In Chapter 2, I draw from pragmatist philosophy and relational sociology to develop a new theory of normativity and institutional change. I propose the concept of a normative configuration as an alternative to the concept of a norm, defined as an arrangement of ongoing, interacting practices establishing action-specific regulation, value-orientation, and avenues of contestation. I argue that situated creativity, problem-solving, and the institutionalisation of action establish normativity within enduring social arrangements. This alternative conception helps clarify the origins of normativity in situations where existing IR theory is limiting, as I show through a review of scholarship on norms drawn both from the field of IR and from the social sciences and humanities more broadly. To develop this new concept, I draw heavily from the work of John Dewey, Hans Joas, and the insights of practice theorists.

In Chapter 4, I investigate the emergence and evolution of the USA’s targeted killing programme, focusing mainly on its origins within the CIA and its transformation from a limited, ad hoc method to a systematic and institutionalised form of militarised counterterrorism. I question whether it represents the erosion of international and domestic prohibitions on assassination and find that it does not; those prohibitions continue to exist and play a normative role in shaping how force is used, but they have changed in content – they refer to something different than before. Central to this process were legal arguments and bureaucratic politics designed to adjust the delegation of authorities across the agencies of the US security apparatus, facilitated by the development of armed unmanned aerial vehicles, which supplied an essential means, and by pressure from the Bush and Obama administrations.

In Chapter 5, I investigate the emergence, institutionalisation, and cessation of the US use of torture during interrogation, in the form of ‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’ developed for the CIA’s detention and interrogation programme. I question whether this represents the erosion of international and domestic prohibitions on torture and find that it does not; they too continue to exist, but temporarily transformed, before reverting back to their earlier form. This process occurred because the CIA developed a new ‘science’ of interrogation and placed it at the centre of new institutional capacities to detain and interrogate ‘high-value’ prisoners, which they justified on the basis of its scientific validity and efficacy. Their legal and scientific arguments revolved around distinguishing their activities from torture, which they never claimed was appropriate but also never admitted to using. As these justifications increasingly failed, the use of EITs stopped and was again prohibited.

In Chapter 6 I investigate the increasing use of Private Security and Military Contractors as armed guards, mainly in the war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, during the USA’s lengthy occupations there, but also elsewhere. I question whether this represents the erosion of international and domestic US prohibitions on mercenarism and find that it does not; as with the previous two cases, these prohibitions changed rather than disappeared. This process occurred as the US government incorporated armed contractors into its operational command and control structures, while the private firms themselves developed mechanisms of self-regulation through a code of conduct and a professional association. Communications technology played a major role in process at first, but then bureaucratic dynamics took precedence. The boundaries between public and private violence have shifted, but most recognisable forms of mercenarism remain prohibited.

In this Introduction to the book, I raise the question of the possible erosion of prohibitions on assassination, torture, and mercenarism. I discuss the limits of ‘norm death’ as an explanation and propose instead that a ‘normative transformation’ has occurred. I outline how pragmatism, practice theory, and relational sociology will inform my perspective, how I will critique and build on theories of norm change in IR, and how I will analyse the three cases: the USA’s targeted killing programme, the CIA’s detention and interrogation programme, and the USA’s extensive employment of armed contractors in war zones.

In this concluding chapter, I discuss my overall findings and their implications. I draw three paired comparisons. Contrasting the first two cases, I find technology was especially important in determining the robustness of normative transformation. Contrasting the first two and third cases, I find normative transformation can occur even without a dedicated set of elite actors acting as ‘entrepreneurs’. Contrasting my approach with that of others, I find a focus on situated creativity, situational rather than personal agency, and a pragmatist view of action clarifies dynamics that are confusing in conventional constructivist theories. I also discuss how my approach may support investigations into other kinds of normative transformations, such as those involving diaspora communities and global governance. I finish by discussing how my findings and my approach support the projects of critical war and security studies and can inform activists and NGOs seeking to limit aggressive or militarised counterterrorism.

In Chapter 3, I propose three causal mechanisms to explain the normative transformations I investigate: convention reorientation, technological revision, and network synthesis. These capture the causal role played by processes of discursive contestation, technical development, and bureaucratic politics. Crucially, I propose that these mechanisms interweave, in an arrangement of reciprocal reinforcement. I also propose a three-stage analytical process for analysing cases such as the ones in this book: de-reification, attributing agency, and tracing transactions. This process allows investigators to ‘break down’ supposed norms into their constitutive and unfolding relations, locate sources of transformative power, and trace how that power operated to

produce a change. I contextualise both the mechanisms and the analytical method with reference to relational sociology, practice theory, and scholarship on institutions.

Emanuel Adler’s theory of cognitive evolution lacks an explicit phenomenology. I provide one here, drawing upon the philosophy of John Dewey and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. A phenomenological elaboration of cognitive evolution theory speaks directly to a number of conversations in the field of IR: those on microfoundations, on ontological security, and on materiality. For all three, phenomenology connects the impetus and feedback effects of experience, as a driver and outcome of action, to the ways practices transform. For microfoundations, it provides the causal beginning and end of a period of change. For ontological security, it “institutionalises” sensation by explicating its role within social relations. For materiality, it fixes the mechanisms of cognitive evolution within their physical context – a field of bodies in motion and of intentional stances. I finally offer some remarks on the normative implications of a phenomenological addition to Adler’s existing approach, and suggest that it provides an important language for the evaluation of orders and a foundation for a cosmopolitan ethos in international politics. I conclude on a speculative note, considering what the phenomenology of cognitive evolution might explain about the recent epistemic fracturing of political discourse into a state of “post-truth.”