The Scaling-up Health-Arts Programme: Implementation and Effectiveness Research (SHAPER) project is the world's largest hybrid study on the impact of the arts on mental health embedded into a national healthcare system. This programme, funded by the Wellcome Trust, aims to study the impact and the scalability of the arts as an intervention for mental health. The programme will be delivered by a team of clinicians, research scientists, charities, artists, patients and healthcare professionals in the UK's National Health Service (NHS) and the community, spanning academia, the NHS and the charity sector. SHAPER consists of three studies – Melodies for Mums, Dance for Parkinson's, and Stroke Odysseys – which will recruit over 800 participants, deliver the interventions and draw conclusions on their clinical impact, implementation effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. We hope that this work will inspire organisations and commissioners in the NHS and around the world to expand the remit of social prescribing to include evidence-based arts interventions.

The personality traits of neuroticism, openness, and conscientiousness are relevant factors for cognitive aging outcomes. The present study examined how these traits were associated with cognitive abilities and corresponding resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) of the default mode network (DMN) in an older and predominantly minority sample. A sample of 58 cognitively unimpaired, largely African-American, older adults (M age = 68.28 ± 8.33) completed a standard RSFC magnetic resonance imaging sequence, a Big Five measure of personality, and delayed memory, Stroop, and verbal fluency tasks. Personality trait associations of within-network connectivity of the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), a hub of the DMN, were examined using a seed-based approach. Trait scores were regressed on cognitive performance (delayed memory for neuroticism, Stroop for conscientiousness, and verbal fluency for openness). Greater openness predicted greater verbal fluency and greater RSFC between the PCC and eight clusters, including the medial prefrontal cortex, left middle frontal gyrus, and precuneus. Greater PCC–precuneus connectivity predicted greater verbal fluency. Neuroticism and conscientiousness did not significantly predict either cognitive performance or RSFC. Although requiring replication and elaboration, the results implicate openness as a contributing factor to cognitive aging via concomitant cognitive performance and connectivity within cortical hubs of the DMN and add to the sparse literature on these variables in a diverse group of older adults.

Cognitive neuroscientists frequently talk about the brain representing the world. Some philosophers claim that this is a confusion. This paper argues that there is no confusion, and outlines one thing that ‘the brain represents the world’ might mean, using the notion of a model derived from the philosophy of science. This description is then extended to make apply to propositional attitude attributions. A number of problems about propositional attitude attributions can be solved or dissolved by treating propositional attitudes as models.

Since the creation of the Joint Committee on Powder Diffraction Standards (JCPDS) over sixty years ago, the Powder Diffraction File (PDF) has been the key source of standard powder diffraction data for identification and analysis of materials of all types, from natural minerals and high-tech ceramics to metals and alloys and pharmaceuticals. Although this editorially reviewed database has been the mainstay for diffraction pattern reference for the x-ray powder diffraction community, recent developments provide information and tools for electron diffraction. In recent years, the International Centre for Diffraction Data (ICDD, formerly JCPDS) has transformed the flat-file format of the PDF to a more flexible relational database (RDB) format. The PDF has been greatly expanded to include calculated patterns from multiple collaborating databases, including the Inorganic Crystal Structure Database (FIZ Karlsruhe, Germany), the Linus Pauling File (MPDS, Vitznau, Switzerland), and the Cambridge Structural Database (CCDC, Cambridge, United Kingdom). A significant portion of its entries include atomic coordinates and a specific database dedicated to organic phases exists. All new entries for the ICDD databases undergo over 100 quality checks before inclusion, and a quality mark is assigned for each entry that passes.

Tim Crane responds to the several recent attacks on religion made by Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, et al.

Philosophers of mind typically conduct their discussions in terms of mental events, mental processes, mental properties, mental states—but rarely in terms of minds themselves. Sometimes this neglect is explicity acknowledged. Donald Davidson, for example, writes that ‘there are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties, which is to say that certain psychological predicates are true of them. These properties are constantly changing, and such changes are mental events’. Hilary Putnam agrees, though for somewhat different reasons:

The view I have long defended is that the mind is not a thing, talk of our minds is talk of World-involving capabilities that we have and activities that we engage in. As Dewey succinctly put it, ‘Mind is primarily a verb. It denotes all the ways in which we deal consciously and expressly with the situation in which we find ourseleves. Unfortunately, an influential manner of thinking has changed modes of action into an underlying substance that performs the activities in question. It has treated mind as an independent entity which attends, purposes, cares and remembers’. But the traditional view, by treating mental states as states of the ‘underlying substance’, makes them properties of something ‘inside’, and, if one is a materialist philosopher, that means properties of our brains. So the next problem naturally seems to be: ‘Which neurological properties of our brains do these mental properties “reduce” to?’ For how could our brains have properties that aren't neurological? And this is how materialist philosphers saw the problem until the advent of such new alternatives in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of language as Functionalism and Semantic Externalism.

‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist.’ Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl's phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano's: that intentionality, the mind's ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano's originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which derives from scholastic discussions of concepts or intentiones. Rather, his originality consists in his claim that the concept of intentionality marks out the subject matter of psychology: the mental. His view was that intentionality ‘is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon manifests anything like it.’ This is Brentano's thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental.