This article focuses on a particular aspect of the operation of proprietary estoppel: it asks when a proprietary estoppel claim will give rise to a property right. The inquiry proceeds on the linked assumptions that proprietary estoppel is a means of acquiring rights and that rights thereby arising take effect immediately, without the need for any court order. Like any other means of acquiring rights, proprietary estoppel can give rise either to personal rights or to property rights: in some cases the estoppel claimant is acknowledged to have a personal right (e.g. to damages or a licence to use land); in others a property right (e.g. a lien; an easement; a lease; or a freehold). The central argument of this article is that proprietary estoppel should give rise to a property right only if that is necessary to protect the claimant’s reasonable reliance. Where a personal right gives sufficient protection that will have to do, whatever the claimant may have been promised or expected; this may well mean that the circumstances in which a property right arises are more narrow than has been thought.

Anti-Social behaviour sits at a strange juncture in the law. Maybe this is because of the many forms that it takes—noise nuisance, fouling public areas, aggressive and violent conduct. Some of this is simply non-neighbourly whereas some is quite clearly criminal. The legal responses to anti-social behaviour also take many forms, but the main focus—notwithstanding that anti-social behaviour affects the whole community—has been to see it as a problem to be tackled by local authorities wearing their “housing management” hat. Even the much trumpeted anti-social behaviour order (asbo), which looks in many respects like part of a criminal code, can be applied for by local authorities and other registered social landlords. This focus on the housing dimension may well have fed the notion that it is council tenants who cause anti-social behaviour, and council tenants alone who the local authority is responsible to, and for.

This article considers the approach taken to devices that are designed to avoid tenancy legislation, exploring the doctrines of sham, pretence, contracting out and the “artificial device doctrine” developed in tax cases. It is argued that the legal response takes two stages. The first judicial task is to determine which legal route is being followed, an enquiry which is designed to identify what the genuine relationship is between the parties and incorporating the doctrines of sham, pretence and labelling. Having determined the true nature of the legal relationship, the task of the court is then to apply the legislation to that relationship, which will include a consideration of whether any “contracting out” by the tenant is lawful. Having reviewed the legal response to devices, the article discusses the decision of the Court of Appeal in Bankway Properties v Pensfold-Dunsford.

The Director General of Fair Trading has recently won the first case seeking an injunction to restrain the continued use of unfair terms in consumer contracts. This represents only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the activity of the Unfair Contract Terms Unit established to enforce the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations. The sparsity of reported judicial decisions does not mean that the Regulations have been ineffective; far from it, numerous contracts across a variety of economic sectors have been amended following complaints made under the Regulations. It may still be early days in the battle against unfair contract terms but, as will be shown, the Regulations are proving to be a highly effective weapon in the consumer's armoury.

John owns a workshop which he wants to redevelop. Securing the necessary financing and obtaining planning permission will take a few months and in the meantime he is happy to let Mike use the workshop for E30 a week. They draw up a simple form of agreement whereby John lets the property to Mark at the agreed rent ‘until John is in a position to proceed with the redevelopment’. John and Mark are content with the arrangement: Mark has the security of knowing he can occupy the premises for several months; John is getting some income from the property.