Chapter 1 offers an in-depth overview of the many substantive, procedural and institutional changes introduced by the various reforms adopted in the field of economic and fiscal policy in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis and the COVID-19 crisis. Reform packages such as the Six-Pack, the Two-Pack, the Fiscal Compact or the adoption of the recovery plan are closely investigated. Over the past decade, each and every aspect of the economic pillar of the EMU was substantially reshaped, changing the face of economic governance in the Eurozone. On the one hand, EU economic governance saw its scope dramatically expand, to become a comprehensive governance system that impacts most aspects of national public finances and macroeconomic policy and absorbs significant portions of social, employment, cohesion and other redistributive policies. On the other hand, recent reforms have also triggered a substantial intensification of the means and methods of EU action with regard to economic policy, significantly exacerbating the level of EU presence in the field of economic and fiscal policy and consolidating its grip over national policy spaces.

Chapter 4 conducts a qualitative assessment of the substantive rules underlying Eurozone economic governance, with the view of testing their actual contribution to trust-generation and uncertainty-reduction. Focused on the Eurozone’s fiscal policy rules, the Chapter shows that the common fiscal discipline of the Eurozone suffers from serious qualitative flaws, pertaining to their complexity, their opacity, their internal inconsistency and the unconstrained discretion that the Commission enjoys as their main enforcer. It argues that the system’s reliance on policy rules has become excessive and counterproductive, as it now works against the objectives of certainty, stability and equality that it was supposed to achieve, instills distrust and facilitates arbitrariness. Hence, the Chapter highlights the pressing need for an overhaul of the existing policy rules and a deeper institutional reflection about the legitimacy of the rules-based approach to economic and fiscal governance.

Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes the issue of fundamental rights sustainability under the new economic governance of the Eurozone. It investigates the role played by, and the status granted to, EU fundamental rights under this governance system. Its core finding is that of a fundamental discrepancy between the evolution of post-crisis economic governance towards a more constraining and supra-nationally driven system of harmonization and the institutional position of fundamental rights. Under the current configuration, that system’s ability to impact levels of rights protection in a systemic manner is not matched with equivalent safeguards. In spite of its clear applicability and multiple references in the relevant legislation, the body of EU fundamental rights only plays a peripheral role in the various policy-making processes making up standard economic governance. If recent initiatives (such as the Pillar of Social Rights or NGEU) do signal greater awareness to the human and social costs of Eurozone governance, rights mainstreaming remains close to non-existent, and the Charter does not guide or constrain policy deliberation in any meaningful way. Moreover, there is no sign that external reviewers (either the Court of Justice or the Fundamental Rights Agency) are ready to redress these deficiencies.

Part II assesses the new economic governance of the Eurozone in light of the “rule of law” framework. Chapter 3 appraises this framework in light of the principle of conferral and the competence allocation system set up by the Treaties. It finds that the Treaties are marked by deep conceptual ambiguity as to the reach of the notion of economic policy and as to the meaning of the concept of policy coordination. It shows how this ambiguity, in-built flexibility and dynamism was fully taken advantage of by the Union in the context of the Eurocrisis and COVID-19 crisis to substantially transform and upgrade EU economic governance. It finds that the reform process flirted with the limits of what was constitutionally feasible but never facially violated the scope of the Treaties’ enabling clauses for economic policy. The advent of a new system of EU economic governance in the postcrisis era is not irreconcilable with the competence allocation system of the Union but materializes the Treaties’ spirit of purposive openness and contextual adaptability. As the EU legislator seems to have reached, with NGEU, the outer edge of what is constitutionally feasible, any further consolidation of the economic pillar would require Treaty revision.

The Introduction familiarizes the reader with the main subject of the book, the economic governance of the Eurozone and the metamorphosis it underwent over the past decade of crises, and the author’s motives for exploring this topic. The Introduction then clarifies the analytical framework on which the book rests, by substantiating the understanding of the rule of law it favors and identifying the operational criteria on the basis of which the analysis will be conducted.

The Conclusion summarizes the main findings and recommendations of the book. It offers closing remarks and reflects upon the role of law and the rule of law in the context of economic governance.

Chapter 2 makes sense of the many reforms passed in the field of economic and fiscal policy over the past decade by conceptualizing them from a governance perspective. Its focus is on the institutional dynamics under the economic pillar and integration techniques mobilized by policy actors. It recalls the centrality of "policy coordination" and finds that in the precrisis era economic coordination was rather loose, horizontal and state-centered, primarily geared towards the pursuit of collective policy goals. It then shows that the Eurocrisis and the COVID-19 crisis have brought the EU and its Member States to largely transcend and reshape this precrisis coordination pattern, leading to its evolution towards a new form of coordination and type of EU intervention in the field of economic policy. This pattern presents the following features. It is more centralized and vertical; no longer confines the Union to a processual role but enables it to meaningfully weigh in on the substance of the policies being coordinated; and is increasingly harmonizing, moving away from the experimentalist philosophy, as it primarily aims at ordering national policies in the economic and social field along the lines of a uniform model.

Chapter 5 investigates the availability of external review under the new economic governance of the Eurozone. It shows that the transformation of the EU’s powers in the economic and fiscal fields have not come together with a parallel intensification of judicial scrutiny by the Court of Justice. It also finds that, considering the Court’s current case law and the conceptual frameworks that continue to structure its action (starting with the concepts of challengeable act and legal effects or the rules on standing) a shift in approach is quite unlikely. The result is a profound disconnect between the evolving nature of law and governance in the realm of EU economic policy and its judicial apprehension by the Court of Justice, an inappropriate level of review and a widening accountability gap. It notes that several bodies have sought to instil a certain dose of review, without compensating the lack of judicial review however. It enjoins the Court to lift the constitutional uncertainty produced by the new economic governance of the Eurozone, to come to terms with what standard economic governance has progressively become and to make sure that supranational judicial scrutiny keeps up with the evolving powers of the EU.