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Learn to assess electromigration reliability and design more resilient chips in this comprehensive and practical resource. Beginning with fundamental physics and building to advanced methodologies, this book enables the reader to develop highly reliable on-chip wiring stacks and power grids. Through a detailed review on the role of microstructure, interfaces and processing on electromigration reliability, as well as characterisation, testing and analysis, the book follows the development of on-chip interconnects from microscale to nanoscale. Practical modeling methodologies for statistical analysis, from simple 1D approximation to complex 3D description, can be used for step-by-step development of reliable on-chip wiring stacks and industrial-grade power/ground grids. This is an ideal resource for materials scientists and reliability and chip design engineers.
In this chapter, we analyze various forms of network effects. As a network effect is an external effect, it is important to identify the economic agent who generates it (the “originator”) and the one who is affected (the “receiver”). If originator and receiver are seen to belong to a common group of agents, one talks of a “within- group” network effect; otherwise, if they are seen to belong to different groups, one talks of a “cross-group” network effect. In both cases, it is also crucial to determine whether network effects are positive or negative. Crossing the two dimensions (within- vs. cross-group and positive vs. negative), we obtain a number of typical situations, which we describe in Sections 1.1 and 1.2. We then confront these typical situations to the reality and, on this basis, we propose a definition of platforms and ways to categorize them in Section 1.3.
In this chapter, we seek to understand key economic consequences of network effects. First, in Section 3.1, we analyze the impacts that network effects have on the demand for participation on a platform. The main lesson we draw is that the interdependence between individual demands leads to unconventional aggregate demands; in particular, we show that a given price for accessing the platform may be compatible with several levels of participation. Next, in Section 3.2, we explore the pricing of access to a platform, which is made complex by the presence of network effects. Finally, in Section 3.3, we discuss other strategic decisions that platforms need to combine with pricing to manage network effects; in particular, a platform has to decide the extent to which its services are compatible with alternative services.
In this epilogue, we give a preview of the topics that we will develop in our next book on platform competition and platform regulation; we also summarize what this book has already taught us about these topics.
In this chapter, we take a closer look at how the strategies of a profit-maximizing two-sided platform affect user participation and usage in a buyer-seller context. First, in Section 6.1, we introduce competition between sellers on the platform and analyze how this affects platform pricing and design; we also assess the impacts of the platform’s decisions on product variety. Next, in Section 6.2, we examine two specific design decisions that affect cross-group network effects: First, we revisit the issue of product variety, which a platform can also manage through its design of rating, reviews, and recommender systems; second, we examine the extent to which an intermediary wants to increase price transparency on the platform. Finally, in Section 6.3, we turn to design decisions that a platform can use to govern the sellers’ pricing strategies; the question here is whether platforms can increase their profit by letting sellers choose from a richer set of pricing strategies – for instance, by providing sellers with buyers’ personal data so as to facilitate differential pricing.
In this chapter, we consider the strategies that platforms can use first to launch their operations and, later, to expand them. In Section 4.1, we explore the economic trade-offs for a firm of choosing a (two- sided) platform model rather than alternative modes of organization. For firms adopting the two-sided platform model, we then expose the difficulties that they will inevitably face when trying to bring two groups of agents together: we formalize, in Section 4.2, what is known as the “chicken-and- egg problem” and show how an adequate choice of strategies may solve it. In Section 4.3, we discuss the strategies that platforms can implement to increase the level of trust among users, thereby securing their participation and, possibly, intensifying the network effects. Finally, in Section 4.4, we examine why and how a platform may decide to expand the range of services that it offers.
In this chapter, we analyze the economics behind the use of big data and, in particular, ratings, reviews, and recommendations that have become mainstream on digital platforms. We start in Section 2.1 by analyzing rating and review systems. These systems provide platform users with information about either products or their counterparties to a transaction. Of crucial importance is, of course, the informativeness of these systems, which depends on the users’ actions. We then turn, in Section 2.2, to recommender systems, which aim to reduce users’ search cost by pointing them towards transactions that may better match their tastes. Besides the ability of such systems to generate network effects, we also discuss their effects on the distribution of sales between “mass-market” and “niche” products. Finally, in Section 2.3, we complement the analysis of ratings and recommender systems by uncovering additional channels through which big data may generate network effects and other self-reinforcing processes on platform.
In this introductory chapter, we present the motivation behind the book and the approach that we follow. We also outline the contents of the six chapters, give a brief history of platforms, and provide a preliminary discussion of the concepts of network effects and economies of scale.
