Alternative paths to conflict and cooperation

The leaders of both democratic and authoritarian states engage in varied patterns of diplomatic and military behavior. In some international disputes we find examples of the aggressive use of military force and intransigent bargaining strategies, while in other disputes military inaction and accommodative diplomacy are equally evident. When and why do democratic and authoritarian leaders at times pursue conflictual policies? Conversely, why do they at other times seek the resolution of international disputes through compromise and concessions? Do differences in the domestic political institutions of states influence the foreign policy choices of political leaders in a consistent and systematic fashion, such that domestic politics models can explain patterns of international conflict escalation and resolution? These are the critical questions that motivate our efforts at theory building in this book.

The starting point for developing theory is to think broadly about the causal pathways that are associated with (a) the presence or absence of military conflict between states, and (b) the continued stalemate or settlement of international disputes. Figure 2.1 presents four different stages that are associated with the development of international disputes over time, along with some of the principal pathways leading to different diplomatic and military outcomes. The Dispute Initiation Stage centers on the emergence of a dispute or disagreement between countries in which a challenger state seeks to alter the prevailing status quo over some issue(s). If a target state rejects the challenger's claims, then a dispute exists.

In this and the next two chapters we assess the explanatory power of the international and domestic politics hypotheses we derived in the previous four chapters. In particular, we evaluate the relative ability of each of our four models – the International Politics Model, the Political Accountability Model, the Political Norms Model, and the Political Affinity Model – to explain the actions of state leaders in each of the three stages of territorial disputes laid out in Chapter 2. Once again, the three decisions we want to understand are: (1) the decision of challenger states regarding whether and how to challenge the territorial status quo, (2) the decisions of both challengers and targets to offer concessions during rounds of talks over disputed territory, and (3) the decisions of challengers and targets to escalate initial military confrontation by mobilizing or employing higher levels of force. In Chapter 7 we examine the decisions of challengers in the Challenge the Status Quo Stage, and then in Chapters 8 and 9 we examine the decisions of both states in the Negotiations and Escalation Stages, respectively. We test our slate of hypotheses through a series of quantitative tests using our data set on 348 territorial disputes that span the period 1919–1995 (as described in Chapter 2 and in Appendices B–E).

While we employ a different statistical model for the Status Quo Stage as opposed to the Negotiations and Military Escalation Stages, there are a few model estimation features common to all of our statistical tests.

As we argued in the previous chapter, the foreign policy choices of state leaders reflect calculations about the constraints and opportunities for pursuing territorial claims in the strategic setting of international politics. This chapter, as well as the two following chapters, constitute the central theoretical chapters of the book, in which domestic political institutions are given center-stage in three models that seek to explain what types of diplomatic and military policies will be adopted by political leaders in territorial disputes. These three models can be viewed as related, but nevertheless distinct, theoretical approaches for analyzing the democratic peace. Their common foundation is that each considers how domestic political institutions shape foreign policy choices. Each model, however, focuses on a different causal mechanism that links domestic institutions to the choices made by political leaders:

1. Institutions are a source of political accountability for leaders' decisions on matters of foreign policy (Political Accountability Model).

2. Institutions are a source of norms for bargaining and conflict resolution in international disputes (Political Norms Model).

3. The similarity of institutions between states is a source of international threat perception and political alignment for state leaders (Political Affinity Model).

The Political Accountability Model centers on the ability of political opposition to punish and reward political leaders for the success or failure of the diplomatic and military policies they pursue. The Political Norms Model views domestic institutions as influencing the principles by which political elites bargain and resolve political conflict. These domestic-based principles, then, also influence how leaders bargain internationally.

In the previous chapter we summarized the stages associated with the evolution of territorial disputes and the corresponding set of policy options from which state leaders can choose. In this and the next three chapters we present a series of models that attempt to explain which diplomatic and military policies will be adopted by political leaders in territorial disputes. The thrust of the theoretical analysis is directed at the domestic level, particularly in Chapters 4 through 6. In this chapter, however, we develop a model of international politics as a starting point for theoretical analysis. For each model presented in this and subsequent chapters, the underlying theoretical foundations are first described and then a number of hypotheses are proposed and discussed. Each chapter concludes with a discussion of how the hypotheses will be operationalized for empirical testing.

A model of international politics

In this model the explanation of the foreign policy choices of state leaders centers on calculations about international political and military conditions. We begin with a model of international politics because each of the domestic-based models in Chapters 4 through 6 must be placed in a broader international strategic context. Before turning to each of these domestic models, it is necessary to identify the general incentives and constraints on decision-makers that are associated with pursuing foreign policy goals in an anarchic international system.

The Political Norms Model becomes the focus of our theory building efforts in this chapter. In the Political Accountability Model, competitive elections, independent legislative powers, and the threat of military coups are key sources of accountability for leadership decisions in foreign policy. In the Political Norms Model, analytical attention shifts to the principles that shape political elite beliefs about how to bargain and resolve political conflicts with domestic and international opponents. In the Accountability Model, state leaders are rational and self-interested politicians who strategically respond to a political environment in which institutions affect the ability of political opposition to reward and punish them for the policies they adopt. In the Norms Model, leaders from democratic and non-democratic states have different beliefs about the acceptability of compromising with and coercing political adversaries. The theoretical focus of the Norms Model therefore differs in comparison to the Accountability Model. In the Accountability Model, the analysis centers on state leaders as rational actors who desire to remain in power and therefore they are attentive to the domestic political implications of foreign policy choices. While there is no reason why the logic of the Norms Model would contest the idea that leaders are rational and strategic acting politicians, the theoretical focus is directed at explaining why political leaders develop varying beliefs about the legitimacy of different strategies of accommodation and coercion in political bargaining, and then explores the implications of such beliefs for foreign policy decision-making.

