieve peace with these groups, the first round of widespread ceasefires was finally achieved in the early 1990s due to military government's initiatives. It was premised on three points: the right to remain armed; the right to administer each group's own demarcated territory; and the right to conduct cross-border commercial activities.

3. • After the elections in November 2010, however, the earlier ceasefire agreements lapsed. The elected Union Government of President U Thein Sein subsequently announced a peace offer on 18 August 2011. Though initially skeptical, 13 of these armed groups eventually entered into ceasefire talks at both provincial and Union level. All agreed to cease hostilities after discussions with government representatives and have engaged in further negotiations.

4. • The Myanmar military is an important player in the peace process and its top leaders need to handle the negotiations with finesse and patience.

INTRODUCTION

State-building in Myanmar is a contentious exercise with many ethnic ‘nations’ challenging the unitary concept of the ruling elites who are mainly from the majority Bamar ethnic group and resorting to armed struggle. The Communists also did not accept the nascent government's legitimacy and sought ‘regime change’ through force of arms. Consequently, the army was wracked by mutinies and civil war erupted soon after independence and the government had to fight a multifront war against a multitude of ideological and ethnic insurgencies some of which are still continuing.

Through all this, the incessant fighting in support of the government and its legendary role in the resistance movement against British rulers and later Japanese occupiers in World War II elevated the Myanmar Defence Services (MDS)—known as the Tatmadaw (Royal Force)—not only into an indispensable adjunct to state power but also into a fount of power itself. As such, the military's perspective has had a domineering influence in shaping Myanmar's security outlook since independence

The 1988 popular uprising that ended the Socialist era of political governance and state building in Myanmar had all the makings of a significant historical conjuncture that not only transformed the country's political and economic systems as well as the nature of ethnic insurgencies but also brought Myanmar's contentious domestic issues to the attention of the international community. It coincided with the emergence of the triumphant outlook of Western democracies capitalizing on the apparent democratic turn following the collapse of Leninist regimes in Europe and brought about the internationalization of Myanmar's security, political and economic issues, premised upon liberal norms of human rights and democracy. The resulting polarized discourse on the country's political and economic reform agenda became part of the contested legacy of the aborted “Four Eights Movement” representing the crest of the revolutionary tide seen by the counter elites as a harbinger of a new political order. However, the democratic aspirations were not realized and the movement's momentum was quickly dissipated as the Tatmadaw (literally meaning royal force), or Myanmar armed forces, re-emerged as the principal steward of Myanmar's destiny. Differing interpretations of that legacy by the military regime and its domestic and foreign detractors have led to divergent attempts of reproduction that have yet to be resolved. On the other hand, a more paranoid, autocratic and powerful regime than the deposed BSPP (Burma Socialist Programme Party) regime emerged in the aftermath of the 1988 uprising, premised on the perpetuation of the Tatmadaw control over political and economic spaces. However, the new constitutional order that took some two decades to become institutionalized through the 2008 Constitution has given some hope for an irreversible change in the political system. This chapter will attempt to identify antecedent conditions preceding the conjuncture and trace the bankruptcy of the BSPP state leading to the rupture in 1988.

The Tatmadaw or the Myanmar armed forces has a motto that proudly proclaims its battle cry: “never surrender”. That motto seems to reflect the ruling junta's (known as the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC) refusal to surrender state power to the National League for Democracy (NLD), which won the 1990 elections, its disinclination to engage in substantive dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the NLD, as well its dismissal of calls for the tripartite dialogue (advocated by the United Nations and democracy lobbies at home and abroad) involving the military, ethnic representatives, and the NLD.

Instead, the Tatmadaw leaders kept to their agenda of first establishing an “enduring” state constitution to their liking and then systematically moving forward to civilian government along the seven-step road map2 unveiled in August 2003 by the then Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt. Before the latter was dismissed in October 2004, the National Convention designed to formulate detailed basic principles of a new constitution was reconvened in May 2004 after a suspension of over eight years. The fourth stage of the road map was completed when the resulting draft constitution (completed in February 2008) was adopted, in May 2008, by a majority of 92.5 per cent in a controversial referendum with a reported turnout exceeding 98 per cent.