In this chapter, we examine how a platform, which has passed the launch phase, prices its services. In Section 5.1, we provide a general introduction to platform pricing by describing the different types of prices that a platform might choose, by going through a simple numerical example, and by discussing why the platform’s decisions may diverge from what would be optimal from a social point of view. We then address, in Section 5.2, the platform pricing problem in a general way to understand how the platform optimally chooses prices so as to manage network effects, and why this often leads to pricing structures such that different groups of users end up paying quite different prices; we also address the question whether platforms should charge users only for accessing the platform or also for the transactions they conduct on the platform. In Section 5.3, we extend the analysis by considering one-sided pricing, the presence of within-group network effects, and differential pricing. Finally, in Section 5.4, we examine the link between pricing and the way users form their expectations regarding the participation of other users.
Adults with systemic right ventricle have a significant risk for long-term complications such as arrhythmias or heart failure.
A nationwide retrospective study based on the German National Register for Congenital Heart Disease was performed. Patients with transposition of the great arteries after atrial switch operation or congenitally corrected TGA were included.
Two hundred and eight-five patients with transposition of the great arteries after atrial switch operation and 95 patients with congenitally corrected transposition of the great arteries were included (mean age 33 years). Systolic function of the systemic ventricle was moderately or severely reduced in 25.5 % after atrial switch operation and in 35.1% in patients with congenitally corrected transposition. Regurgitation of the systemic atrioventricular valve was present in 39.5% and 43.2% of the cases, respectively. A significant percentage of patients also had a history for supraventricular or ventricular arrhythmias. However, polypharmacy of cardiovascular drugs was rare (4.5%) and 38.5 % of the patients did not take any cardiovascular medication. The amount of cardiovascular drugs taken was associated with NYHA class as well as systemic right ventricular dysfunction. Patients with congenitally corrected transposition were more likely to receive pharmacological treatment than patients after atrial switch operation.
A significant portion of patients with systemic right ventricle suffer from a relevant systemic ventricular dysfunction, systemic atrioventricular valve regurgitation, and arrhythmias. Despite this, medication for heart failure treatment is not universally used in this cohort. This emphasises the need for randomised trials in patient with systemic right ventricle.
Digital platforms controlled by Alibaba, Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, Netflix, Tencent and Uber have transformed not only the ways we do business, but also the very nature of people's everyday lives. It is of vital importance that we understand the economic principles governing how these platforms operate. This book explains the driving forces behind any platform business with a focus on network effects. The authors use short case studies and real-world applications to explain key concepts such as how platforms manage network effects and which price and non-price strategies they choose. This self-contained text is the first to offer a systematic and formalized account of what platforms are and how they operate, concisely incorporating path-breaking insights in economics over the last twenty years.
Studying phenotypic and genetic characteristics of age at onset (AAO) and polarity at onset (PAO) in bipolar disorder can provide new insights into disease pathology and facilitate the development of screening tools.
To examine the genetic architecture of AAO and PAO and their association with bipolar disorder disease characteristics.
Genome-wide association studies (GWASs) and polygenic score (PGS) analyses of AAO (n = 12 977) and PAO (n = 6773) were conducted in patients with bipolar disorder from 34 cohorts and a replication sample (n = 2237). The association of onset with disease characteristics was investigated in two of these cohorts.
Earlier AAO was associated with a higher probability of psychotic symptoms, suicidality, lower educational attainment, not living together and fewer episodes. Depressive onset correlated with suicidality and manic onset correlated with delusions and manic episodes. Systematic differences in AAO between cohorts and continents of origin were observed. This was also reflected in single-nucleotide variant-based heritability estimates, with higher heritabilities for stricter onset definitions. Increased PGS for autism spectrum disorder (β = −0.34 years, s.e. = 0.08), major depression (β = −0.34 years, s.e. = 0.08), schizophrenia (β = −0.39 years, s.e. = 0.08), and educational attainment (β = −0.31 years, s.e. = 0.08) were associated with an earlier AAO. The AAO GWAS identified one significant locus, but this finding did not replicate. Neither GWAS nor PGS analyses yielded significant associations with PAO.
AAO and PAO are associated with indicators of bipolar disorder severity. Individuals with an earlier onset show an increased polygenic liability for a broad spectrum of psychiatric traits. Systematic differences in AAO across cohorts, continents and phenotype definitions introduce significant heterogeneity, affecting analyses.