The Republic of Peru enjoys a rich and storied history, and this is especially true when it comes to its external affairs. General José de San Martín in early August 1821, six days after he declared Peru independent, established the Ministry of State and Foreign Relations, appointing Juan García del Río as the first minister of foreign affairs of Peru. Following the decisive patriot victory at Ayacucho in 1824, Peruvian independence was finally secured, and the goals, capabilities, options, and constraints of Peruvian foreign policy began to clarify. In common with most of its neighbors, Peru from the outset focused on the accomplishment of a limited number of core objectives central to the well-being of any independent state, including political sovereignty, territorial integrity, continental solidarity, and economic independence.

With the exact location of its boundaries in dispute, Peru embraced the principle of uti possidetis de jure de 1810 which generally stated that each new state was entitled to the territory formerly under the jurisdiction of the colonial administrative unit from which it was formed. Territorial issues were often complicated by the commercial advantages at stake as the coastal states of South America quarreled over trade routes and seaports. Ideological differences intensified all of these conflicts as did concerns for regional hegemony. Peru shared with neighboring states a profound awareness of interlocking interests, and bilateral disputes frequently assumed multilateral dimensions as states shifted alliances in search of relative advantage. The conflicting demands of independence and interdependence, as determined by this mix of domestic and international forces, strongly influenced the content and expression of Peruvian foreign policy over much of the next 200 years (Wagner de Reyna 1964, 1: 9–14).

End of the Beginning

Under President Ramón Castilla (1845–51, 1855–62), Peru first acquired the degree of internal peace, centralized and efficient state organization, adequate and reliable public funding, and an emerging sense of national unity necessary for the formation of a foreign policy. During his two terms in office, Peru experienced for the first time a government that outlined a foreign policy at the outset of its term and then worked to achieve its stated objectives. Articulating a coherent, comprehensive foreign policy founded on the principles of continental solidarity, nonintervention, and national integrity, Peru under Castilla assumed a leadership role in continental affairs.

Taking a page from his predecessor, retired army officer Ollanta Humala Tasso reinvented himself during the 2011 presidential campaign. In 2006, he was a fiery populist, donning red shirts, boasting plans to establish state control over natural resources, criticizing US policies, and touting support from Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales. Five years later, Humala had become a moderate, pro-business social democrat who often wore a business suit. Moreover, Nadine Heredia Alarcón de Humala, the candidate's charming and photogenic wife, was never far from his side—or from the cameras. Brazilian political consultants were central to Humala's transformation from a radical politician into a socially moderate one, attractive to a broader political base and international markets (Aramayo and Pereira 2011; St John 2016, 153). Humala won the first round with 31.7 percent of the vote followed by Keiko Fujimori, daughter of former president Alberto Fujimori, who polled 23.6 percent. In the second round, Humala was elected with 51.54 percent of the vote (Lupu 2012).

Three factors helped to explain Humala's surprising victory. First, the collapse of political parties in Peru led to a fragmented political environment. Ten candidates ran for president in 2011 but only five were truly competitive. Three establishment candidates together won 44 percent of the vote, but none of them won enough votes to move to the second round, opening the door to anti-establishment candidates to advance. Second, despite the economic boom under García, public discontent and distrust of the political system was high due to a weak state and weak democratic institutions. Concerned about crime and corruption, the electorate voted for change. Third, Humala's moderate turn during the campaign, masterminded by Brazilian advisers, helped him win over middle class voters. Fujimori, on the other hand, was unable to distance herself from the authoritarian government of her imprisoned father (McClintock and Vallas 2011).

In most important areas, the foreign policy of the Humala administration closely resembled the foreign policies of the Toledo and García governments. In an interview, Foreign Minister Rafael Roncagliolo Orbegoso rightly emphasized that “the foreign policy of states is based on national interest” and “there exist permanent interests and those that reflect international circumstances.” At the same time, he argued there was an important qualitative difference in the foreign policy of the Humala administration, noting its emphasis on investment, regional infrastructure, and educational and cultural exchange.

In common with most of its neighbors, the foreign policy of Peru after independence in 1821 focused on core interests that can be summarized as political sovereignty, territorial integrity, continental solidarity, and economic independence. Over the next 200 years, Peruvian foreign policy expanded in scope and direction; nevertheless, these four tenets continued to encapsulate the nation's external policy. Consequently, the permanent interests of Peru remain a logical place to begin an assessment of Peruvian foreign policy in the modern era.

