In most international tribunals, states alone can submit requests for advisory opinions.1 This is also true of requests to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) sitting in plenary composition. The United Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)2 does not expressly confer advisory jurisdiction on ITLOS. In practice, the Tribunal's advisory jurisdiction is governed by Article 138 of its Rules of Procedure, under which international agreements can empower entities to request advisory opinions of the Tribunal. The process leading to the making of advisory requests to ITLOS includes the drafting of legal questions and is largely political.3 In this process, sponsoring states have three goals: first, get requests before ITLOS; second, ensure that requests are not thrown out on grounds of jurisdiction or discretion; third, mobilize the constituency having stakes in the requests. This essay explores each of these goals.

Much scholarship on customary international law has examined the merits of induction, deduction, and assertion as approaches to custom identification. Save for where international tribunals identify custom by assertion, writers have viewed custom identification that does not rely on evidence of State practice and opinio juris as an example of deductive reasoning. However, writers have stated that, at best, deduction is reasoning from the general to the particular. This article draws on legal philosophy to define the contours of deductive reasoning and argues that pure deduction, namely deduction not combined with other forms of reasoning, is an unsound approach to custom identification. This argument is tested by reference to cases of custom identification by the International Court of Justice, categorised according to three types of deduction: normative, functional, and analogical. This article also explores the authority and utility of custom identification by pure deduction and its impact on content determination.

The literature on the identification of rules of customary international law is extensive. Commentators have focused on isolating the methodologies by which international courts and tribunals identify customary international law, with most of the debate revolving around the use of induction, or deduction and assertion as methods of custom identification. However, the existing literature has overlooked that the choice among custom identification methodologies takes place behind closed doors, during confidential deliberation processes. When all that scholars see may be deduction or assertion, international courts and tribunals may have ascertained the existence of customary rules by induction, but induction may not have made it into the final text of the decision. This article elaborates on the impact of judicial deliberations at the International Court of Justice on the choice among custom identification methodologies. It argues that individual-driven stages of deliberations favour custom identification by induction, while collegial stages promote custom identification by non-inductive methodologies.

Geographical phenomena impacting the shape of coastlines may have implications for the stability of maritime boundaries delimited by agreement or judicial process. Sea level rise resulting from human-caused climate change has recently arisen as an additional phenomenon compelling the re-assessment of the stability of maritime boundaries over time. In a recent article published in this Journal, Dr. Snjólaug Árnadóttir has argued that a solution to the challenges of coastline change could be for maritime boundaries to fluctuate following the fluctuation of the baselines on which their course depends. By way of reply to Dr. Árnadóttir’s suggestion, this article argues that fluctuating boundaries have no legal basis either in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or in judicial decisions. Moreover, the delimitation process in three stages, commonly applied by international courts and tribunals since the Black Sea judgment, appears to be ill-suited for establishing fluctuating boundaries. There seems to be other solutions to the problem of coastline change, which this article also briefly explores.

This brief contribution contains some reflections on the relevance of the “what about me?” question in proceedings on compensation and maritime delimitation. The focus is on disputes at the International Court of Justice (ICJ or Court). My argument is that, as things currently stand at the ICJ, the Court is ill-equipped to address the “what about me?” question and that, as a result, ICJ proceedings remain very much state-centric. This view likely is not surprising because the Court was conceived, since its origins in the 1920s, as an interstate judicial organ. Other dispute settlement institutions have developed since then to bring dispute settlement closer to individuals, such as regional human rights courts and arbitral tribunals in the investor-state context. However, this situation does not mean that the ICJ should not take into account individuals in deciding disputes submitted to its jurisdiction. What this situation does mean is that one would need to rethink some procedural aspects of ICJ dispute settlement, which I will discuss in relation to compensation, and parts of the ICJ's jurisprudence, which I will discuss in relation to maritime delimitation.

Judges ad hoc of the International Court of Justice have been widely criticized for their supposed lack of impartiality. This criticism may seem all the more powerful if one takes into account that judges ad hoc were created as a means to avoid the Court’s bias and appearance of bias. However, recent developments in the appointment of judges ad hoc indicate that, far from being a detriment to the states’ perception of the Court’s impartiality, judges ad hoc are a means to enhance the perception that the Court as a whole is impartial. Such developments include the increased frequency with which former elected judges are appointed judges ad hoc, the practice of electing judges from the ranks of former (or sitting) judges ad hoc, and the appointment of nationals or non-nationals as judges ad hoc. The institution of judges ad hoc has come full circle, and should be regarded as fulfilling the function for which it was created.