To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Based on a comprehensive empirical analysis of maritime disputes during the twentieth century, this Article argues that international courts cast a shadow that markedly changes bargaining by potential litigating states. In particular, the filing of optional declarations under Article 287 of UNCLOS increases states’ use of non-binding methods of dispute settlement, and the Article theorizes that this occurs because the declarations credibly threaten court involvement and provide more information about likely litigation outcomes. The Article's central finding is that states that file Article 287 declarations have fewer maritime claims, more peaceful negotiations, and less need for judicial dispute settlement.
Recent studies identified gendered citation gaps in political science journal articles, with male scholars being less likely to cite work by female scholars in comparison to their female peers. Although journal editors, editorial boards, and political scientists are becoming more aware of implicit biases and adopting strategies to remedy them, we know less about the proper baselines for citations in subfields and research areas of political science. Without information about how many women should be cited in a research field, it is difficult to know whether the distribution is biased. Using the gender distribution of membership in professional political science organizations and article authors in 38 political science journals, we provide scholars with suggested minimum baselines for gender representation in citations. We also show that women represent a larger share of organization members than the authors in sponsoring organizations’ journals.
Accumulated evidence identifies discernible gender gaps across many dimensions of professional academic careers including salaries, publication rates, journal placement, career progress, and academic service. Recent work in political science also reveals gender gaps in citations, with articles written by men citing work by other male scholars more often than work by female scholars. This study estimates the gender gap in citations across political science subfields and across methodological subfields within political science, sociology, and economics. The research design captures variance across research areas in terms of the underlying distribution of female scholars. We expect that subfields within political science and social science disciplines with more women will have smaller gender citation gaps, a reduction of the “Matthew effect” where men’s research is viewed as the most central and important in a field. However, gender citation gaps may persist if a “Matilda effect” occurs whereby women’s research is viewed as less important or their ideas are attributed to male scholars, even as a field becomes more diverse. Analysing all articles published from 2007–2016 in several journals, we find that female scholars are significantly more likely than mixed gender or male author teams to cite research by their female peers, but that these citation rates vary depending on the overall distribution of women in their field. More gender diverse subfields and disciplines produce smaller gender citation gaps, consistent with a reduction in the “Matthew effect”. However, we also observe undercitation of work by women, even in journals that publish mostly female authors. While improvements in gender diversity in academia increase the visibility and impact of scholarly work by women, implicit biases in citation practices in the social sciences persist.
Why do disputants favor some conflict management strategies when managing certain territorial claim types—land, river, or maritime—but not others? We propose that state interests—defined via claim characteristics and interdependence—and transaction costs (i.e., the challenges associated with aggregating state preferences over outcomes) differ across claim types. These differences then incentivize states to cede varying levels of control over claim management, ultimately encouraging them to prioritize and institutionalize certain conflict management strategies when managing particular types of territorial claims. More specifically, we theorize and find that states pursue distinct management strategies when addressing their land (informal; bilateral negotiations and arbitration), river (more formal; third-party non-binding), and maritime claims (most formal; multilateral negotiations and legal processes).
We evaluate hypotheses about human capital and structural theory-based predictors of variation in academic salaries. We use standard statistical models to explore differences in salary among full-time political science faculty, while also utilizing selection models to control for factors that place individuals on different trajectories stemming from their graduate school experience. We report on several findings, one of which is the positive effect on salary associated with graduation from a highly ranked PhD program; a second being the negative effect on salary of a high undergraduate teaching load. Other findings are that negotiation positively affects salary for men, but not for women, and that journal publications increase salaries amongst women, but not men. At the associate professor level, we find a significant gender gap in salary, even with controls for human capital, structural factors, and productivity. We also find a significant effect of race on the salaries of male faculty.
This article examines the dual problems of “women don't ask” and “women don't say no” in the academic profession. First, we consider whether female faculty bargain more or less frequently than male faculty about such resources as salary, research support, clerical support, moving expenses, and spousal accommodation. Analyzing a 2009 APSA survey, we find that women are more likely to ask for resources than men when considering most categories of bargaining issues. This finding goes against conventional wisdom in the literature on gender and bargaining that suggests that women are less likely to bargain than men. Second, we seek to understand if women are reluctant to say no when asked to provide service at the department, college, university, or disciplinary levels. We find that women are asked to provide more service and that they agree to serve more frequently than men. We also find that the service women provide is more typically “token” service, as women are less likely to be asked by their colleagues to serve as department chair, to chair committees, or to lead academic programs. The implications of these results for the leaky pipeline in the academic profession are discussed.
We report the results of hypotheses tests about the effects of several measures of research, teaching, and service on the likelihood of achieving the ranks of associate and full professor. In conducting these tests, we control for institutional and individual background characteristics. We focus our tests on the link between productivity and academic rank and explore whether this relationship reveals a gender dimension. The analyses are based on an APSA-sponsored survey of all faculty members in departments of political science (government, public affairs, and international relations) in the United States.
The proliferation of international courts and tribunals in the international system over the past century poses an interesting puzzle for exploration. Why has the number of international courts and the power that they wield increased despite the significant intrusion such courts can have on state sovereignty? The ICC, for example, requires mandatory jurisdiction for signatories to the Rome Statute and allows for an independent prosecutor to initiate proceedings regarding crimes against humanity when member states are unwilling or unable to do so. The ECJ is similar in that members of the EU are required to accept the court's jurisdiction. Even in situations where states can place reservations on their commitments to international courts, it is difficult to anticipate all future situations that might arise that could disadvantage states, as the United States realized in 1986 in light of the Nicaragua case before the ICJ.