Political Sovereignty

In the early years of independence, Peru struggled to decide whether it would divide, federate with Bolivia, or stand alone. Like most newly independent states, Peru achieved statehood long before it achieved nationhood, and it sometimes struggled to retain the former as it strived to develop the latter. From the outset, the Peruvian Diplomat Service played a decisive role in the legal defense of the national inheritance often in vast, encyclopedic defenses of Peruvian territorial claims. Over time, Peru faced nine wars (two with Chile, two with Colombia, two with Ecuador, and three with Bolivia). After each one, Peruvian diplomats negotiated a peace mostly on terms favorable to Peru. Having achieved political sovereignty in the nineteenth century, there was little serious challenge to it, apart from a few territorial issues, in the twentieth century.

The issue of political sovereignty surfaced again during the Castillo administration. In late 2021, former Bolivian president Evo Morales announced his intention to hold a meeting in Cuzco of RUNASUR, an organization that entertained vague plans of constructing a plurinational nation from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. In response to efforts to organize the Cuzco gathering, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Peruvian congress condemned what it termed the political activism of Morales and called for President Castillo to declare Morales persona non grata. A few days later, three former foreign ministers and eight former vice foreign ministers issued a joint statement denouncing the proposed RUNASUR forum as a clear threat to the national sovereignty, independence, and security of Peru. The Cuzco forum was later postponed; nevertheless, the declared objectives of RUNASUR remained a latent threat to the political sovereignty of Peru. The RUNASUR issue surfaced again during the demonstrations that swept Peru in 2022–23.

Alejandro Toledo rose from humble beginnings in the north of Peru to earn an undergraduate degree at the University of San Francisco and graduate degrees at Stanford University. In the 2001 presidential race, most of the candidates, including Toledo, were centrist, pro-market, and emphatic about their democratic credentials. Stressing his indigenous roots and rise from poverty, Toledo occupied the center ground between former president Alan García Pérez, a center-left populist, and Lourdes Flores Nano, a center-right conservative. Toledo defeated García in the second round with 53.08 percent of the vote (St John 2010, 27–31, 37–38).

Unlike its predecessors, the Toledo administration articulated an interrelated set of foreign policy goals at the beginning of its term in office and then pursued them over the next five years. First, it continued the long-time Peruvian emphasis on expanded integration with subregional, regional, and international organizations. Second, it emphasized better relations with the industrialized states of the world as well as the major powers in the Asia–Pacific region. Third, it promoted democracy and human rights, often tying improvement in these areas to a fourth policy goal, the struggle against poverty. Fifth, it advocated reduced arms spending throughout the region, arguing the money would be better spent on education, health care, and poverty reduction. Sixth, it worked to improve diplomatic and commercial relations with neighboring states, encouraging economic development in the borderlands. Seventh and eighth, it called for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promote the domestic economy abroad and to improve services to the more than two million Peruvians living overseas. Finally, the Toledo administration encouraged ongoing reforms at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (García-Sayán Larrabure 2002, 18–27; Toledo Manrique, interview with author, 12 September 2008).

Subregional and Regional Integration

In his 2001 inaugural address, President Toledo promised a foreign policy that would connect Peru with the outside world, emphasizing the need to expand relations with subregional, regional, and international organizations. He called for CAN to be relaunched to accelerate regional integration, and he urged member states to adopt a multilateral approach to arms control, using the savings achieved to expand social welfare programs (Toledo Manrique 2001).

Alberto Fujimori, a little know university professor of Japanese descent, won the 1990 presidential election by a commanding majority. Following his election, Peruvian pundits referred to his campaign as a tsunami, a powerful metaphor highlighting the velocity and magnitude of his final electoral surge. With a straightforward campaign platform promising “Honesty, Technology and Work,” Fujimori promised an era of socioeconomic and political reform. Instead, he presided over a decade of increasingly authoritarian rule, marked by a level of graft and corruption unknown in Peru.

Fujimori's election led to enormous change in countless areas of socioeconomic and political life, including the end of the traditional party system in Peru. In the 1980 presidential election, four political parties, Acción Popular (AP), Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC), and Izquierda Unida (IU), won 97 percent of the vote, and in the 1986 municipal elections, they took over 90 percent. The traditional parties appeared to be vibrant and robust; however, a weak electoral tradition, an inexperienced electorate, and the disappointing performance of traditional parties in office undermined their appeal. As the established parties were discredited, voters increasingly sought options outside the existing political system. Fujimori's victory in the June 1990 runoff sanctioned this decline. During the campaign, Fujimori created a new model of electoral organization known as the disposable party. Described by some observers as independent movements, disposable parties were seldom more than electoral labels or candidate-centered vehicles. Over the next three decades, the decline in traditional political parties, combined with the rise of disposable parties, had a significant influence on both the domestic and the foreign policies of Peru (Tanaka 1998, 59–235).

