This fragment’s argument rejects positivism, the leading theoretical framework informing comparative law, and introduces culturalism with a view to enhancing comparatism’s interpretive yield.

This fragment’s argument is that the designation ‘comparative law’, while epistemologically impoverished, must ultimately be retained for pragmatic reasons. Yet, it must be invested with an alternative meaning.

This fragment addresses the epistemic equipment that a comparatist must carry in his tool-box as he embarks upon his foreign-law investigations.

This fragment’s argument refutes leading theoretical assumptions informing comparative law to the effect that comparatism can be objective and access truth, on one hand, and that it must be objective and access truth, on the other. Through a biographical sketch, this argument shows that there cannot be a comparison that is not informed by the comparatist’s predispositions and predilections, themselves having much to do with the cultural world that the comparatist embodies.

‘A text … is at the same time the condensation of a history scarcely delimitable. But this condensation of history … remains … indissociable from an event absolutely singular, a signature absolutely singular, and therefore also of a date, of a language, of an inscription autobiographical.’1 What ascertainable circumstances, then, does this exercise in amplification herald, this supplement in the sense in which Derrida understands the term, that is, a text come from within NCL even as it is written after completion of NCL and grafted on to NCL in extremis?2

This fragment’s argument is to challenge one of comparative law’s most influential assumptions to the effect that there are commonalities across laws (which must ultimately favour unification). The result of flawed reasoning, this postulate is unwarranted. Rather, the comparison of laws must address difference across laws for this is all there is.

This fragment’s argument advocates for the epistemological significance of fieldwork in comparative law.

This fragment’s argument draws on a range of intellectual sources in order to make the case for the value of oppositional or negative thought, the thought that says ‘no’ to orthodox ideas.

This fragment assembles a list of the resources (including inspirational models) that I mobilized in the construction of a radically alternative theoretical model to inform the practice of comparative law.

This fragment’s argument is that comparative law is in thrall to a colonial mindset and must in short order emancipate itself from this epistemic predicament.

This fragment’s argument advocates for comparative law’s indiscipline vis-à-vis legal positivism and claims that insights from other disciplines are crucial to the production of an enhanced interpretive yield in any foreign-law investigation.

This fragment’s argument proceeds to a detailed critique of the theoretical postulates informing comparative law’s orthodox model.

This fragment’s argument is that comparative law covers a semantic zone embracing transnational law and international law. Pursuant to given circumstances, it also extends to studies devoted to one foreign law only.

This fragment’s argument shows the culturalist advantage at work. Over against the positivist model, it illustrates how the comparatist’s understanding of law as law-as-culture generates an enhanced interpretive yield vis-à-vis foreign law.

This fragment applies negative thought to the French statute prohibiting ostensible religious attire at school and shows the radically alternative comparative law model that I defend at work.