In this chapter we turn to the empirical analysis of decisions by leaders in both challenger and target states to offer concessions in negotiations over disputed territory. Our analysis of the Negotiations Stage in this chapter is designed to build on the initial decision of the challenger to seek talks in the Challenge the Status Quo Stage (Chapter 7). We now attempt to explain the outcomes of these diplomatic initiatives. As a result, in this chapter we take the cases from the Status Quo Stage in which the challenger proposed talks and use statistical analyses to test the ability of our four models to explain whether each state will offer territorial concessions during those rounds of negotiations.

We find that there are two general types of cases of “negotiations.” The first type consists of those instances in which the challenger's initial call for talks leads to subsequent negotiations over a longer period of time. In the second case, however, the challenger's initiative does not lead to formal substantive talks, but the two parties do exchange proposals and discuss the possibility of opening up more extensive talks. Nevertheless, these initial talks quickly become stalemated at this preliminary stage of discussions. It is important to include this latter set of cases since they represent attempts to undertake more extensive negotiations, and the reasons why they do not advance beyond preliminary talks should be addressed by the theoretical models we are testing.

In this final empirical chapter we analyze the decisions of leaders in challenger and target states to risk war by escalating military confrontations in territorial disputes. The military confrontations we examine in this chapter are those initiated by the challenger either through threats of force, military movements and deployments, or the limited use of force in disputed territory (see Chapter 7). Once again, we test the hypotheses derived from our four models to determine which international politico-military and domestic political conditions influence policy choices in this Escalation Stage.

Estimation of the Escalation Stage

We estimate the Military Escalation Stage in a manner that parallels our estimation of the Negotiations Stage in Chapter 8. However, instead of explaining whether state leaders make concessions once they have entered into a round of talks, our focus now shifts to an examination of whether the challenger or target escalates the use of military force now that the two states are engaged in a military confrontation. We once again employ a bivariate probit model to examine the escalation decisions of both the challenger and the target. As we discussed in the previous chapter, bivariate probit models take into account many of the strategic dynamics inherent to the Military Escalation Stage, yet still allow us to test separate sets of hypotheses for each of the two states embroiled in a militarized dispute. Furthermore, we find particularly strong evidence to justify the use of a bivariate model to test the Escalation Stage hypotheses.

In the opening chapter to this book we argued that while scholarship over the past decade has made substantial contributions to our understanding of how domestic political institutions influence patterns of international conflict, opportunities remain for continuing research to make important new advances in our understanding of the democratic peace. In particular, we claimed that the deductive logic of different models of the democratic peace could be developed more fully, thus producing a broader range of hypotheses to explain the diplomatic and military policies that state leaders adopt in international disputes. We also argued in favor of new statistical tests of theoretical models of the democratic peace, and claimed that such tests should focus on the evolution of territorial disputes into different stages and the choices made by state leaders at these various stages.

It is now time to step back from the extended and detailed discussion of theoretical models, hypotheses, and statistical results. In this concluding chapter we pull together our research findings and summarize the contributions we have made on both the theoretical and empirical fronts and also discuss some of the policy implications of our research. We begin by reviewing the empirical results for each of the models tested and drawing conclusions about the performance of each model. We follow our summary of results by considering how our findings address central debates and research puzzles in the democratic peace literature and the study of international conflict more broadly.

This appendix is divided into two sections. In the first section we discuss the concept of a territorial dispute in international politics. The second section concerns coding issues that we addressed in our efforts to create a data set of territorial disputes.

Territorial conflict in the international system

In the twentieth century territorial conflict has centered upon six types of disputes:

1. Disputes between two states over competing claims to their homeland territory. These are typically disputes between neighboring states who disagree over the location of land or river borders, the sovereignty of offshore islands, or whether the very sovereignty and independence of neighbors should be recognized.

2. Disputes between two states with competing claims to the homeland territory of one state and the overseas territory of the other state. These disputes often have involved major powers establishing spheres of influence and colonial empires abroad, in which territorial conflict with local states emerged over the location of borders, the sovereignty of islands, and rights to military bases. For example, in the first half of the twentieth century, China raised the issue of leased territories with Britain and France and disputed its border with the British Empire in India. Other examples include Thailand's border with French Indochina, Ethiopia's borders with Italian and British colonies, and Liberia's borders with French colonies.

3. Disputes between two states whose competing claims involve the overseas territory of both states. These disputes arise when two colonial empires come into direct territorial contact with each other and the borders and rights to offshore islands need to be established. Good examples include border disputes among the European colonial empires in Africa and in the Middle East from the turn of the century to the end of World War II.

4. […]

Introduction

Over the past decade numerous books and countless articles have been published on the theoretical and empirical relationship between democracy and international conflict. The central theoretical claim advanced by scholars is that decisions by state leaders to rely upon either peaceful diplomacy or military force as the means to resolve international disputes are influenced by the political institutions and norms of political competition and conflict resolution within states. As a result, analysts have argued that patterns of international conflict behavior should vary between democratic and non-democratic countries because of differences in the degree of state leaders' political accountability, or the strength of nonviolent norms of resolving political conflict among political elites (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999; Dixon 1993, 1994, 1998; Doyle 1986; Kahl 1998/99; Maoz and Russett 1992, 1993; Owen 1994, 1997; Raymond 1994; Rummel 1983, 1985; Russett 1993; Schweller 1992; Weart 1998).

In empirical research scholars have examined patterns of military conflict between democracies and non-democracies, as well as among the two types of states. Two different conclusions have emerged from empirical findings. The first, more widely accepted, claim is that while democratic states rarely if ever go to war against each other, they do adopt more confrontational diplomatic and military policies towards non-democratic states. Thus, patterns of military conflict between democracies and non-democracies are not very different from patterns of military conflict among non-democracies.