In the criminal law, the law of attempts is of comparatively recent vintage. It is part of an important contemporary legal trend towards early intervention in the criminal process. There are now a substantial number of crimes on the books that, like the crime of attempt, only require that the perpetrator start down the road to carrying out his criminal intentions and do not require him actually to have harmed (or, in some cases, even identified) his victim. Besides the law of attempts, these new crimes include conspiracy and solicitation, forgery and counterfeiting, the possession offences (drugs, burglary tools, counterfeit money, automobile master keys, etc.), even corruption of youth (children). In all these cases, the law is stepping in to forestall harm, rather than waiting until a harm has already happened.

This article applies event-study methodology to explore the economic consequences of cartelisation in Imperial Germany. By combining qualitative and quantitative sources it discusses the risk and return effects of the establishment of the allegedly most powerful cartel, the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate (RWKS). Its findings cast doubts on the importance of the RWKS for the development of the German coal industry. The cartel did not affect the major part of a typical mine's risk-the firm-specific risk – and its moderate return effects were mostly confined to larger mines. Cartelisation did not seem to be an important pillar of ‘organised capitalism’.