What effects do contentious elections have on partisan appraisals of democracy? We consider the case of the November 2020 US election, a highly polarized partisan contest but also an objectively free and fair election by credible accounting. We conducted a panel study embedded within two nationally representative surveys before and after the election. Results indicate a familiar but underexamined partisan gap, in which satisfaction with democracy decreases among Republicans and increases among Democrats relative to nonpartisans. We find that the gap is fully mediated by partisan shifts in satisfaction with elections and the news media that cover them. Our results underscore how eroding institutional confidence can undermine democratic legitimacy in hitherto consolidated democracies. To overcome partisan divisions following contentious elections, we highlight the need to bolster confidence in democratic institutions to reduce partisan fears and uncertainties—both rational and irrational—that electoral losses may trigger.

Our research speaks to the ongoing debate over the extent and severity of partisan political divisions in American society. We employ behavioral experiments to probe for affective polarization using dictator, trust, and public goods games with party identification treatments. We find that subjects who identify politically with the Democratic or Republican Party and ideologically as liberals and conservatives display stronger affective biases than politically unaffiliated and ideological moderates. Partisan subjects are less altruistic, less trusting, and less likely to contribute to a mutually beneficial public good when paired with members of the opposing party. Compared to other behavioral studies, our research suggests increasing levels of affective polarization in the way Americans relate to one another politically, bordering on the entrenched divisions one commonly sees in conflict or post-conflict societies. To overcome affective polarization, our research points to inter-group contact as a mechanism for increasing trust and bridging political divides.

Much research examining gender bias in politics analyzes responses to explicit survey questions asking individuals whether they prefer male over female leaders or agree that male political leaders are superior. Drawing insights from the measurement of other types of prejudice, this article explores the methodological shortcomings of a widely used question of this type. Analyzing the results of two surveys—one national and one state-level—I compare response patterns to a standard, highly explicit question that is frequently administered by the Pew Research Center with those for a modestly altered item that employs multiple strategies to reduce social desirability bias. Compared with the alternative measure, the conventional item seriously underreports prejudice against women leaders. Moreover, the underreporting of bias is especially prevalent among individuals belonging to groups that are strong advocates of gender equality.

Popular accounts of the 2016 presidential election attribute Donald Trump’s victory to the mobilization of angry white men seeking to restore traditional values and social roles. Whereas a majority of Trump voters were male, more than 40% of women who went to the polls on Election Day also supported him. This analysis explores the motivations of these women, asking how partisanship, demographics, and beliefs motivated their vote choice. We found that, although party affiliation was an important predictor of both women’s and men’s vote choice, sexism and racial resentment had a greater influence on voters of both genders. Moreover, the influence of these biases was similar for women and men.

Scholars exploring the female representation gap in the U.S. Congress have pointed to district-level differences to explain why some districts regularly field women candidates and elect congresswomen while others almost never do. Specifically, demographic, economic, and political characteristics strongly influence a district's female candidacy, nomination, and election rates. This article asks whether also knowing about a district's religious environment helps us better predict the presence and success of women candidates. My central finding is that religiosity, in general, and the strength of some denominations within a district are strong predictors of where women will run and how well they will compete.

Research shows that areas with high levels of aggregate religiosity are less likely to elect female candidates to national, state, and local offices. These studies, however, do not determine the causal mechanisms underlying this relationship. In the present analysis, we seek to examine what role, if any, religious exposure and tradition play in determining individuals’ general election vote choices in mixed-gender contests. To explore this relationship, we use data from the 2010 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies. We find some evidence of a relationship between religious beliefs and voting for female congressional candidates; when compared to secular voters, evangelical Protestants and Catholics are more likely to vote for Republican women and less likely to support Democratic women. Our results, however, also underscore partisan identities’ central role in shaping individual vote choice, regardless of a candidate's gender.