To determine the scope, source, and mode of transmission of a multifacility outbreak of extensively drug-resistant (XDR) Acinetobacter baumannii.

Outbreak investigation.

Residents and patients in skilled nursing facilities, long-term acute-care hospital, and acute-care hospitals.

A case was defined as the incident isolate from clinical or surveillance cultures of XDR Acinetobacter baumannii resistant to imipenem or meropenem and nonsusceptible to all but 1 or 2 antibiotic classes in a patient in an Oregon healthcare facility during January 2012–December 2014. We queried clinical laboratories, reviewed medical records, oversaw patient and environmental surveillance surveys at 2 facilities, and recommended interventions. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) and molecular analysis were performed.

We identified 21 cases, highly related by PFGE or healthcare facility exposure. Overall, 17 patients (81%) were admitted to either long-term acute-care hospital A (n=8), or skilled nursing facility A (n=8), or both (n=1) prior to XDR A. baumannii isolation. Interfacility communication of patient or resident XDR status was not performed during transfer between facilities. The rare plasmid-encoded carbapenemase gene blaOXA-237 was present in 16 outbreak isolates. Contact precautions, chlorhexidine baths, enhanced environmental cleaning, and interfacility communication were implemented for cases to halt transmission.

Interfacility transmission of XDR A. baumannii carrying the rare blaOXA-237 was facilitated by transfer of affected patients without communication to receiving facilities.

Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2017;38:1335–1341

To establish a statewide network to detect, control, and prevent the spread of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) in a region with a low incidence of CRE infection.

Implementation of the Drug Resistant Organism Prevention and Coordinated Regional Epidemiology (DROP-CRE) Network.

Oregon infection prevention and microbiology laboratory personnel, including 48 microbiology laboratories, 62 acute care facilities, and 140 long-term care facilities.

The DROP-CRE working group, comprising representatives from academic institutions and public health, convened an interdisciplinary advisory committee to assist with planning and implementation of CRE epidemiology and control efforts. The working group established a statewide CRE definition and surveillance plan; increased the state laboratory capacity to perform the modified Hodge test and polymerase chain reaction for carbapenemases in real time; and administered surveys that assessed the needs and capabilities of Oregon infection prevention and laboratory personnel. Results of these inquiries informed CRE education and the response plan.

Of 60 CRE reported from November 2010 through April 2013, only 3 were identified as carbapenemase producers; the cases were not linked, and no secondary transmission was found. Microbiology laboratories, acute care facilities, and long-term care facilities reported lacking carbapenemase testing capability, reliable interfacility communication, and CRE awareness, respectively. Survey findings informed the creation of the Oregon CRE Toolkit, a state-specific CRE guide booklet.

A regional epidemiology surveillance and response network has been implemented in Oregon in advance of widespread CRE transmission. Prospective surveillance will determine whether this collaborative approach will be successful at forestalling the emergence of this important healthcare-associated pathogen.

Mandatory reporting of healthcare-associated infections is common, but underreporting by hospitals limits meaningful interpretation.

To validate mandatory intensive care unit (ICU) central line–associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI) reporting by Oregon hospitals.

Blinded comparison of ICU CLABSI determination by hospitals and health department–based external reviewers with group adjudication.

Forty-four Oregon hospitals required by state law to report ICU CLABSIs.

Seventy-six patients with ICU CLABSIs and a systematic sample of 741 other patients with ICU-related bacteremia episodes.

External reviewers examined medical records and determined CLABSI status. All cases with CLABSI determinations discordant from hospital reporting were adjudicated through formal discussion with hospital staff, a process novel to validation of CLABSI reporting.

Hospital representatives and external reviewers agreed on CLABSI status in 782 (96%) of 817 bacteremia episodes (k = 0.77 [95% confidence interval (CI), 0.70-0.84]). Among the 27 episodes identified as CLABSIs by external reviewers but not reported by hospitals, the final status was CLABSI in 16 (59%). The measured sensitivities of hospital ICU CLABSI reporting were 72% (95% CI, 62%-81%) with adjudicated CLABSI determination as the reference standard and 60% (95% CI, 51%-69%) with external review alone as the reference standard (P = .07). Validation increased the statewide ICU CLABSI rate from 1.21 (95% CI, 0.95-1.51) to 1.54 (95% CI, 1.25-1.88) CLABSIs/1,000 central line–days; ICU CLABSI rates increased by more than 1.00 CLABSI/1,000 central line–days in 6 (14%) hospitals.

Validating hospital CLABSI reporting improves accuracy of hospital-based CLABSI surveillance. Discussing discordant findings improves the quality of validation.