The Five D’s

Given the deplorable state of the Peruvian economy, the first priority of the Fujimori government was to improve relations with the international financial community. Before his inauguration, President-elect Fujimori traveled to Japan and the United States, promising to implement an austerity program and resume service on the external debt. In response, an international consortium, including Japan, Spain, and the United States, made a preliminary commitment for bridge loans to cover the defaulted debt to the IMF and other multilateral lending agencies.

Throughout most of the 2016 presidential campaign, Keiko Fujimori was the front runner with Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski Godard, a wealthy investment banker with considerable international financial experience, occupying third or fourth place in most polls. Kuczynski was well known in Peruvian political circles, having served as an economic adviser and manager of the central bank during the first Belaúnde Terry administration and both finance minister and prime minister in the Toledo administration. Kuczynski's prospects improved in March when the candidates polling in second and fourth place were disqualified. Fujimori won the first round with 39.82 percent of the vote with Kuczynski in second place with 20.98 percent (Horler and Cazarez 2016). In the second round, Kuczynski benefitted from the endorsement of the leftist politician Verónika Mendoza, who placed third in the first round, and a strong anti-fujimorista animus among the electorate. Kuczynski won the second round by the narrow margin of 42,597 votes (Crabtree and Durand 2017, 186).

Rise and Fall of Kuczynski

On 28 July 2016, President Kuczynski appointed Víctor Ricardo Luna Mendoza, a career diplomat who had served as ambassador to the United States (1992–99) and Great Britain (2006–2010), as minister of foreign affairs. In a succinct overview of Peruvian foreign policy, Ambassador Luna highlighted the key components of the foreign policy of the Kuczynski administration. With neighboring Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador, he planned to continue binational cabinet meetings in conjunction with targeted programs for each country with the intent to encourage development in the borderlands. On the regional level, he prioritized the Pacific Alliance, noting blocs like ALBA, CAN, CELAC, and UNASUR often were competitive instead of complementary in their promotion of integration and development. Elsewhere, Luna recognized the need for institutional change at the United Nations, arguing the best way to effect change was for Peru to take a leadership role. As a former ambassador to the United States, he also recognized the importance of maintaining good relationships with the White House even as Peru continued to expand its ties with China and the European Union. Finally, Luna promised to better serve Peruvians abroad by continuing efforts to improve efficiency and reduce bureaucracy at Peruvian embassies and consulates (Luna Mendoza 2016).

Following a period of extended political instability, an unprecedented 18 candidates sought the presidency in April 2021. When the ballots were tabulated, José Pedro Castillo Terrones, a school teacher, union leader, and self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist, was the surprise winner in the first round with 18.99 percent of the vote, and Keiko Fujimori was in second place with 13.39 percent (El Comercio, 20 April 2021). Castillo won the second round with 50.13 percent of valid votes due to overwhelming support in the poorest areas of the country and in key mining regions, like Cotabambas, Espinar, and Chumbivilcas (El Comercio, 16 June 2021). Keiko Fujimori, who finished second for the third time, cried foul without evidence to back up claims of fraud, and once she exhausted every avenue to substantiate them, Castillo was declared the winner.

During the campaign, Castillo promised to rewrite the constitution, spend 10 percent of the GDP on education and health care, restructure the pension system and nationalize the energy industry (La República, 18 April 2021). His socialist platform alarmed international investors and the political class of Peru who feared his administration would end the free market economic model in place since the early years of the Fujimori government. Castillo responded to his critics by softening earlier proposals, promising a technocratic heavy cabinet and moderate economic policies. These changes temporarily calmed nervous investors and financial markets; nevertheless, his election was expected to lead to an extended period of political unrest. Of 130 congressional seats, Perú Libre, the party that nominated Castillo for the presidency, won only 37; consequently, Castillo was forced to govern without a congressional majority. Keiko Fujimori's Fuerza Popular party took 24 seats, presenting a small but determined opposition (Moncada 2021).

