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Healthcare personnel (HCP) were recruited to provide serum samples, which were tested for antibodies against Ebola or Lassa virus to evaluate for asymptomatic seroconversion.
From 2014 to 2016, 4 patients with Ebola virus disease (EVD) and 1 patient with Lassa fever (LF) were treated in the Serious Communicable Diseases Unit (SCDU) at Emory University Hospital. Strict infection control and clinical biosafety practices were implemented to prevent nosocomial transmission of EVD or LF to HCP.
All personnel who entered the SCDU who were required to measure their temperatures and complete a symptom questionnaire twice daily were eligible.
No employee developed symptomatic EVD or LF. EVD and LF antibody studies were performed on sera samples from 42 HCP. The 6 participants who had received investigational vaccination with a chimpanzee adenovirus type 3 vectored Ebola glycoprotein vaccine had high antibody titers to Ebola glycoprotein, but none had a response to Ebola nucleoprotein or VP40, or a response to LF antigens.
Patients infected with filoviruses and arenaviruses can be managed successfully without causing occupation-related symptomatic or asymptomatic infections. Meticulous attention to infection control and clinical biosafety practices by highly motivated, trained staff is critical to the safe care of patients with an infection from a special pathogen.
The saltmarshes of the Georgia, USA, Atlantic coast are expansive and highly productive. The marshes form the intertidal ecosystem 5–10 km wide extending from the barrier-island chain to the mainland. The predominant macrophyte of the marshes is smooth cordgrass (Spartina alterniflora Loisel.). Cross-marsh average annual production of smooth cordgrass shoots in Georgia has been measured at approximately 1.3 kg m− 2 of marsh (Newell, 2001a, from Dai & Wiegert, 1996). Like most grasses, smooth cordgrass does not abscise its leaf blades; they remain attached to the leaf sheath after senescence and death (Newell, 1993, and references therein). As new blades are produced at the apex of shoots, the bottom blades senesce and die, until the whole shoot dies after flowering. Therefore, a large crop of standing-dead litter is available to microbes for decomposition for much of the year (for leaf blades alone, up to 538 g dry mass m− 2) (Newell et al., 1998).
Because smooth cordgrass is produced in an intertidal marsh, one might suspect that tidal flooding would be a major wetting phenomenon for the standing-dead cordgrass leaves. However, the grass shoots extend above the flooding-tidal level most of the time: it is estimated that most of the dead-blade mass is wetted by tides only about 10% of the time on an annual-average basis (Newell et al., 1998).
The first half of the sixteenth century witnessed the tentative beginnings of direct political relations between Ireland and France in the form of a French dimension to the intrigues of the Anglo-Irish Geraldine dynasty. During this period, leading members of the Geraldine family of Desmond and Kildare mounted campaigns in opposition to the English crown and in the process sought the assistance of François I (1494–1547). James Fitzgerald, tenth earl of Desmond (d. 1529), was the first Irish magnate to engage in serious intrigue with the French crown in the early 1520s. In 1540 his kinsman, Gerald Fitzgerald, heir to the earldom of Kildare then in abeyance following his half-brother's rebellion (1534–5), sought temporary asylum in France. His status as a leading Anglo-Irish magnate and as a figurehead of Ireland's first nation-wide coalition gained him an hospitable reception at the hands of the French authorities and ensured his safe passage through France into Flanders while exerting a modest strain on Anglo-French relations. In the longer term, it gave rise to his being invested with a pivotal role in French war propaganda during the 1540s. This deliberately contrived scaremongering was effective in playing upon one of the greatest fears of the Whitehall and Dublin administrations in relation to Ireland – a revival of the Geraldine interest, backed by the French and possibly the Scots. Through their intrigues the Fitzgeralds therefore furnished the French with legitimising causes for possible intervention in Ireland during the two Anglo-French wars in the 1520s and in the mid-1540s.
The opening years of the seventeenth century heralded a series of changes in politics in Ireland, France and on the international stage that brought to an end the episodic political engagement of the sixteenth century between Irish dissidents and the French for several decades to come. After the Spanish Armada, and throughout the 1590s, disaffected Irish lords consistently directed all their pleas for military aid at the Spanish and papal courts. However, a slight glimmer of hope for a possible French invasion of Ireland still survived so long as Hugh O'Neill, earl of Tyrone, and Hugh Roe O'Donnell of Tyrconnell led their campaign to forestall the Anglicisation of Ulster. Elizabeth I's decisive defeat of the joint Gaelic and Spanish forces led by O'Neill, O'Donnell and Don Juan del Águila at the battle of Kinsale in 1601, in the final challenge to the Tudor regime, and the departure from Ireland in 1607 of O'Neill and Rory O'Donnell (Hugh Roe's brother), the last of the greatest potentates of the Gaelic polity, effectively quashed the possibility of any further collusion between Irish rebels and the French. Henri IV's unwillingness to annoy James I, who concluded the Treaty of London with Spain in 1604, James's search for a Spanish or French bride and his resolution to concentrate on securing his position in England meanwhile proved decisive in ensuring the maintenance of stable amicable relations between the three monarchs in the first decade of the seventeenth century.
The historiography of Franco-Irish relations in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries has traditionally concentrated on commercial connections between the two countries and on the embryonic development of the Irish, and specifically the clerical, diaspora in France. Ireland's commercial ties with France in the late Middle Ages have been the subject of a substantial amount of specialised scholarly research that has broadly traced the principal trade routes, identified both Irish and French families involved in commercial networks and provided an insight into the practicalities of their business transactions. Arising from this exposition it is clear that Ireland had established trade links with the main ports of Normandy and those of the French Atlantic seaboard by the late fifteenth century. This trade survived the disruptions of legislative restrictions, war and piracy throughout the sixteenth century and increased in the early 1600s. While existing studies have examined Ireland's commerce with France in isolation, this study shows that when set within the wider context of sixteenth-century Franco-Irish relations, these connections, combined with Irish seafarers' familiarity with French ports, proved critical in facilitating the flight and safe harbouring of Ireland's political dissidents who sought asylum or assistance in France from 1540 onwards. Later they were to determine the destinations of the thousands of Irish migrants who fled to France during and in the immediate aftermath of the final contest in the Elizabethan conquest of Ireland, the Nine Years' War (1594–1603).
