Epidemiological studies have found coffee consumption is associated with a lower risk for type 2 diabetes mellitus, but the underlying mechanisms remain unclear. Thus, the aim of this randomised, cross-over single-blind study was to investigate the effects of regular coffee, regular coffee with sugar and decaffeinated coffee consumption on glucose metabolism and incretin hormones. Seventeen healthy men participated in five trials each, during which they consumed coffee (decaffeinated, regular (containing caffeine) or regular with sugar) or water (with or without sugar). After 1 h of each intervention, they received an oral glucose tolerance test with one intravenous dose of [1-13C]glucose. The Oral Dose Intravenous Label Experiment was applied and glucose and insulin levels were interpreted using a stable isotope two-compartment minimal model. A mixed-model procedure (PROC MIXED), with subject as random effect and time as repeated measure, was used to compare the effects of the beverages on glucose metabolism and incretin parameters (glucose-dependent insulinotropic peptide (GIP)) and glucagon-like peptide-1 (GLP-1)). Insulin sensitivity was higher with decaffeinated coffee than with water (P<0·05). Regular coffee with sugar did not significantly affect glucose, insulin, C-peptide and incretin hormones, compared with water with sugar. Glucose, insulin, C-peptide, GLP-1 and GIP levels were not statistically different after regular and decaffeinated coffee compared with water. Our findings demonstrated that the consumption of decaffeinated coffee improves insulin sensitivity without changing incretin hormones levels. There was no short-term adverse effect on glucose homoeostasis, after an oral glucose challenge, attributable to the consumption of regular coffee with sugar.

The problem of landing an aeroplane under conditions of low visibility has been a subject for speculation for the last twenty years, but it is only within the last ten years that it has been given any serious practical attention. This practical attention has been forced by the necessity for aircraft to maintain schedule regardless of weather conditions in competition with other forms of transport.

Although certain schemes involving radio were amongst the earliest proposals for a solution of the problem, the first practical work appears to have been concerned with methods of a more mechanical or optical nature, including a proposal to deposit the fog by high tension discharge.

Chapters 12 and 13 of the De Interpretations present some puzzles, which it is my purpose to try to solve. The latest commentator, Professor Jaakke Hintikka, attempts in Acta Philosophica Fennica xiv (1962), 5–22, to abolish the difficulties by taking certain verbs in an unusual way. He suggests that in these chapters , which is usually taken to denote logical consequence, sometimes expresses simply compatibility (21b35–22a1, 22b11–14, 22b17–22), sometimes equivalence (22a14 and 33, 22b22ff., 23a18ff.), and that at 22a38ff., 22b3O, and 23a17 , which again is usually taken to denote consequence, in fact expresses compatibility. I propose to counter Hintikka's arguments and to maintain that both verbs express consequence; but as my main purpose is to give my own explanation of the general trend of Aristotle's remarks, I shall take the passages discussed by Hintikka in the order in which they occur in Aristotle's text.

The first question here is the interpretation of line 638. Burges wrote: ‘Constructio sic solvenda est: M. Parmentier in the Budé edition translates, ‘On ne souffre pas quand on n'a nul sentiment de ses maux’, likewise assuming that is doing double work. For this he compares Andromache 706 f., Electra, 383, and Orestes 393. None of these passages is in fact an example of how a negative can negative simultaneously a finite verb and a participle. But in any case, what is the subject of Burges supposed that a line was lost ; Parmentier does not explain his ‘On’.

In the Theaetetus, after identifying Theaetetus' conjecture that knowledge is perception with Protagoras' theory that man is the measure of all things, Socrates associates this view with what he suggests may have been a ‘secret doctrine’ of Protagoras. What we say ‘is’ really is only in process of becoming: nothing is really of any definite sort. What is called white colour simply arises between the eye and the ‘motion’ which it encounters and is something peculiar to each several percipient. At this point (154b) Socrates goes on to say that ‘the thing which measures itself against the object or touches it’, like ‘the thing that we measure ourselves against’, is constantly undergoing change, for otherwise ‘when a different thing came into contact with it or were somehow modified, it, on its side, if it were not affected in itself, would not become different’. He continues, ‘For as things are we are too easily led into making statements which Protagoras and anyone who maintains the same position would call strange and absurd’, and he instances the case of six dice, which are said to be more when compared with four and fewer when compared with twelve, and himself, who is now taller than Theaetetus, but within a year will be shorter, without having lost in height (because Theaetetus is growing).

In C.Q. N.S. vii (1957), 164 ff. Professor Demos raises the question in what sense, if at all, the state which Plato describes in the Republic can be regarded as ideal, if the warrior-class and the masses are ‘deprived of reason’ and therefore imperfect. The ideal state, he thinks, appears at first sight to be composed of un-ideal individuals. But ‘the problem is resolved by separating the personal from the political-technical areas of control. In so far as they are citizens, men in the ideal city will indeed represent one part of the soul and one function.…

Various attempts have been made to find a satisfactory alternative to Cornford's explanation of what the Sophist has to say about false statement, and in particular to his interpretation of the passage in which the statements ‘Theaetetus is sitting’ and ‘Theaetetus is flying’ are discussed. The difficulty with Cornford's view is that he wants to find the explanation of truth and falsity entirely in the ‘blending’ or incompatibility of Forms, but that in the examples Socrates chooses, while Sitting and Flying may be Forms, Theaetetus cannot be. Hence Cornford has to say, ‘It is not meant that Forms are the only elements in all discourse. We can also make statements about individual things. But it is true that every such statement must contain at least one Form’. Unfortunately, when talking about the ϵἴδων συμπλοκή at 259e, the Stranger seems clearly to envisage a blendin g of ϵἴδη with each other:. How can this be reconciled with an ‘example’ in which only one term stands for a Form?

I do not propose to discuss in detail the various solutions that have been offered, but to set forth my own interpretation of the whole passage. This may be regarded as to some extent a ‘blending’ of what has been said by Professor Hackforth and Mr. Hamlyn, but a number of points arise which deserve further discussion, and it may perhaps be hoped that such a σύνθϵσις as this may prove to be .

In a recent article in the Philosophical Review (lxiii [1954], 319 ff.) Professor Gregory Vlastos has given an acute analysis of the ‘Third Man’ Argument as it appears in the Parmenides for which all Platonic scholars will be grateful. In view of the importance of the article and the interest that it has aroused, I should like to offer one or two criticisms of his conclusions.