The 2010 multiparty general election was the fifth and crucial stage of the road map and may be considered the crowning achievement of the Myanmar military's managed transition towards a civilian government while at the same time ensuring continued military dominance of the political space and the Myanmar state, which have been under different forms of military control for nearly half a century. Myanmar's fifth competitive election, the culmination of the long drawn out series of preparations carried out by the junta in the aftermath of the 1990 election which was interpreted by the military leaders as a preliminary step for constitution making. The most significant measures undertaken by the ruling junta in preparation for this second multiparty election under its supervision were the formulation of the 2008 Constitution (hereafter referred to as the Constitution) that codified the “leading” role of the military in a multiparty setting and the introduction of a new generation of younger Tatmadaw leaders.

The most significant events for Myanmar in the year 2008 were the devastating tropical Cyclone Nargis that wreaked havoc in the former capital Yangon and the Ayeyarwady Delta and the constitutional referendum that was conducted soon after the disaster. Both elicited strong emotional responses from the military government's detractors at home and abroad. In fact, the tragedy brought about by Nargis provoked a storm of protest and angry calls for humanitarian intervention from opposition groups, human rights advocates, and (mainly) Western politicians over the military government's seemingly lethargic response in the storm's aftermath and its attempts to control the flow of international aid as well as access to affected areas. At the same time, the timing of the referendum that was organized in two stages during the same month in which Nargis struck as well as the overwhelming (over 92 per cent) proportion of affirmative votes led to accusations of callousness and allegations of vote rigging on the government's part.

On the other hand, the extent of the devastation that required a sustained and massive relief and rehabilitation effort led to the active involvement of the United Nations (UN) — through the personal diplomacy of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon — and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in a tripartite arrangement with the Myanmar government to coordinate and oversee damage assessments as well as international assistance in personnel, money and material. Consequently, an opportunity was created for local civil society organizations (CSO), general public, and INGOs (international non-governmental organizations) to take part in a monumental effort aimed at helping the victims of Nargis. To some observers, this augurs well for the development of civil society in Myanmar.

Meanwhile, skeptics and critics continued to harp on the lack of progress in political dialogue between the government and the political opposition and the continued detention of opposition icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

Economic growth in Southeast Asia was estimated at 6.1 per cent year on year compared with 6 per cent in 2006. This was due to better performance in Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia while Vietnam sustained its impressive performance of 2006. Further, Singapore exceeded earlier expectations by growing only marginally slower than in 2006. Stronger than expected domestic demand and higher remittances for some countries contributed to the robust performance of Southeast Asian economies though exports also continued to play an important role. Yet, there were also growing concerns about the underlying competitiveness of some countries to meet longer-term economic challenges, with issues of governance, education and training at the forefront of these concerns.

The picture was more mixed in the arena of politics and security. Thailand had yet to recover its stability after the military coup of 19 September 2006, despite the election of December 2007. The political divisions in the country had, if anything, increased and the apparently failing health of the King only added to the currents of uncertainty. Meanwhile the insurgency in the southern Muslim provinces continued unabated with no solution in sight. In the Philippines, though President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's presidency turned out to be politically resilient, it remained tarnished by a widespread perception of corruption among those close to her, while the country continued to face multiple insurgencies involving the communists and, in the south, different groups of Muslim rebels. In Malaysia there were growing signs of racial polarization and disappointment with the Abdullah administration's failure to deliver on its promises to reduce crime and corruption. The situation in Myanmar seemed worse with the September demonstrations led by Buddhist monks, which were violently suppressed. Yet, by the end of the year, nothing seemed to have changed. On the other hand, Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia, had acquired a measure of stability and normalcy not seen since the financial crisis of 1997–98.

