To send content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about sending content to .
To send content items to your Kindle, first ensure email@example.com
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about sending to your Kindle.
Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This book is the first of its kind in focusing on the enforcement of corporate and securities laws, both public and private, which is a relatively understudied but critically important issue for the development and health of global capital markets. The book has a special focus on the young system coming into being in the People's Republic of China (PRC), but also examines the enforcement of corporate and securities laws across the globe and across different legal and political systems from an in-depth comparative perspective. This single volume assembles a veritable 'dream team' of contributors who are amongst the very best scholars and legal specialists in the many national jurisdictions covered in the book. Hence, it is of significant value to corporate and securities regulators, judicial officials, prosecutors, litigation specialists, corporate counsel, legal and economic policymakers, scholars, think tanks, students, and investors alike.
Corporate governance reform has become a topic of considerable debate both in the US and in many emerging markets. Indeed, the discussion is important because these reforms may have potentially long-standing effects upon the global allocation of capital, and in understanding the ways in which governance norms are communicated across markets and nations in an ever-globalizing world. In this chapter we examine the corporate governance reform efforts of the world's two biggest and fastest growing emerging markets, the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) and India. In the process we find that our understanding of how and why corporate governance reform comes about, where it leads, and what value it has can vary significantly, but still shares some commonalities that are of considerable theoretical and practical importance.
The inquiry commenced in this chapter is inspired by certain key facts. First, China and India are growing at a remarkable and unprecedented pace and seem to have survived the 2008–9 Global Financial Crisis better than most other economies. Second, China and India are not Western countries, but have been heavily influenced by “globalized” Anglo-American notions of corporate law, corporate governance norms, and securities regulation. Third, China and India are presently two of the most popular destinations for foreign capital in the world – whether via foreign direct investment (FDI) in essentially private (or pre-public) transactions or public capital markets transactions.
The essence of corporate and commercial laws is to protect business and commerce from the threat of political power.
– Zheng Guanying (1893)
This chapter draws on a detailed study of corporate law adjudication in Shanghai from 1992 to 2008. The purpose of the study was to better understand the demonstrated technical competence, institutional autonomy, and political independence of one court system in the People's Republic of China (“PRC”) in a sector outside of the criminal law. The study consisted of a detailed examination and comparison of full-length corporate law opinions for more than 200 reported cases, a 2003 Shanghai High Court opinion on the 1994 Company Law (describing a decade of corporate case outcomes), a 2007 report on cases implementing the Company Law in 2006 (more than 760 cases), and extensive interactions with Shanghai court officials handling such disputes – all for a wide diversity of Shanghai jurisdictions and procedural postures. Due to space limitations, this chapter focuses on the demonstrated independence, and to a lesser extent autonomy, of the Shanghai courts when faced with a completely altered Company Law.
THE NEW JUSTICIABILITY OF THE COMPANY LAW
Corporate law theory holds that in jurisdictions like the PRC, where the judiciary is regarded as underdeveloped, buffeted by political and other external pressures, and deficient in handling complex cases, company law must be largely self-enforcing and may not be structured to “depend on fast and reliable judicial decisions.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.