“In all candor, I just don't think much about Europe except in connection with a cut in our troop strength there.” So a “Senate leader” confessed to the New York Times in September 1969. His admission comes as no surprise to the student of Congress's role in shaping America's European policy from 1969 to 1990. In those years congressional opinion on Europe was marked by division and uncertainty; the unity of purpose that led Congress to play a decisive role in extricating America from Vietnam was nowhere to be seen. Many legislators did agree that a substantial reduction of American forces in Europe would benefit the American economy, and perhaps the NATO alliance as well. Yet even when strong sentiment prevailed, as on this issue, Congress was not able to unite on a statement expressing the body's will, let alone on legislation to see that will carried out. Legislators tended, in addition, to give very little attention to specifically German issues, and then only in the broader context of Western Europe and NATO. This disinterest stemmed largely from Congress's inability, from the late 1960s on, to discern what precisely the issues that affected Germany were. After Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik relieved the atmosphere of crisis that had surrounded the German question, American legislators devoted less attention to Germany.

In studies of German-American relations, the role of the American Congress has received comparatively little attention. This comes as no surprise because even many legislators accepted the primacy of the executive in foreign policy until America's involvement in Vietnam provoked a reassertion of congressional prerogatives. A 1962 study of Congress's role in foreign policymaking concluded that legislative influence was “primarily (and increasingly) one of legitimating and amending policies initiated by the executive to deal with problems usually identified by the executive.” Or, in Robert Dahl's words, “the President proposes, the Congress disposes.”

Although America's policy toward Germany has tended to confirm Congress's deference to the White House, one cannot say that congressional leaders “shied away from foreign policy issues,” even if they did shy away from forcing policy changes. Legislators grappled with many of the most important issues in postwar German-American relations, and rarely could the president - or the government in Bonn - simply ignore congressional opinion. Understanding Congress's role is, therefore, vital to understanding the postwar German-American relationship.

As World War II drew to a close, Congress generally reflected the nation's attitudes toward Germany. Legislators were particularly interested in seeing that those responsible for war crimes be punished. Prior to Germany's collapse, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs considered resolutions defining American policy toward war criminals. Executive and legislature generally agreed on this important issue.