Chapter 3 is dedicated to the reconstruction of the case of the Costa Concordia accident, which occurred on January 13, 2012, off the west coast of Italy, near the island of Giglio, and presents an analysis of the scapegoating process that involved the ship’s captain. Sailing very close to the coast, the Costa Concordia foundered on a rock. The impact tore open a gash in the ship, allowing in water which put the engines out of action. After traveling a short distance, the ship ran aground near the island, listing over onto its side. Out of over four thousand people on board, thirty-two died. The dominant view of this case from the judiciary, the media and public opinion, was that the ship’s captain was the main and, in fact, almost the only, figure responsible for the accident and for the inadequate management of the emergency. This book challenges the conventional interpretation of the accident, providing a revised history of the event and at the same time putting forward a different explanation.

Chapter 6 discusses the limits of a purely accusatory approach in dealing with complex events such as the various types of organizational failure (except, of course, in cases of malicious intent and gross negligence) and its contribution, even if involuntary, to scapegoating. The accusatory approach renders organizational and institutional learning processes problematic, putting an end to complex events with the mere sanctioning of “bad apples.”

Chapter 2 offers a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the scapegoat in organizations. In such contexts, it would not be credible for the scapegoats to be extraneous to the event that they are blamed for. It is therefore an individual, or a group of individuals, in some way involved in the event, who are blamed. They are an instrument of organizational rationality, strategically deployed by the organization to avoid any legal consequences and economic damage. Nevertheless, scapegoating also benefits the managers of the organization because their personal reputation can be damaged by their association with a tainted organization. The chapter presents some situations that can favor the creation of scapegoats: accidents, business scandals, organizational failures, crises, and policy fiascos. These events, particularly if amplified by the media, tend to generate scapegoats with the greatest frequency.

Chapter 1 introduces the three different forms and types of use of the scapegoat concept: the archetypal figure/sacrificial victim, the innocent scapegoat, and the organizational scapegoat.

Chapter 4 illustrates some typical steps in the process of identifying organizational scapegoats and discusses the complex relationship between individual and organizational contribution in the etiology of critical events and organizational failures. In part, this involves the analysis of two emblematic cases: the torture of detainees that took place at Abu Ghraib prison and the scandal known as “Dieselgate.” These two cases show that scapegoating is an organizational strategy that can be implemented by both private, for-profit organizations as well as non-profit, governmental ones. These strategies can be used to cope with different crises ranging from (involuntary) incidents to (deliberate) violations of laws and moral norms.

Chapter 5 compares two different investigative logics that follow on from organizational failures: the accusatory approach, based on the person, and the system approach, aimed at organizational learning. It concludes by illustrating possible undesired effects of the accusatory approach through the discussion of the widespread practice of defensive medicine.

A large cruise ship sinks after hitting some outcropping rocks near the shore. Who is to blame? In the face of negative events – accidents, corporate scandals, crises and bankruptcies – there are two organizational strategies for managing blame. The first is to take full responsibility for the event and to implement adequate corrective measures. The second is to create one or more scapegoats by transferring blame to some of the people directly involved in the event. In this way, the organization can appear blameless and avoid costly remedial interventions. Reappraising the Costa Concordia shipwreck and other well-known cases, Catino analyzes the processes and mechanisms behind creating the “organizational scapegoat.” In doing so, Catino highlights the limits of explanations centered on guilt and individual solutions to organizational problems, and underlines the need for a different civic epistemology.