A conceptual foundation for a process approach in psychology is provided, including the characteristics of a ‘process’ and a process ontology (or metaphysics) and its philosophical roots. We describe how this approach contrasts substantialism and a substance ontology. Here, we introduce what our envisioned process-approach implies for realism, where we discuss the stance that the construal of reality is constructed. With this, we position ourselves as critical realists.

We reflect on the relative ‘success’ versus ‘failure’ of psychology as a research field, and we challenge the widelybheld notion that we are in a reproducibility (or replication) crisis. At the centre of our discussion is the question: does psychology have a future, qua science, if the phenomena it studies are changing all the time and contingent on fleeting contexts or historical conditions? This chapter describes how there is only a reproducibility crisis if we adopt assumptions and expectations that enact a substance ontology. In contrast, we describe how variability is to be expected if we adopt a process ontology. We argue that the way out of the current ‘crisis’ is therefore not necessarily more methodological and experimental rigour, but a fundamental shift in what we should expect from psychological phenomena. We call for a prioritization of understanding the ways in which phenomena are socially situated and context-contingent, rather than an unrealistic need to replicate.

With this chapter, we sketch a picture of a future process-oriented praxis. We describe what is required to instigate a theoretical shift toward a process commitment, and what that shift might look like for the psychological praxis. To flesh this out, we conceptualize psychological science as a complex dynamic system whose behaviour is currently dominated by a substance-oriented attractor state. We describe the dynamic mechanisms that serve to integrate the layers of practices into a living, breathing praxis. And we describe how the current praxis might be perturbed, such that a new process-oriented praxis might emerge.

This chapter demonstrates how concrete practices align and form a praxis, using the field of self-esteem research as a case study – as one of the most popular concepts in both academic and pseudo psychology. The mainstream praxis of self-esteem research is dissected in the context of enacting a substance ontology. Here Aristotle’s distinction between particulars (i.e., primary substances) and universals (i.e., secondary substances) is applied as a way of making sense of various dominant practices in self-esteem research. The tendency to reify self-esteem is discussed, including how this relates to objectivist measurement-standards of self-esteem, an emphasis on predicting ‘levels’ of self-esteem, and a societal need and felt-responsibility to ‘boost’ self-esteem. I discuss how the mainstream praxis of self-esteem research demonstrates an attempt to position our field (and individual scientist identities) as ‘scientific’, thus revealing a (inaccurate) natural-science envy.

The small and somewhat fringe praxis of processual self-esteem research is described with respect to its enactment of a process ontology. The chapter shows that a process approach has resulted in a focus on ‘how’ questions in self-esteem research (rather than on predictive validity, for example) and a more pluralistic approach to the operationalization of self-esteem. What the various processual-studies reviewed have in common is a conceptual and methodological approach to self-esteem as a situated and action-based process, rather than a thing that individuals have to different degrees. Here, the central role of situational affordances is highlighted. This processual praxis often relies explicitly on complex dynamic systems principles, such as self-organization, emergence, variability, and attractor landscapes. With processes and actions as its focus, this praxis constructs self-esteem knowledge that emphasizes one’s agency in the world and the centrality of our actual context-bound actions and experiences as we move through it. This chapter ends with a discussion of how a process approach is beneficial for the lived reality of self-esteem, where individuals are encouraged to embrace and reflect on their situated and fluctuating experiences of self, rather than a pursuit of ‘high’ self-esteem.

This chapter discusses the practice of measurement in psychological research. Here, where we cast doubt on the basic assumptions and endeavours underlying the act of measuring in mainstream psychology. Next, we introduce the processual alternative, which stresses the study of activity as situated and coupled with an environment. This chapter explains how a process approach to ‘measurement’ is thus fundamentally different from the standard one, and can remedy existing issues related to non-ergodicity and the ecological fallacy. These ideas are illustrated by means of the concept of intelligence, which is undoubtedly one of psychology’s show-pieces of measurement.

Science communication is an important practice in psychological research. With this chapter, we examine this practice in mainstream psychological research. We look at the ways that our words, definitions, and descriptions (of experimental studies) create a world of categories, called ‘natural kinds’. We describe how these natural kinds are constructed by our communication practices and subsequently serve as targets for social action, which then further construct the meaning of the natural kinds.

With this chapter, we deal with the problem of research ‘uncertainty’: how it is defined and dealt with in the standard praxis of psychological research. It stresses that the idea of measurement ‘error’ (in the sense of variability) is predominantly valid under a substance ontology. The processual alternative is described, stemming from a complex dynamic systems framework, which embraces variability, a fuzziness of category boundaries, and multiplicity. As the notion of uncertainty is also inextricably linked with the fundamental concept of probability, we present a processual framework for understanding probability.

This chapter examines psychology’s deeply rooted practice of explaining psychological phenomena based on the model of manipulation or intervention causality. We reveal and unpack the assumption of isolable factors that bring about a specific effect, and of unidirectional pathways from cause to effect. The chapter then dives into specific forms of causal explanation, including psychology’s tendency to explain the relationship between separate universals.

An overview of the foundational aspects of complex dynamic systems is provided. This chapter serves as a reference for applications of complex dynamic systems concepts and methods to concrete topics. This chapter argues that complex dynamic systems is an ideal candidate for realizing a process approach in psychology, without it necessarily being a monolithic framework.

A conceptual foundation for a process approach in psychology is provided, including the characteristics of a ‘process’ and a process ontology (or metaphysics) and its philosophical roots. We describe how this approach contrasts substantialism and a substance ontology. Here, we introduce what our envisioned process-approach implies for realism, where we discuss the stance that the construal of reality is constructed. With this, we position ourselves as critical realists.

With this chapter, we contrast the mainstream explanatory practices with forms of causality that are processual: complex causality. Complex dynamic systems are used as a framework, incorporating principles such as emergence, self-organization, circular causality, and perturbations. With this alternative, processes themselves are seen as causes, making causality a moving and dynamic phenomenon. We conclude with descriptions of various concrete causal models that can be used to help researchers understand causality via processes.

We discuss the broad organizational power-structures that regulate the virtues of doing science, the values upheld, and the introduction of novices into the scientific community. Aristotle’s scheme of knowledge is used to introduce the relevance of a value-laden praxis, of phronesis, which is the virtue of ‘doing’. We discuss these ideological issues in the context of classic philosophical notions put forth by Hannah Arendt (and her work on action) and Bruno Latour (and his work on praxis, actor networks, and inscription devices). This chapter thus serves as a broad foundation for analyses of the ways in which scientific virtues are deeply intertwined with the activities of psychological science. It sketches psychology as action-based and virtue-laden, based on the notion of a dynamic praxis consisting of interacting agents.