The first cases of COVID-19 arrived in Israel in March 2020. In Israel, the first known cases were Israeli patients diagnosed with COVID-19 aboard the Diamond Princess which were repatriated.

Shortly later, additional cases were found in increasing numbers constituting the "first wave". The high number of patients put significant strain on Israeli hospitals. The initial wave was later followed by additional surges in the number of patients further straining the system. At the peak, hospitals with a total bed capacity of 800 had 135 covid-19 patients with 21 of them requiring ventilatory support.

Daily and weekly multidisciplinary meetings were held and daily reports were composed. Following each wave, lessons learned and recommendations for improved preparedness were formulated. The following results and conclusion sections summarize some of the main insights and recommendations.

The main challenges in Beilinson hospital during the "first wave" were a shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE) and how to best utilize the existing supplies, uncertainty regarding infectiveness, best management practices and uncertainty regarding the expected magnitude and duration of the pandemic. In retrospect, the major insights were the need for a flexible and divisible ED to safely care for changing loads of suspected and verified COVID-19 patients as well as COVID-19 negative patients. Increasing the in-hospital stockpile of PPE as well as the regional and national stockpile and creating local production capacities. The importance of the daily multidisciplinary managerial meeting was to improve situational awareness and allow improved decision making. Staff briefing occurred on a daily basis and during times of high uncertainty at the beginning of every shift.

Performing structured and frequent debriefing and analysis to achieve clinical and operational insights is crucial for improved short-term performance as well as improving preparedness for future challenges.

Crowd control is essential to the handling of mass-casualty incidents (MCIs).This is the task of the police at the site of the incident. For a hospital, responsibility falls on its security forces, with the police assuming an auxiliary role. Crowd control is difficult, especially when the casualties are due to riots involving clashes between rioters and police. This study uses data regarding the October 2000 riots in Nazareth to draw lessons about the determinants of crowd control on the scene and in hospitals.

Data collected from formal debriefings were processed to identify the specifics of a MCI due to massive riots. The transport of patients to the hospital and the behavior of their families were considered.The actions taken by the Hospital Manager to control crowds on the hospital premises also were analyzed.

During 10 days of riots (01–10 October 2000), 160 casualties, including 10 severely wounded, were evacuated to the Nazareth Italian Hospital. The Nazareth English Hospital received 132 injured patients, including one critically wounded, nine severely wounded, 26 moderately injured, and 96 mildly injured. All victims were evacuated from the scene by private vehicles and were accompanied by numerous family members. This obstructed access to hospitals and hampered the care of the casualties in the emergency department. The hospital staff was unable to perform triage at the emergency department's entrance and to assign the wounded to immediate treatment areas or waiting areas. All of the wounded were taken by their families directly into the “immediate care” location where a great effort was made to prioritize the severely injured. In order to control the events, the hospital's managers enlisted prominent individuals within the crowds to aid with control. At one point, the mayor was enlisted to successfully achieve crowd control.

During riots, city, community, and even makeshift leaders within a crowd can play a pivotal role in helping hospital management control crowds. It may be advisable to train medical teams and hospital management to recognize potential leaders, and gain their cooperation in such an event. To optimize such cooperation, community leaders also should be acquainted with the roles of public health agencies and emergency services systems.

A mass toxicological event (MTE) caused by an act of terrorism or an industrial incident can create large numbers of ambulatory casualties suffering from mild intoxication, acute stress reaction (ASR), and exacerbation of chronic diseases or iatrogenic insult (such as atropine overdose). The logistical and medical management of this population may present a challenge insuch a scenario. The aim of this article is to describe the concept of the Israeli Home Front Command (HFC) of a “Mild Casualties Center” (MCC) for a chemical scenario, and to analyze the results of two large-scale drills that have been used to evaluate this concept.

Two large-scale drills were conducted. One MCC drill was located in a school building and the second MCC drill was located in a basketball stadium. These medical centers were staffed by physicians, nurses, and medics, both military (reservists) and civilian (community, non-hospital teams). Two hundred simulated patients entered the MCC during each of the drills, and drill observers assessed how these patients were managed for two hours.

Of the casualties, 28 were treated in the “medical treatment site”, 10 of which were relocated to a nearby hospital. Only four casualties were treated in the large “mental care site”, planned for a much higher burden of “worried well” patients. Documentation of patient data and medical care was sub-optimal.

A MCC is a logistically suitable solution for the challenge of managing thousands of ambulatory casualties. The knowledge of the medical team must be bolstered, as most are unfamiliar with both nerve gas poisoning and with ASR. Mild casualties centers should not be located within hospitals and must be staffed by non-hospital, medical personnel to achieve the main task of allowing hospital teams to focus on providing medical care to the moderate and severe nerve gas casualties, without the extra burden of caring for thousands of mild casualties.

Large-scale, terrorist attacks can happen in peripheral areas, which are located close to a country's borders and far from its main medical facilities and involve multi-national casualties and responders. The objective of this study was to analyze the terrorist suicide bombings that occurred on 07 October 2004, near the Israeli-Egyptian border, as representative of such a complex scenario.

Data from formal debriefings after the event were processed in order to learn about victim outcomes, resource utilization, critical events, and time course of the emergency response.

A total of 185 injured survivors were repatriated: four were severely wounded, 13 were moderately injured, and 168 were mildly injured. Thirty-eight people died. A forward medical team landed at the border town's airport, which provided reinforcement in the field and in the local hospital. Israeli and Egyptian search and rescue teams collaborated at the destruction site. One-hundred sixty-eight injured patients arrived at the small border hospital that rapidly organized itself for the mass-casualty incident, operating as an evacuation “staging hospital”. Twenty-three casualties secondarily were distributed to two major trauma centers in the south and the center of Israel, respectively, either by ambulance or by helicopter.

Large-scale, terrorist attacks at a peripheral border zone can be handled by international collaboration, reinforcement of medical teams at the site itself and at the peripheral neighboring hospital, rapid rearrangement of an “evacuation hospital”, and efficient transport to trauma centers by ambulances, helicopters, and other aircraft.