The hybridisation of welfare regimes is a critical issue in social policy literature due to the lack of a uniform dependent variable and the comparative, international scope of social policy analysis, and data availability. We argue that what is presented in the global welfare regime literature as an analytical problem of classification or transitioning could also, in fact, be treated as a methodological issue. Based on this, we aim to establish a criterion for determining the membership of a welfare regime by capturing the presence of hybridisation of welfare regimes in a given country at a particular time. We present a novel methodological approach based on multistage sampling to capture the hybridisation of distinct welfare regimes and determine the most populous cluster in Pakistan. Establishing criteria for capturing and determining welfare regime membership can improve the understanding of welfare regime dynamics and factors that contribute to hybridisation. Ultimately, this knowledge can inform policy decisions and contribute to the development of more effective welfare systems for diverse populations.

Anchored on the global welfare regime literature, this article discusses three key themes: welfare regime change, the drivers of change and the implication of the regime change toward insecurity in Southeast Asia. This article focuses on welfare regimes in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand mainly because these countries experienced high economic growth and were correspondingly affected by the 1997-Asian financial crisis. However, their response to the crisis differed due to their distinctive historical-colonial legacies. The article argues that the regimes shifted from productivist to a more inclusive regime partly as public health programmes reached citizens previously uncovered. However, the timing, pace and direction of welfare reform met social unrest, and fundamentally brought into the fore questions of ‘ontological security’. The article concludes that the three regimes cannot substantiate a shift towards ‘secure’ welfare regimes as they continue to rely heavily on family and community for welfare provision to overcome social risk.

Welfare policy may promote social integration and reduce social conflicts in communities. However, this study finds that the Indonesian unconditional cash transfer program stimulated multifaceted conflicts, which were accompanied by harmful social unrest. The government failed to lessen such conflicts, but community leaders successfully minimized the conflicts through informal redistribution. This redistribution reflects problematic informal-formal layering and nesting, which lead to a complicated policy failure. Employing social conflict and institutional change theoretical frameworks, this article aims at using the Indonesian cash transfer as a lens to understand how and why welfare policy causes social conflicts in communities and how the conflicts stimulate policy distortion and modification, resulting in policy failure. This policy failure reveals important theoretical implications on the nexus of conflict and institutional change.