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3 results

Intentional change, intrinsic motivations, and goal generation
Riccardo Manzotti, Paolo Moderato
Journal:

Behavioral and Brain Sciences / Volume 37 / Issue 4 / August 2014

Published online by Cambridge University Press:

27 August 2014, pp. 431-432
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Wilson et al. draw our attention to the problem of a science of intentional change. We stress the connection between their approach and existing paradigms for learning and goal generation that have been developed in machine learning, artificial intelligence, and psychology. These paradigms outline the structural principles of a domain-general and teleologically open agent.

What does “isomorphism between conscious representations and the structure of the world” mean?
Riccardo Manzotti, Giulio Sandini
Journal:

Behavioral and Brain Sciences / Volume 25 / Issue 3 / June 2002

Published online by Cambridge University Press:

11 June 2003, pp. 346-347
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Perruchet & Vinter's provocative article challenges a series of interesting issues, yet the concept of isomorphism is troublesome for a series of reasons: (1) isomorphism entails some sort of dualism; (2) isomorphism does not entail that a piece of the world is a representation; and (3) it is extremely difficult to provide an explanation about the nature of the relation of isomorphism.

Does functionalism really deal with the phenomenal side of experience?
Riccardo Manzotti, Giulio Sandini
Journal:

Behavioral and Brain Sciences / Volume 24 / Issue 5 / October 2001

Published online by Cambridge University Press:

18 November 2002, pp. 993-994
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Sensory motor contingencies belong to a functionalistic framework. Functionalism does not explain why and how objective functional relations produce phenomenal experience. O'Regan & Noë (O&N) as well as other functionalists do not propose a new ontology that could support the first person subjective phenomenal side of experience.

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3 results

Intentional change, intrinsic motivations, and goal generation

What does “isomorphism between conscious representations and the structure of the world” mean?

Does functionalism really deal with the phenomenal side of experience?