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Singh's analysis has much to be said for it. When considering the treatment of illness, however, he begins from a shaky premise about uncontrollability and, so, fails to make the most of what shamanic treatments – as placebos – can deliver.
Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) dismiss in a couple of pages the possible costs of self-deception. But there is a downside to self-deception that they do not consider. This is the loss of psychological insight into deceit by others that blindness to deceit by oneself is likely to entail.
Scientists are generally more moral, and moralists more scientific, than Knobe suggests. His own experiments show that people, rather than making unscientific judgements about the moral intentions of others, are behaving as good Bayesians who take account of prior knowledge.
Intellectual disability (ID) is highly prevalent in tuberous sclerosis (TS). Putative neurobiological risk factors include indices of cortical tuber (CT) load and epilepsy. We have used univariate and multivariate analyses, including both CT and epilepsy measures as predictors, in an attempt to clarify the pattern of cross-sectional associations between these variables and ID in TS.
Forty-eight children, adolescents and young adults with TS were identified through regional specialist clinics. All subjects underwent thorough history taking and examination, and had brain magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans. The number and regional distribution of CTs was recorded. Subjects were assigned to one of nine ordered intellectual quotient (IQ) categories (range <25 to >130) using age-appropriate tests of intelligence.
On univariate analyses, ID was significantly associated with both a history of infantile spasm (IS) (Z=−2·49, p=0·01) and total CT count (Spearman's ρ=−0·30, p=0·04). When controlling for total CT count, the presence of CTs in frontal (regression coefficient=−2·43, p=0·02) and temporal (regression coefficient=−1·60, p=0·02) lobes was significantly associated with ID. In multivariate analyses the association between IS and ID was rendered insignificant by the inclusion of the presence of CTs in temporal and frontal lobes, both of which remained associated (p=0·05 and p=0·06 respectively) with ID.
The presence of CTs in specific brain regions as opposed to a history of IS was associated with ID in TS. The significance of these findings is discussed in relation to previous work in TS, and the neural basis of intelligence.
The history and meaning of doctors' approval by the Secretary of State under Section 12(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983 is discussed. The definition for approval is examined with relevant rulings on interpretation. Training requisites of such doctors are examined, outlining a framework of educational aims and objectives, with suggestions for delivery. The aims must include direct factual content and also the skills, values and attitudes required for humane and consistent practice. The particular needs of some specific groups and individuals are highlighted. The continual learning for updating skills and knowledge, including event-based learning, audit and reflection, is placed in the context of clinical governance wherein doctors must ensure that they continue to be ‘fit for purpose’. The case is made for ‘nationalisation’ of the syllabus and standards.
The theory presented here is a near neighbour of Humphrey's theory of sensations as actions. O'Regan & Noë have opened up remarkable new possibilities. But they have missed a trick by not making more of the distinction between sensation and perception; and some of their particular proposals for how we use our eyes to represent visual properties are not only implausible but would, if true, isolate vision from other sensory modalities and do little to explain the phenomenology of conscious experience in general.
Results are presented from a randomized controlled trial indicating which psychotic symptoms respond to
cognitive behaviour therapy. The aim of the study was to investigate whether different types of psychotic symptoms
are more or less responsive to cognitive-behaviour therapy compared to treatment received by control groups. Seventy-two patients suffering from chronic schizophrenia who experienced persistent positive psychotic symptoms were
assessed at baseline and randomized to either cognitive-behaviour therapy and routine care, supportive counselling and
routine care, or routine care alone and were re-assessed after 3 months of treatment (post-treatment). Independent and
blind assessment of outcome indicated delusions significantly improved with both cognitive behaviour therapy and
supportive counselling compared to routine care. Hallucinations significantly decreased with cognitive-behaviour therapy compared to supportive counselling. There was no difference in the percentage change of hallucinations compared
to delusions in patients treated by cognitive behaviour therapy. There was little change in measures of affective
symptoms but there was no evidence that a reduction in positive symptoms was associated with an increase in depres
sion. In fact, a reduction in positive symptoms was positively correlated with a reduction in depression. There were
significant differences in the reductions in thought disorder and negative symptoms with an advantage of cognitive-behaviour therapy compared to routine care.
Dreaming can provide a marvelous opportunity for the “playful” exploration of dramatic events. But the chance to learn to deal with danger is only a small part of it. More important is the chance to discover what it is like to be the subject of strange but humanly significant mental states.
Previously reported results have demonstrated the efficacy of exposure and cognitive therapy in the treatment of chronic post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but have not shown one to be superior to the other.
To investigate whether treatment benefits and equivalence are maintained at 12-month follow-up in patients with chronic PTSD treated with either imaginai exposure or cognitive therapy.
Twelve-month follow-up of a randomised clinical trial.
Fifty-four subjects (87% of the sample) were available to follow-up. They did not significantly differ clinically from drop-outs. There was significant clinical improvement at 12 months compared with pre-treatment. However, 39% of those followed-up still met criteria for PTSD. There were no significant differences between the two treatments. Victims of crime displayed higher levels of symptoms at follow-up than victims of accidents.
Clinical benefits for exposure or cognitive therapy were maintained.
Persistent drug-resistant psychotic symptoms are a pervasive problem in the treatment of schizophrenia.
To evaluate the durability of the treatment effects of cognitive–behavioural therapy for chronic schizophrenia one year after treatment termination.
A comparison of clinical outcomes was made at one-year follow-up from a randomised trial of cognitive–behavioural therapy, supportive counselling and routine care alone in the treatment of chronic schizophrenia.
Seventy out of the 72 patients (97%) who completed treatment were assessed at follow-up. There were significant differences between the three groups when positive and negative symptoms were analysed by means of ANCOVAs. Between-group comparisons indicated significant differences between cognitive–behavioural therapy and routine care at follow-up for positive symptoms. There was a trend towards significance for both cognitive–behavioural therapy and supportive counselling to be superior to routine care alone on negative symptoms.
At 12-month follow-up the significant advantage of cognitive– behavioural therapy compared to routine care alone remained.
The emergence of cave art in Europe about 30,000 years ago is widely believed to be evidence that by this time human beings had developed sophisticated capacities for symbolization and communication. However, comparison of the cave art with the drawings made by a young autistic girl, Nadia, reveals surprising similarities in content and style. Nadia, despite her graphic skills, was mentally defective and had virtually no language. I argue in the light of this comparison that the existence of the cave art cannot be the proof which it is usually assumed to be that the humans of the Upper Palaeolithic had essentially ‘modern’ minds.
Block's notion of P-consciousness catches too much in its net. He would do better to exclude all states that do not have a sensory component. I question what he says about my work with the “blind” monkey, Helen.