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Edited by
Ottavio Quirico, University of New England, University for Foreigners of Perugia and Australian National University, Canberra,Walter Baber, California State University, Long Beach
Links between the Arctic and the Earth’s climate system generate several paradoxes. Despite the low level of anthropogenic emissions of GHGs from the Arctic, it plays a critical role in the dynamics of the Earth’s climate system. The principal drivers of climate change are non-Arctic, but climate change impacts show up sooner and more dramatically in the Arctic, making it ground zero in efforts to address the challenge of climate adaptation. Ironically, these changes have also increased the accessibility of the massive reserves of hydrocarbons located in the circumpolar north. The Arctic Council has sought to address these concerns by monitoring the course of climate change in the Arctic and bringing together representatives of major GHG emitters to consider options for addressing climate change, but the council is limited in terms of authority and resources; Russia’s war in Ukraine has disrupted its activities. The paradoxical links arising in this case are characteristic of complex systems more generally and highlight the importance of developing the ability to respond agilely when needs and opportunities to deal effectively with rapidly changing conditions arise.
The world today confronts unprecedented needs for governance having profound implications for human well-being that are difficult - perhaps impossible - to address effectively within the prevailing global political order. This makes it pertinent to ask whether we must assume that the global order will continue during the foreseeable future to take the form of a state-based society as we think about options for addressing these challenges. Treating political orders as complex systems and drawing on our understanding of the dynamics of such systems, the author explores the prospects for a critical transition in the prevailing global political order. Individual sections analyze constitutive pressures, systemic forces, tipping elements, the effects of scale, the defining characteristics of potential successors to the current order, and pathways to a new order. In the process, seeking to make a more general contribution to our understanding of critical transitions in large political orders.
At the Arctic Council’s Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik on 20 May 2021, Russia assumed the chairmanship of the council for the second time since its establishment in 1996. Though some Russian analysts and practitioners were skeptical about the usefulness of such a mechanism during the 1980s and 1990s, Russia has become an active contributor to the progress of the Arctic Council (AC). Russia’s first term as chair during 2004–2006 led to the creation of the Arctic Contaminants Action Program as an Arctic Council Working Group. Since then, Russia has served as co-lead of the Task Forces developing the terms of the 2011 agreement on search and rescue, the 2013 agreement on marine oil spill preparedness and response, and the 2017 agreement on enhancing international scientific cooperation. Russia also has participated actively in the creation of related bodies including the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and the Arctic Economic Council whose chairmanships rotate together with the chairmanship of the AC. Now, far-reaching changes in the broader setting are posing growing challenges to the effectiveness of these institutional arrangements. The impacts of climate change in the high latitudes have increased dramatically; the pace of the extraction and shipment of Arctic natural resources has accelerated sharply; great-power politics have returned to the Arctic foregrounding concerns regarding military security. Together, these developments make it clear that a policy of business as usual will not suffice to ensure that the AC remains an important high-level forum for addressing Arctic issues in a global context. The programme Russia has developed for its 2021–2023 chairmanship of the council is ambitious; it proposes a sizeable suite of constructive activities. In this article, however, we go a step further to explore opportunities to adapt the Arctic governance system to the conditions prevailing in the 2020s. We focus on options relating to (i) the AC’s constitutive arrangements, (ii) links between the council and related governance mechanisms, (iii) the role of science diplomacy, and (iv) the treatment of issues involving military security. We conclude with a discussion of the prospect of organising a heads of state/government meeting during the Russian chairmanship as a means of setting the Arctic governance system on a constructive path for the 2020s.
Issues of governance arising in areas beyond national jurisdiction are rising rapidly as priority concerns. In thinking about institutional architectures for these areas, it is helpful to subdivide this class of issues into three subcategories dealing with: (i) international spaces or areas easy to locate in spatial terms; (ii) earth systems that play critical roles in determining the habitability of the planet; and (iii) virtual systems that are increasingly important but difficult to locate in spatial terms. Focusing on one prominent example exemplifying each of these subcategories – the high seas, the earth’s climate system and cyberspace – this chapter seeks to identify lessons of general interest regarding the governance of areas beyond national jurisdiction. It directs attention to the importance of process in contrast to substance, the role of discursive embeddedness, and the importance of balancing stability and agility in a world featuring increasingly complex systems.
International courts and tribunals now operate globally and in several world regions, playing significant roles in international law and global governance. However, these courts vary significantly in terms of their practices, procedures, and the outcomes they produce. Why do some international courts perform better than others? Which factors affect the outcome of these courts and tribunals? The Performance of International Courts and Tribunals is an interdisciplinary study featuring approaches, methods and authorship from law and political science, which proposes the concept of performance to describe the processes and outcomes of international courts. It develops a framework for evaluating and explaining performance by offering a broad comparative analysis of international courts, covering several world regions and the areas of trade, investment, the environment, human rights and criminal law, and offers interdisciplinary accounts to explain how and why international court performance varies.