We move now from the individual needs of immigrants to the overall position of foreign languages other than English in the language policy landscape. While the role of English will be mentioned where relevant, the main focus of this chapter will be on two other aspects of language provision in the community, namely the teaching and learning of foreign languages other than English in Japanese schools and universities and the provision of multilingual information for foreign residents. Both of these relate to language policy in obvious ways. The aggressive promotion of English downgrades the importance of teaching in schools both those languages which in Japan may properly be considered community languages and other culturally and strategically important foreign languages, and the provision of multilingual information to non-Japanese residents in local communities is in the best interests of both government, community and individual alike. Policy exists to support and to facilitate: in the first part of the chapter, we shall see that the support for English has not been paralleled by support for the teaching of other languages, while in the second, it will become clear that the integration of newcomer residents into local communities has been facilitated by policy decisions taken to provide necessary information in a range of relevant languages.

The attention of policy-makers has focused on English to the detriment of the teaching of other languages, which are referred to in passing only at the end of educational policy documents which are titled ‘Gaikokugo’ (foreign languages) but which deal almost exclusively with English. The word ‘gaikokugo’ is thus used in a very narrow sense, denoting in practice only one language. Other foreign languages are referred to as ‘eigo igai no gaikokugo’ (foreign languages other than English), underscoring the priorities of a foreign-language programme in which English is taken as the sine qua non. The working dichotomy is plain to see, as summed up by Fujita-Round and Maher (2008: 93): ‘In the imagined community in which language policy emerges in Japan, two geographical beacons are visible: Japanese (Nihongo) is the (sole) national language (kokugo) and English is pre-eminently the vehicle of internationalization. A straightforward ideological system underpins this stance which, mutatis mutandis, informs large tracts of policy-making at various educational levels.’

The ideology of monolingualism can prove enduringly resistant to change, regardless of what new practices might be introduced. Australia adopted official national policies on multiculturalism in the 1970s, and yet in a study of that country's language potential, Clyne (2005) stresses the disparity between what he calls Australia's ‘monolingual mindset’ at policy and institutional level and the on-the-ground multilingual reality of Australia's communities. The same is true of Japan, which is at a much earlier stage in the process: leaving aside the notable exception of the promotion of English, other policies and practices remain largely predicated on the ideological assumption that Japan is a monolingual nation, although there are signs that this is beginning to change. The following discussion will examine the linguistic needs of immigrants and their relationship to existing ideologies and policies.

When prominent Japanese journalist and political commentator Funabashi Yōichi wrote in a 2001 essay entitled ‘Japan's Moment of Truth’ that ‘new lines of debate are forming around the politics of Japanese identity’, he summarised astutely the issues surrounding Japan's current demographics. ‘This debate’, he continued, ‘takes the form of a clash between two visions of Japan's future: a more open, multilingual and multiracial Japan versus a homogenous, monolingual and mono-ethnic one.’ As we saw in Chapter 1, immigration, for so long a reluctant response to the demands of an ageing population and a low birth rate, is now a fact of life in Japan and is increasingly being recognised as such in both official and private sector discourse across the country. A report on Japan's future goals published in the year 2000 spoke encouragingly of immigration's potential to contribute to Japan's wellbeing and even suggested that Japan begin work on an ‘imin seisaku’ (migration policy) (Nijūisseiki Nihon no Kōsō Kondankai 2000). The use of the word ‘imin’ (migrant) here, Morris-Suzuki (2002: 169) points out, is significant because the more commonly used terminology of ‘shutsunyūkoku kanri seisaku’ (policy controlling entry and exit from Japan) refers more to border control than to any real acknowledgment of the existence and needs of migrants as people.

In the best of all possible worlds, the formulation and implementation of language policy would respond quickly to change in on-the-ground circumstances once sufficient time had elapsed to establish the permanence of that change. In modern bureaucracies, however, this is only infrequently the case. If we consider language policy in its formalised, overt incarnation, i.e., as ‘the formulation and proclamation of an explicit plan or policy, usually but not necessarily written in a formal document, about language use’ (Spolsky, 2004: 11), then examination of past policy formulation in Japan – relating, for example, to standardisation, script reform and the revival of the Ainu language – makes it clear that the process is usually slow and often tortuous. The presence of deep-rooted language ideologies means that change is something to be carefully scrutinised for agendas both overt and hidden that have the potential to upset the status quo. On a practical level, the implementation phases of new policies must be carefully planned and costed. Change at the national level of language policy often involves many years of discussion and consultation on issues that affect the nation as a whole.