Democracy in Peru

The election of Pedro Castillo highlighted the many problems undermining democracy in Peru. Low levels of institutional legitimacy, a weak party system, an often corrupt unicameral legislature, and the repeat appearance of outsiders in the political arena have plagued Peru for three decades (Paz-Soldan 2022). The ongoing conflict between the executive and legislative branches of government was the most persistent problem as it made it difficult if not impossible for chief executives to enact the policies, they promised during their election campaigns (Shifter 2021).

Having left office in 1990 with the lowest approval rating in Peruvian history, former President Alan García Pérez, a brilliant orator and protégé of the legendary APRA leader, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, reinvented himself in the course of the 2006 presidential campaign. Billing himself as an elder statesman who had learned from past mistakes, he targeted his message at younger Peruvians with no memory of his disastrous first administration. During the campaign, García promised “responsible change,” embraced the neoliberal model and positioned himself as a defender of the status quo (St John 2006b; Crabtree and Durand 2017, 1, 125–26). In the first round of the 2006 election, García came in second behind Ollanta Humala Tasso, a populist retired army officer, but in the second round, García overtook Humala, winning the presidency with 52.8 percent of the vote (St John 2006c).

Peru experienced strong economic growth during the second García administration; nevertheless, government policies were slow to reduce poverty levels, leaving the majority of Peruvians increasingly unhappy (Economist, 12 May 2008). President García also failed to address pressing social issues, like indigenous rights, corruption, drug trafficking, and human rights, and his attempts to open the Amazon rainforest to exploitation and development led to spirited indigenous protests. In the highlands, indigenous elements protested living and working conditions at multiple large mining sites, including La Oroya, considered one of the 10 most polluted places in the world. Additional sources of discontent included coca farmers opposed to coca eradication efforts, informal miners rejecting efforts to integrate them into the formal economy, and splinter groups of the Sendero Luminoso guerrilla–terrorist movement active in remote regions of the country (La República, 4 June 2011). Constrained by limited popularity and the absence of a legislative majority, the García administration appeared largely content with strong macroeconomic figures, ignoring the paradox between economic growth rates among the highest in the region and dysfunctional governance. President García focused on his coastal base mostly ignoring the interior and failing to bridge deep socioeconomic divides in a country marked by severe inequality and widespread social discontent (St John 2006d).

Blending Old and New

In his 28 July 2006 inaugural address, President García stressed domestic issues.

Introduction

Over the centuries, Berbers, Vandals, Phoenicians,Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Ottomans and Italiansoccupied Libya in a long history of authoritarianrule. Following independence in 1951, the monarchy(1951–69) and the Qaddafi regime (1969–2011)continued this tradition of author-itarianism. Afterthe February 17 Revolution ousted the Qaddafiregime, most of the newly created political bodiesexhibited authoritarian tendencies; however, none ofthem established legitimacy or a national presencein a fractured state. Instead, overlapping circlesof local and regional power and influence, includinglocal councils, ethnic groups, militias, tribes anda potpourri of religious movements, flourished,using traditional and non-traditional authoritarianmeasures to maintain control in their spheres ofinfluence. This chapter focuses on these circles ofinfluence, together with the ways in which they goabout exerting authoritarian control. In so doing,it highlights new political, technological, militaryand policing means of repression where found,including the extent to which outside powers haveimported both the latest military tactics andequipment and the latest forms of social mediasurveillance.

The February 17 Revolution

On 17 February 2011, a heavy-handed government responseto peaceful demonstrations in Benghazi led to callsthroughout the country for regime change. Five weekslater, Mustafa Muhammad Abd al-Jalil, a formerminister of justice under Qaddafi, announced theformation of the National Transitional Council(NTC). The NTC billed itself as the actinggovernment of Libya; however, this was something ofan illusion. During the civil war, real power restedwith the local councils and militias formed to oustthe Qaddafi regime (Wehrey 2018: 59–60, 174–5).

The end of the Qaddafi regime was followed bynationwide polls in July 2012 to elect a 200-memberGeneral National Congress (GNC). The Justice andConstruction Party (JCP), the political arm of theMuslim Brotherhood, and the National Forces Alliance(NFA), described in the Western media as a ‘liberal’political party, were the major political movementscontesting the elections. The polls were doublyremarkable in that they took place only nine monthsafter the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime, and theelectorate strongly supported moderate parties,reversing a regional trend in support of Islamistgroups. Of the eighty seats allocated to politicalparties, the NFA won thirty-nine and the JCP onlyseventeen (St John 2017: 303–4).