The first territory to be returned to Japan by the United States since the 1945 surrender is a group of the Ryukyu Islands. This fact focuses attention on this strategically important archipelago extending from southernmost Japan to Formosa, although the Ryukyus have been at least on the periphery of Western attention for two centuries. The chief compulsions for American popular interest in the islands have been the Battle of Okinawa of World War II and, more recently, the best selling novel and Broadway hit, The Teahouse of the August Moon.

This transitory and popular interest will undoubtedly give way to wider international attention in the next few years as the Japanese become more articulate in their criticism of the questionable grounds on which these islands were stripped from Japan Proper at the end of the war. Of further significance to political science is the fact that Okinawa, major island of the group, is (excepting only the Bonins) the last area of the world to remain under complete American military government control. The character of this nearly ten-year rule by the United States and its impact on a million people who have continually demanded “reversion” to Japan must inevitably be the subject of study of those interested in the confluence of cultures under conditions of sustained military government.

In a political tradition conditioned to stress personal aspects of government administration rather than rule of law, the scope and the nature of executive power assume great significance. Government under men rather than government under law presumes intentional absence of clearly defined areas of administrative discretion and equally intentional haziness surrounding controllability of administrative officials by the citizenry.

Literature which has accumulated during three years since the surrender of Japan has not yet encompassed a consideration of the administrative process of military government at the local level. That the function of local military government units as the field service of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) has been overlooked is to be explained principally by the dramatic character and impressive scope of the functions of MacArthur's headquarters and the resulting eclipse of local activities necessarily of a more prosaic nature. Moreover, in neglecting the local levels of administration, analysts have reflected a prevalent American conception of central-field relationships, a conception which implies that the importance of administrative activity diminishes as it descends from level to level.

The presence of nearly two thousand military government personnel in the 46 prefectures makes evident the inadequacy of a critique of the occupation based solely on the functions of SCAP. It is this group of field service administrators who, living close to the citizenry, have daily contact with native government officials and are in an unparalleled position to impress the Japanese with the quality of American administration. The close relationship which inheres at this level subjects American administration to careful scrutiny and will be of no little importance in judging the final success of the occupation. Poor official performance or disreputable personal conduct is not as easily concealed by small detachments in the field as by large headquarters in metropolitan areas. Neither the headquarters personnel living in large Americanized compounds and working in modern office buildings nor tactical forces isolated in cantonment areas have the same intimate responsibility and contact with Japanese officialdom.