The flight of the Gaelic lords from Ulster, and the delicately balanced relationship between Henri IV, James I and Philip III in the early 1600s, effectively eliminated the remote prospect of a revival of Franco-Irish intrigue and closed a chapter on Ireland's short-lived political relations with France that was not re-opened until the 1640s. For almost sixty years, between the early 1520s and the early 1580s, the Irish had become embroiled in intrigue with the French for a variety of reasons. All the protagonists – the tenth earl of Desmond, Gerald Fitzgerald, Con O'Neill, Manus O'Donnell, O'Doherty, Cormac O'Connor, MacWilliam Burke, Shane O'Neill, Conor O'Brien, James Fitzmaurice, Brian MacGeoghegan andWilliam Nugent – were driven by essentially personal, dynastic or seigneurial motives. They sought French assistance to bolster their campaigns against the crown at times when they were experiencing particular difficulties in their immediate locales, and their rhetoric alone elevated their intensely localised disputes to the status of a ‘national’ cause. Some, such as James Fitzmaurice, sought French assistance to back their efforts to defend Catholicism in Ireland as part of their agenda for protecting their position and privileges in opposition to the advance of Anglicisation and Protestantism. Typically, when Gaelic lords such as Shane O'Neill and Manus O'Donnell were seeking better treatment from the English crown and the lord deputy and Irish council, they made political capital out of rumours of their alleged or real associations with the French in order to apply pressure on the English.
In early August 1540 Lord Leonard Grey's successor, Sir Anthony St Leger, arrived in Ireland to begin an eight-year term of office as lord deputy. This led to a change in the tenor of domestic and Anglo-Irish political relations which in turn profoundly shaped the character of Franco-Irish relations. During the early and mid-1540s the altered dynamic of Ireland's contacts with France resulted in a temporary aberration in their relations in two key respects. First, thanks to the success of St Leger's conciliatory policy in handling the most powerful Gaelic and Anglo-Irish lords, the early and mid-1540s witnessed none of the opportunistic contrivance with the French that had characterised previous decades. This was manifest in the refusal by both Anglo-Irish and Gaelic lords to respond to rumours of Gerald Fitzgerald leading a French invasion of Ireland that were little more than war propaganda deliberately circulated by Henry's French opponents in 1543–6 as one means of securing French victory over England. Second, in an unprecedented show of support for their newly-declared king, these lords mustered Gaelic soldiers for service in Henry's army in the Anglo-Scottish (1542–9) and Anglo-French (1543–6) wars at a time when his position and the security of the British Isles was particularly vulnerable.
St Leger's occupancy of the lord deputyship was critical in maintaining the fragile peace and stability that resulted in both Irish abstinence from involvement in intrigue with France and consequent minimal demands for financial, military and naval resources from the English privy council to fortify Ireland's defences.
Not so much for the care I have for Ireland, which I have often wished to be sunk in the sea, as for that the French should set foot therein, they should not only have entry to Scotland … but also by the commodity of the havens here [Ireland] and in Calais … whereby would endure such a ruin to England I am afeared to think on: The opinion of the earl of Sussex, touching reformation of Ireland, 11 Sept. 1560, Carew MSS, 302.
Although Franco-Irish intrigue during the period 1553–67 never reached the intensity or the seriousness that it had in the winter of 1549–50, a level of engagement between the French and Scottish courts and Irish dissidents persisted throughout the following two decades and quickened significantly in three distinct phases. The first serious engagement in the autumn and winter of 1553 centred on a plot to stage an uprising in Ireland to coincide with Sir Thomas Wyatt's rebellion in England. The crucial parties to this intrigue were Antoine de Noailles and Henri Clutin d'Oisel, ambassadors to England and Scotland respectively, along with Marie de Guise, the ringleaders of the Wyatt rebellion and probably Henri II. The second though much less consequential episode occurred in spring 1557, on the eve of the outbreak of war between France and England, when an Irishman named Power sought to capitalise on the tensions between the two monarchs by presenting Henri II with a proposal for a French invasion of Ireland.
The establishment of garrisons beyond the Pale in Ireland during the late 1540s initiated a process of piecemeal conquest which antagonised displaced Gaelic lords, drove them to seek foreign intervention and created strategic threats to the British polity where none had hitherto existed. Throughout the period from the late 1540s to the mid-1560s, Gaelic dissidents became embroiled with the French, the Scots and disaffected elements in England in intrigue which involved varying degrees of collaboration and which aimed at undermining the Tudor régime. For the first time the Gaelic lords' projection of the Irish cause in quasi-religious terms impacted in a real sense on the consciousness of France's leading statesmen. The highpoint of this convergence of interests occurred in the winter of 1549–50 when Henri II came closest to staging an invasion of Ireland via Scotland.
This episode took place at a critical phase in relations between France and the three kingdoms of the British Isles that revolved around two highly contentious issues – the dispute between France and England concerning the latter's determined hold on its few French possessions, and their conflicting interests in Scotland. Henri II's ascension to the French throne in 1547 and the concomitant ascendancy of the Guises, their joint support for Marie de Guise in Scotland, the vulnerability of the minority régime in England, the disturbed state of the Gaelic polity and strained relations between France and England in the late 1540s and early 1550s all augured well for Irish prospects of securing French intervention.