At the Arctic Council’s Ministerial Meeting in Reykjavik on 20 May 2021, Russia assumed the chairmanship of the council for the second time since its establishment in 1996. Though some Russian analysts and practitioners were skeptical about the usefulness of such a mechanism during the 1980s and 1990s, Russia has become an active contributor to the progress of the Arctic Council (AC). Russia’s first term as chair during 2004–2006 led to the creation of the Arctic Contaminants Action Program as an Arctic Council Working Group. Since then, Russia has served as co-lead of the Task Forces developing the terms of the 2011 agreement on search and rescue, the 2013 agreement on marine oil spill preparedness and response, and the 2017 agreement on enhancing international scientific cooperation. Russia also has participated actively in the creation of related bodies including the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and the Arctic Economic Council whose chairmanships rotate together with the chairmanship of the AC. Now, far-reaching changes in the broader setting are posing growing challenges to the effectiveness of these institutional arrangements. The impacts of climate change in the high latitudes have increased dramatically; the pace of the extraction and shipment of Arctic natural resources has accelerated sharply; great-power politics have returned to the Arctic foregrounding concerns regarding military security. Together, these developments make it clear that a policy of business as usual will not suffice to ensure that the AC remains an important high-level forum for addressing Arctic issues in a global context. The programme Russia has developed for its 2021–2023 chairmanship of the council is ambitious; it proposes a sizeable suite of constructive activities. In this article, however, we go a step further to explore opportunities to adapt the Arctic governance system to the conditions prevailing in the 2020s. We focus on options relating to (i) the AC’s constitutive arrangements, (ii) links between the council and related governance mechanisms, (iii) the role of science diplomacy, and (iv) the treatment of issues involving military security. We conclude with a discussion of the prospect of organising a heads of state/government meeting during the Russian chairmanship as a means of setting the Arctic governance system on a constructive path for the 2020s.

The Arctic and the Antarctic appear to be polar opposites with regard to many matters, including the systems of governance that have evolved in the two regions. Antarctica is demilitarised, closed to economic development, open to a wide range of scientific activities, and subject to strict environmental regulations under the terms of the legally binding Antarctic Treaty of 1959 along with several supplementary measures that together form the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). The Arctic, by contrast, is a theatre of military operations, a site of largescale industrial activities, a homeland for sizable groups of indigenous peoples, and a focus of growing concern regarding the environmental impacts of human activities. The Arctic Council, the principal international body concerned with governance at the regional level, operates under the terms of a ministerial declaration that is not legally binding; it lacks the authority to make formal decisions about matters of current interest. Digging a little deeper, however, one turns up some illuminating similarities between the governance systems operating in the antipodes. In this article, I pursue this line of thinking, setting forth a range of observations relating to (i) the history of governance in the antipodes, (ii) institutional innovations occurring in these regions, (iii) issues of membership, (iv) jurisdictional concerns, (v) the role of science, (vi) relations with the UN system, (vii) institutional interplay, and (viii) the adaptiveness of governance systems in the face of changing circumstances. The governance systems for the polar regions are not likely to converge anytime soon. Nevertheless, this analysis should be of interest not only to those concerned with the fate of Antarctica and the Arctic but also to those seeking to find effective means of addressing needs for governance in other settings calling for governance without government.