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The independence of outside directors is critical to corporate board effectiveness. We examine a unique period in corporate governance when outside directors' defined benefit pensions are replaced with increases in equity. Firms with pension plans significantly underperform their industry in terms of stock returns. Firms terminating the pension plans in exchange for equity have significant increases in stock returns relative to their industry subsequent to the change. All samples outperform the ROA and ROE industry medians both before and after the change in compensation, indicating pressure from organized investors likely comes from stock performance, not accounting performance. Investor rights pressure and outside director compensation and not takeover risk or institutional ownership best explain firms altering outside director compensation, with board of director effectiveness improving.
Insider ownership and antitakeover provisions both affect a firm's vulnerability to takeover, its value, and its managers' incentives and utility. We examine the simultaneous determination of insider ownership and takeover protection using data from mutual savings and loan associations converting to stock form. At low levels of insider ownership, we find that ownership is negatively related to the number of extraordinary antitakeover provisions; at higher levels, ownership is not related to the number of antitakeover provisions. These results are consistent with insider entrenchment.
The results of photometric and spectroscopic observations of dwarf novae are presented. The data were obtained during an international program of multiwavelength observations, held in 1986 February at several observatories, of dwarf novae during the first and subsequent days of outburst. During the campaign numerous dwarf novae were monitored in order to catch them in outburst. Preliminary results and analysis of some objects are reported elsewhere. A total of 30 dwarf novae were observed in the northern and southern hemispheres. Among them 37% were caught in outburst, including 10% on the rise to outburst and 17% in decline. Photometric observations were carried out in the UBVRI system and colour indexes were calculated.
Of the many conglomerate studies to date, some have dealt with the risk-return performance of conglomerates in the context of the capital asset pricing model [2,7,10,14], others have considered the motives for the formation of conglomerates [4,5,6,13], and still others have examined the operating characteristics of conglomerates [9,12,15]. Within the last group, Weston and Mansinghka [15, p. 928] argued that the primary motivation for conglomerate formation is defensive diversification, “…defined as diversification to avoid adverse effects on profitability from developments taking place in the firm's traditional product market areas.” Another motivation is provided by Levy and Sarnat  and Lewellen  who demonstrated that the only economic gain from a purely conglomerate merger may be the increased debt capacity resulting from the combination of entities having imperfectly correlated earnings streams.
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