Introduction

As Southeast Asia entered the twenty-first century, political dynamics and security concerns in the region seemed to enter a new post-Cold War phase characterized by significant leadership changes, political transitions and the rise in prominence of non-traditional security issues.

In recent years, new leaders have emerged in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore mainly through the democratic electoral process whereby major iconic figures like Suharto in Indonesia and Dr Mahathir in Malaysia had relinquished their dominant role in the respective ruling elites. Even one-party states like Vietnam and Laos showed signs of more tolerance, openness and transparency in the political sphere, especially at the grassroots level.

Traditional security threats in the form of insurgencies remained relevant though seemingly diminishing (except in southern Thailand where there has been a revival in the last few years) in Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines and Thailand. Meanwhile, non-traditional security issues concerning viral epidemics (AIDS or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, SARS or Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, and avian flu), tsunamis, narcotics, human trafficking, piracy and terrorism came to the fore in challenging the state's capacity to safeguard human security and maintain the regime's authority and legitimacy.

On the other hand, political stability appeared to have been consolidated in the core of ASEAN (the five original members) until recently when public discontent spawned massive demonstrations on the streets of Manila and Bangkok. Such attempts to topple elected leaders by “people's power” were seen by many observers as a setback for democratic consolidation in the very nations that were touted as examples of liberal democratic political order in the region.

Political Trends in Southeast Asia

The most significant trends in the internal politics of Southeast Asia have been what one scholar called “political transitions” that entailed the replacement of authoritarian rule by more democratic political governance (Indonesia), less idiosyncratic style of leadership (Malaysia), “changing of the guard” and self-renewal of the ruling party (Singapore), unprecedented electoral mandate for the incumbent (Thailand), and a controversial second term for a beleaguered leader (Philippines).

After gaining independence from the British in 1948, Myanmar's economy was heavily dependent upon foreign trade with exports constituting on average some 45 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) during the early 1950s. This proportion fell to around 33 per cent in 1961, the year before the March 1962 military coup that led to 26 years of socialist command economy. During this period, foreign trade became marginalized, despite the fact that it was the major source of acquiring foreign goods and services in the absence of foreign direct investment (FDI) and limited official development assistance (ODA). For example, during fiscal year 1985–86, external trade reached a total volume of US$900 million, accounting for only around 11.3 per cent of the GDP. During the socialist era, Myanmar posted persistent deficits in its trade balance.

When the military took over control in September 1988 in the aftermath of a widespread popular uprising against the one-party socialist government, market- oriented reforms were quickly introduced after abolishing the socialist economic system. In 1989, foreign trade, which was formerly the sole prerogative of the state, was liberalized to allow private participation and an “open door” policy towards FDI and foreign trading firms. This led to a revival of foreign trade as a significant driver of economic growth, a major source of fungible hard currency, and of revenue for the state. The private sector quickly realized its potential for quick returns and rapid expansion. Trading enterprises blossomed in the early 1990s with the number of registered export-import companies increasing from none in 1988 to 2,813 in April 2001 and to 19,494 in June 2005. Since the Myanmar currency is not convertible, exports became the private sector's sole vehicle in obtaining the scarce foreign exchange needed not only to import consumer goods but also to obtain materials and equipment for the services and manufacturing sectors. By the fiscal year 2005–2006 the value of foreign trade reached US$5.5 billion — six times the volume achieved 20 years ago.

Introduction

Since the military took power in Myanmar on 18 September 1988, most of the academic literature and almost all of the news and commentaries on Myanmar politics and security have been focused on three broad themes: Human rights and democracy issues revolving around the democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the narcotics issue associated with the infamous “Golden Triangle” and ethnic issues viewed as a dichotomous relationship between the majority Bamar and the minority ethnic nationalities. With such a fixation on these seemingly intractable problems, equally significant issues relevant to the physical and spiritual well-being of Myanmar's inhabitants — both citizens and non-citizens alike — remain relatively obscured and unarticulated. This chapter is an attempt to address those issues from a human security perspective in order to highlight the vulnerabilities of the people of Myanmar to threats which are perhaps more insidious and no less deserving of policy sensitivity and response than those posed by armed conflict, erosion of national sovereignty and loss of territorial integrity. The aim is to identify a “convergence of the development and security agendas”.

