On 10 December 2018, the Court of Justice (CJEU) delivered the Wightman judgment and recognized the unilateral revocability of the notification ex Art. 50 Treaty on European Union (TEU). This article offers a critical analysis of the decision by insisting above all on the national background of the ruling and the political risks stemming from the decision. The article is structured as follows. Firstly, it analyses the legal questions of the Scottish case, which constituted the ground for the admissibility of the preliminary ruling and showed the perils for the exercise of national sovereign rights embedded in the lack of clarity on revocation options. It thus reconstructs the critical aspects of the preliminary ruling of the CJEU. Subsequently, the article examines the implications of the ruling for the EU legal order. On the one hand, the analysis considers the conception of the EU membership by comparing the approach of the CJEU and that of Advocate General Campos Sánchez Bordona in Wightman.

In order to get a better understanding of the current relationship between liberty and security in the European Union (EU), the essay adopts a new approach to counterterrorism matters, namely by availing itself of Administrative Law, and focuses on a specific case study, the European Community's (EC) regulations on freezing the assets of the terrorists as well as those of the people and entities associated with the terror network and blacklisting the identified subjects.

This article aims to analyse the role of law in the identification of the responsibility domain of ‘regulatory science’ (Jasanoff, 1990) within the risk regulatory process. The main research question is therefore,what kindof relationshipbetween science andpolicy-making lawshould design in risk regulation.

In order to address this issue, this contribution focuses on the recent verdict of the Tribunal of L’Aquila. After the earthquake occurred in L’Aquila on the 6th April 2009, six Italian scientists that had participated in the Major Risks Commission's meeting have been condemned for the multiple manslaughter of 29 people who were among the 309 victims of the earthquake, ‘for having assessed the risks related to seismic activity in the L’Aquila territory in an inaccurate, generic and ineffective way’ and for having provided ‘information which was imprecise, incomplete and contradictory as to the nature, the causes and the hazardousness and on the future development of the seismic activity’.

As far as risk assessment and risk communication are concerned, firstly the tasks of the Major Risks Commission under the Italian Civil Protection law will be analysed. Against this backdrop, the issues related to this expert body's responsibility will be addressed and the gaps in the current accountability regime will be pointed out.

This article aims to analyse liability issues as a further means to regulate risks, in case the precautionary measures of the delivered safety system fail. Through liability, the risk that cannot be prevented can be transferred onto those parties who are in the best position to spread them. The allocation of liability thus works as an incentive to the correct functioning of the preventive measures. Liability rules appear to be a key legal remedy which can ensure both tort reparation and a fair and efficient distribution of burdens in a legal order. In this vein, air traffic management (ATM) is addressed as a case study, which shows the main issues and the gaps that liability rules face when dealing with the trade off between risk and safety as conveyed by technology.

After having clarified the nature of the relations between risk and liability on the one hand, and automation and liability on the other hand, this article analyses liability issues in the framework of ATM by approaching this topic in a comparative way between the National Airspace System (NAS) of the United States of America (USA) and the Single European Sky (SES) of the European Union (EU).