In defining the tradition of Austria's German policy between 1815 and 1870, Helmut Rumpler wrote recently that it was both consistent and contradictory. On the one hand it was characterized by a struggle against the establishment of Prussian hegemony in Germany while, on the other, it sought co-operation with Berlin based upon the unspoken but clear assumption of a shared or dualistic supremacy within the German Confederation. Far from wanting to weaken Prussia or significantly to diminish the role Berlin would play in either German or European affairs, Vienna was painfully aware of the importance of a strong Prussia for the maintenance of Austria's position as a European power. The problem of Prussia for Austrian policy was therefore the need to find ways to reconcile the necessity of opposing Prussia's ambitions with the equally obvious need to secure her co-operation and support. The dilemma facing Vienna was one of devising policies consistent with the fact that Prussia was at the same time Austria's most dangerous rival and her most important ally.

In 1835 the Sardinian Minister in Vienna, Count Vittorio Amadeo Bertone di Sambuy, wrote that Count Karl Ferdinand von Buol-Schauenstein, then Austrian envoy to Baden, was a man of whom there had been “great expectations,” which somehow had never been realized. Sambuy spoke too soon, of course, since Buol subsequently occupied some of the most sensitive and prestigious posts in the Austrian service, including those at Turin, St. Petersburg, and London, and ended his long career serving as Austrian foreign minister from 1852 to 1859. But many historians, taking the lead from a few of his contemporaries, have continued to write that Buol did not live up to expectations of one who belonged to the Metternichian school of diplomacy. Austrian historians in particular have been hard on him, universally judging him as quite unfit for the office of foreign minister. Heinrich von Srbik, probably the most widely respected modern interpreter of the Metternich tradition, referred to Buol as a “weak copy of the original Schwarzenberg.” Srbik, Heinrich Friedjung, Richard Charmatz, and others blamed him for the decline of Austria's prestige in Europe after the death of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg and for the difficulties Austria faced in Germany, the Near East, and Italy during the course of his ministry. In their view, Metternich and Schwarzenberg had always secured for Austria the alliances necessary for her to maintain her power and influence in Europe. Buol, on the other hand, squandered the legacy of Austrian prestige and good relations with foreign powers left to him by Schwarzenberg through high-handedness and incompetence.”