Myanmar under the Revolutionary Council (RC) that came to power through a coup d'etat on 2 March 1962 underwent a political and economic transformation. The parliamentary regime was replaced by a military junta, which abolished the Constitution and ruled by decree, removing all vestiges of the ancien regime. The populace was completely depoliticized and socialist revolution became the vanguard of state ideology. The mixed economy comprising a nascent private sector and a shrinking state sector was replaced by a state-controlled autarkic economy that stressed self-reliance and equity.

RESTRUCTURING STATE AND SOCIETY

Both the RC, which was the supreme authority, and the Revolutionary Government (RG) of senior military officers were chaired by General Ne Win, the idiosyncratic chief of the armed forces. The RG instituted a hierarchy of Security and Administrative Committees (SACs) to replace the civil service. The SACs’ principal function seems “to have been to check on local initiatives and to ensure that central directives were followed”.

The RC announced its ideology known as the Myanma Hsoshelit Lanzin or the Burmese Way to Socialism (BWS), on 30 April 1962. The BWS, inspired by the socialist tradition of pre-independence nationalists, denounced bureaucracy, repudiated parliamentary democracy, and promised to develop a non-exploitative planned socialist economy as well as a socialist democracy appropriate to Myanmar conditions. Subsequently, the RC formed a cadre party called the Myanma Hsoshelit Lanzin Parti (Burma Socialist Programme Party, or BSPP) in July. This was followed by the publication of the BSPP's world-view in January 1963. Entitled “The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment” (SCME), it was an eclectic mixture of Buddhism and Marxism couched in general terms susceptible to a variety of interpretations.

The autarkic approach of the Revolutionary Council (RC) era was modified when the “Long-Term and Short-Term Economic Policies” (LTSTEP) were adopted as the economic manifesto of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) that led the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma after March 1974. However, the state-led import-substituting industrialization (ISI) strategy which had been continuously pursued since Myanmar's independence remained unchanged within the Twenty-Year Plan's (TYP) framework. As such, it entailed acceptance of official development assistance (ODA) and private sector participation in selected industrial activities.

INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY, POLICIES AND PLANS

The aim of Myanmar's industrial strategy in the BSPP framework was to create an industrial base utilizing Myanmar's natural resources and agricultural products for an eventual transformation into an industrialized country. The emphasis was on resource-based industrialization (RBI) while incorporating an “export-substituting” element that entailed increasing the export of value-added (through industrial processing) products. Nevertheless, the legacy of inward-orientation in economic outlook together with restrictive external trade policies foreclosed the EOI (export-oriented industrialization) option.

The long-term policies enunciated in the LTSTEP document were adopted as guidelines for the FYPs and their annual components. Together with the list of ownership vis-à-vis industrial classifications stipulated in the LTSTEP document, the sectoral objectives and policies enunciated in the latter formed the basis of state-led industrialization in the TYP (1974–94) period.

The FYP plan guidelines for the industrial sectors endorsed by the corresponding Pyithu Hluttaw sessions are shown in Table 7.1. They reflected the BSPP's perception on means and ends for transforming Myanmar into an agriculture-based industrial economy by 1994. They also demonstrate the persistence of resource constraints, especially capital and energy shortages, and that each successive FYP encountered essentially the same problems and shortcomings thereby eliciting similar exhortations. These guidelines suggest that underutilization of industrial assets and lack of financial and technological resources were major problems for state industrial enterprises (SIEs) throughout these four FYP periods. Given such constraints, rationalization of the SIEs with less emphasis on new projects and more on full utilization of existing factories should have been carried out from the outset. However, only in fiscal 1983/84 did the state decided to give priority to “completing ongoing projects” and new ones that “were less capital intensive, had short gestation periods, utilized domestic resource base, and had good export potential”.