We have seen in earlier chapters of this book that growing multilingualism in local communities, the negative effect of the overwhelming national promotion of the study of English on the teaching of other languages and the changes to ways of writing Japanese enabled by electronic text production all raise questions about the way language is currently managed in Japan, i.e., about language policies. The preceding chapter discussed the only one of these to have been addressed at national level so far. In this chapter, I will examine to what extent the will to move in the direction of change can be discerned at national level in response to the other issues. As will become clear, a discursive shift is under way in relation to the old ideology that the Japanese language is the exclusive property of the Japanese people.

The broad social reach of language policy's implementation makes it a key player in framing the manner in which language is handled in a particular society. It acts as an important device for the legitimisation of particular uses of language which coincide with social expectations, i.e., it encapsulates and articulates the national thinking on language (language ideology) and cannot stand outside the culture and the times in which it is created. Therefore, it is imperative that language policy evolves to reflect contemporary social realities and does not remain fossilised, reflecting circumstances now past. Both increased immigration and technology-related language change have made their presence felt in Japan for thirty years now; they are in no sense temporary aberrations. It is clear that they have important consequences for society at large and that language policy must therefore be extended to address them. As we have seen, at national level only one of these issues has resulted in action, namely the revision of the kanji policy to reflect the influence of information technology on reading and writing.

I would argue that the provision of JSL learning opportunities at national level and the expansion of opportunities to learn languages other than English are the most important language policy matters facing Japan today, far more significant than the forthcoming establishment of English as a curriculum subject in elementary schools, because of their deep and enduring import for future social cohesion. What has emerged in this book from the discussion of community language needs and practices and responses to them by government and other groups is a picture of rich, diversely textured language management activities (language policies) being adopted in a multiplicity of areas by bodies ranging from groups of concerned individuals to the highest levels of the national government, with many local government levels in between. What is at issue now is the direction in which Japan will next move. At what stage will the government decide that a critical mass of long-term foreign residents sufficient to justify national intervention into language provision has been reached?

This book examines two important issues in language policy in Japan today: first, and most prominently, increasing migration-induced multilingualism which has ramifications both for providing Japanese-language learning opportunities for migrants and for the use and teaching of languages other than Japanese and English; and second, the influence of electronic technologies such as computers and cell phones on the way in which Japanese is written. These two developments, of course, have occurred in many other countries beside Japan. What makes the Japanese case particularly interesting is that Japan does not yet consider itself to be a country of immigration and hence has only recently shown signs of an awareness of the importance of providing both language teaching and multilingual services for non-Japanese workers, so that what policy development does exist in this area is ad hoc and fragmented rather than centrally planned and coordinated at national level. It also has in place a set of longstanding policies pertaining to the officially sanctioned use of the writing system, policies which were arrived at after a great deal of division and debate, that shape the way in which Japanese and non-Japanese children alike learn to read and write in Japanese schools. In both these cases, official and individual views are strongly informed by language ideologies of various kinds.

Any study of a society's language policy must take into account the ideological context within which language functions because language ideologies always mediate and sometimes directly shape the formulation of such policy. To speak of language policy in Japan in isolation from national ideas about language would be to see only a part of the whole picture. Language ideology plays an important role in discussions of issues pertinent to this study, such as the provision of multilingual services for migrants, the current ‘tabunka kyōsei’ (multicultural coexistence) policy discourse influencing local communities, the teaching of foreign languages other than English and the prominence of non-standard orthographic conventions online. The most strongly entrenched and overarching ideology is a lingering belief that Japan is monolingual.

It is no accident that the most clearly marked policy development in recent years, apart from the announcement of the Action Plan to Cultivate Japanese with English Abilities, relates to kanji. For one thing, the kanji policy is relatively easy to change, because it already exists as a policy document; while arguments surrounding the recent increase in content were many and varied, they centred on which characters should be added or deleted rather than on whether the policy itself should be changed to accommodate an increase. For another, kanji are the venerated icons of Japan's writing system: reinforcing their position is in line with the language ideology surrounding characters discussed in Chapter 1. We have seen that despite the availability of an alternative means of writing in the form of the kana, literacy in Japan is judged by the ability to use kanji correctly; use of kana where kanji would be the norm is not encouraged, despite its frequent occurrence. This means that ‘kanji heavily contribute to the lengthening of acquisition of literacy, which is often a lifelong process’ (Akamatsu 2006: 486). It takes until the end of the nine years of compulsory education to teach the full List of Characters for General Use. Over the two decades between 1975 and 1995, the teaching of writing was the most researched and discussed aspect of national language education in Japan (Namba 1995: 64), a situation which has continued since then. ‘Under the conditions of a writing system that makes use of Chinese characters’, Coulmas (1994: 312) comments, ‘literacy is a graded notion. This is true, of course, also of alphabetic literacy, but with Chinese characters this gradation is more obviously encoded in the writing system.’ Everyone who has completed compulsory education is expected to know and to use a certain level of kanji, whether or not this is actually the case in practice. Little wonder, then, that discussion of literacy standards, by which is frequently meant kanji proficiency standards, features so frequently in both the academic and popular literature.