The expansion of international adjudication is puzzling from a traditional realist perspective, where the existence of an anarchic system implies that courts might not work well globally because they are not backed by a coercive authority. One possible solution to this quandary is for a global or regional hegemon to step in and help create an international or regional court and then act as an enforcer for the court. For example, the Central American Court of Justice was arguably most effective when regional powers, such as the United States and Mexico, were willing to support the court's rulings (Allain 2000).
The ICC, created by the Rome Statute in 1998, constitutes a truly unique international adjudicative body. It exemplifies the process of global legalization, it points to the strong connection between domestic and international law, and it embodies a true compromise between two domestic legal traditions. During the Rome negotiations, state representatives pushed for rules and procedures that were familiar to them based on their domestic legal backgrounds, which resulted in the creation of a sui generis international court, an interesting hybrid between common law and civil law principles. This design process was not only rational from the perspective of the Court's supporters, it also had unintended consequences in that states considering whether to join the ICC at a later date would be influenced by the original design of the court.
In this chapter, we apply the theory articulated in Chapter 3, which contends that states' domestic legal traditions influence their preferences regarding the legal design of international courts. States involved in creating a new international adjudicative body seek to design a court with familiar legal rules and principles, anticipating that an initial commitment to the court will be durable and have long-term consequences. We argue that the ICC originators pushed for rules and procedures that mimicked those of their domestic legal systems to help reduce uncertainty regarding the Court's future decision-making processes.
International courts have proliferated in the international system, with over one hundred judicial or quasi-judicial bodies in existence today. This book develops a rational legal design theory of international adjudication in order to explain the variation in state support for international courts. Initial negotiators of new courts, 'originators', design international courts in ways that are politically and legally optimal. States joining existing international courts, 'joiners', look to the legal rules and procedures to assess the courts' ability to be capable, fair and unbiased. The authors demonstrate that the characteristics of civil law, common law and Islamic law influence states' acceptance of the jurisdiction of international courts, the durability of states' commitments to international courts, and the design of states' commitments to the courts. Furthermore, states strike cooperative agreements most effectively in the shadow of an international court that operates according to familiar legal principles and rules.
In this chapter, we lay the groundwork for our theoretical argument about the creation of new international courts and the expansion of state support for pre-existing courts by focusing on the characteristics of the three major domestic legal traditions in the world: civil law, common law, and Islamic law. We provide a brief historical account of the origins of these three legal families and we describe the major distinctions between them, including differences in the source of law, distinctions in the law of contracts, and variations in legal procedures (e.g. litigation). We then discuss how these features of domestic legal traditions influence foreign policy decision-making processes, especially as they impinge upon the creation of new international institutions and the signature and design of interstate commitments. We conclude by describing some of the convergences that have occurred over time between these legal families, especially between civil law and common law, and the significance of this temporal trend for our research.
Introduction to legal systems
Each state in the international system, as a political entity, possesses its own legal system, which is manifested at any point in history by a system of rules, norms, and principles. There are several definitions of the term “legal system.” Merryman (1985, 1) defines it as “an operating set of legal institutions, procedures, and rules.”
In his book How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory, Andrew T. Guzman writes:
The study of international law is undergoing a transformation from a discipline focused on practice and doctrine into one putting greater emphasis on theory and social science methodology. International law scholars are rapidly adopting more sophisticated analytical techniques and applying these tools to study how states use law to promote cooperation in our anarchic international system.
(Guzman 2008, 211)
The goal of this book is to contribute to both aspects of this transformation – theory and social science methodology. We develop a rational legal design theory of international adjudication, which attempts to explain an important part of cooperation in the international system: the creation and expansion of international courts. In particular, we ask why states create new international courts and why states join pre-existing international courts. We argue that an interesting intersection of domestic and international law occurs when international courts are formed. After accepting a basic premise that states can benefit from bargaining with the potential assistance of an adjudicator, we contend that not all adjudicators are created equal. Different courts are created to suit the interests of a particular group of states. States have incentives to create international courts in their own legal image to reduce uncertainty in future bargaining situations. Thus, the initial negotiators of new courts, who we call the “originators,” design institutions in ways that are optimal from both a political and legal standpoint.
International courts have proliferated significantly in the international system, growing from only a handful of courts a century ago, to over 100 judicial or quasi-judicial bodies today. Prominent international courts include the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the International Criminal Court (ICC), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding. International courts operate at the regional and global levels and cover a wide variety of issues such as territorial disputes, human rights, the law of the sea, trade, investments, and the use of military force.
While the number of international courts has increased significantly over time, there is considerable variation across courts. First, some international courts receive much stronger and broader state support than other courts. The Rome Statute, which recognizes the jurisdiction of the ICC, has currently been ratified by 111 countries, or over 55% of all states in the world. The World Trade Organization's adjudication mechanism receives a high level of international support as well, with 153 states (75%) belonging to the organization today. Other courts receive significantly less international support, such as the ICJ, where only one third of states in the world accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Alexandrov 1995).
Second, there is considerable variation in the design of international courts. Some courts, such as the ECJ, have a limited regional membership scope, while other courts, like the ICJ and the ICC, are more global and universal in their orientation.