State-led industrialization in Myanmar was largely influenced by ideas and notions closely associated with socialism and economic nationalism that were embraced and interpreted by the nationalist political leadership that governed Myanmar after independence. Those manifestations of “reactive nationalism” (against Britain, the colonial power) endured for many decades after independence in conjunction with the continued domination of the political landscape by the “1945 generation” of political and military leaders, whose leadership credentials were legitimated by their role in the anti-fascist “revolution” of 1945 (see next chapter). Foremost among them was the student activist turned politician and military hero Bogyoke (literally Major-General but in the pantheon of Myanmar political leadership figuratively symbolizing illustrious military leadership) Aung San, whose political legacy was invoked and reinterpreted by successive governments of Myanmar.

SOCIALISM AND THE LEGACY OF BOGYOKE AUNG SAN

Socialism is an elusive concept which defies exact definition. It is usually characterized by distinctive institutional arrangements and class relations. It has been argued that “as long as public ownership and planning are predominant the economy is socialist”. Though ill-defined, the socialist theme:

The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) that was transformed into a mass party prior to the institution of the Socialist Constitution that mandated one-party rule became the supreme economic as well as political authority of Myanmar. The elected government formulated and executed long- and short-term economic plans under the guidance of the BSPP cadres whose supervisory and monitoring functions extended from the centre through the regional hierarchy of party apparatus down to the enterprise and ward/village tract level.

BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAMME PARTY MONOPOLY

Instituted on 3 January 1974, the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma was a unitary one-party socialist state led by the BSPP. Electoral representation was based on a four-tier hierarchy consisting of three regional people's councils (ward/village, township, and state/division) and the Pyithu Hluttaw (“Parliament”), held on a quadrennial basis. However, given the BSPP's prerogative of nominating “official” candidates, elections implied confirmation rather than competition.

The locus of all three state powers (executive, judicial, and legislative) was the BSPP-dominated unicameral Pyithu Hluttaw, thereby blurring the demarcation between the party and the state. There were regional and local administrative and judicial bodies under the central organs of state power. The state executive operated under the leadership and guidance of the Central Committee and the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the BSPP. Similarly, the territorial hierarchy of people's councils were supervised by the corresponding regional party organs. The new political order was predicated upon the BSPP's “centralized control, pervasive authority and sole legitimacy”.

Industrialization has been a fixation in Myanmar's vision of economic development, as espoused by the ruling elites, since the country gained independence from the British colonizers in 1948. It has been factored into successive policies and plans that successive governments of Myanmar formulated and implemented in order to modernize Myanmar and bring about prosperity with equity to its citizens. The socialist vision of the first generation Myanmar (nationalist) leaders was premised upon fostering successful industrialization of the agriculture-based national economy.

THE GOAL OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

It seems that the “profound aspiration for economic development in the Third World always involves a desire to industrialize” and “[t]his desire is universal”. For Myanmar, the desire to transform its agriculture-based economy into an industrial economy has resulted in a sustained effort by the state since regaining independence on 4 January 1948. For many decades the Myanmar state has expended a substantial portion of its political and economic resources in the name of industrialization. To understand Myanmar's industrialization effort, it is necessary to explore it as a key link in the state's political economy. By taking into account the interplay of economics and politics, it is possible to arrive at a broader understanding of the state's strategies, policies, and management of industrialization. This study attempts to analyse Myanmar's quest for industrial development along those lines.

In this analysis the “state” is used as a locus for industrialization through motivation, formulation, articulation, and implementation of particular strategies, plans, and policies associated with “state leaders” or “state managers”. This warrants a definition of the state which sets it apart from “regime” or “government”. Following Taylor and Migdal, the state may be defined as an autonomous institution which holds authority over people and other institutions within a territory in such a way that it can determine its relationship with them as well as with each other while monopolizing the right to use coercion and violence. It does not mean, however, that societal responses by non-state institutions or individuals are to be dismissed altogether.