This book examines two language issues in Japan today which have arisen from significant developments in the social environment over the last three decades and have pointed to a need for a change in language policy. One is the increase in the number of migrants needing opportunities to learn Japanese as a second language (JSL), the other is the influence of electronic technologies on the way Japanese is written. Immigration-induced demographic changes confront long-cherished notions of national monolingualism, and technological advances in electronic text production have led to textual practices with ramifications for script use and for literacy in general. My central concern is to show whether and how language policy authorities in Japan are moving to accommodate these social and cultural changes. Both the integration of immigrants and new practices affecting literacy are important to the social fabric; it is essential, therefore, that expectations about language in these areas are clear and that policy addresses the realities of the present rather than harking back to an earlier social context.

In one of these two areas, a national policy already exists; in the other, it does not. In one of these areas, the national policy has been revised to acknowledge change; in the other, no national-level policy has yet been developed. In the area of kanji policy, deeply rooted in Japanese language ideology and important to ethnic mainstream Japanese citizens as it is, the widespread uptake of electronic text production has been viewed as necessitating a revision of the List of Characters for General Use, which has just been expanded to acknowledge that larger numbers of kanji are now routinely used than was the case when writing by hand alone. In the second, more contentious area, that of providing JSL instruction for migrants to Japan at a national rather than local level, no policy currently exists, in large part because such a move goes against deep-seated national language ideologies of monoethnicity and monolingualism. It is only very recently that the national government – in contrast to local governments, which have been active in this area for years – has begun to make sporadic provision for language training in certain clearly defined areas relating to employment.

One of the strongest indicators of a society's attitudes to language and identity is the kind of language used to refer to those of its members who are seen as in some way disadvantaged or outside the mainstream. The last thirty years of the twentieth century saw a heated debate on inclusive language in most of the world's advanced industrial societies, as ethnic and other minority groups protested against the use of language which labeled them as in some way inferior to other members of those societies. This was fuelled in part by international movements on minority rights such as the United Nations International Year of Disabled Persons in 1981 and Decade of Disabled Persons (1983–1992), the United Nations Decade for Women (1976–1985), and the United Nations Year for Indigenous People in 1993 and Decade for Indigenous People (1994–2004).

Japan was no exception, although the debate on “political correctness” (a backlash from people who did not wish to restrain the speech they used in referring to others) which resulted came rather later than in other countries like Australia or the United States. The push for language change in Japan came not from a strong civil rights tradition as in the United States but from a combination of international pressure and a strongly developed domestic sensitivity to public embarrassment on the part of the media and government.

One of the major twentieth-century developments affecting the Japanese language, at least in its written form, was the development around 1980 of character-capable software. Although, as we saw in Chapter Five, Japan has not been noticeably handicapped by the intricate nature of its orthography, until the invention of this technology the complexity and size of the character set meant that it had never been able to have a successful “typewriter age” as in the west, so that most office documents and of course personal documents were still written by hand at a time when printed documents had become the norm elsewhere. The new technology therefore carried wide-ranging implications for writing. In the business domain, of course, it expedited office automation. In the personal domain, it brought about changes both in the way people wrote when they used it and in the nature of interpersonal relations mediated through print. Japanese consumers made of it a powerful expression of individual identity during the 1980s and 1990s, a trend which continues and today finds an extra dimension of expression in the messaging capability of mobile phones.

In addition to revolutionizing the way people thought about document production both in the office and at home, word-processing technology also then enabled Japan to construct a Japanese-language presence on the Internet. After a slow start relative to other countries, Japanese rose quickly to become the second most common language on the Internet, a position from which it was only edged out by Chinese in September 2000; it is currently sitting in third place.

Let me begin by asking a question: how do we define the term, “the Japanese language”? Odds are that those both unfamiliar and fairly familiar with Japan alike will answer at once, “the language that is spoken by people in Japan.” And of course, they would be quite right, up to a point.

Pressed for a similar definition of the English language, the answer would require more thought, since English is patently not just the language spoken in England by the English but, like French and Spanish, is spoken in a variety of local forms throughout a great number of countries of the world, legacies of former empires and the commercial and cultural webs spun between countries around the world. Arabic, too, is the official language of over twenty countries and Chinese in one form or another is spoken widely throughout East and South East Asia and in the countries of the Chinese diaspora.

In the case of Japanese, while geography likewise plays a part in definition, the geography is limited to that of the Japanese archipelago. Japan once had an empire too, and Japanese was spoken in its colonies, as we shall see, and to some extent remains so: in the former colony of Taiwan, for example, elderly people who were children during the days of the Japanese empire were brought up to speak Japanese as their first language and speak it still. Yet for most people the definition given above is the first which springs to mind.