One can share Block's aim of distinguishing “phenomenal” experience from cognitive function and agree with much in his views, yet hold that the inclusion of representational content within phenomenal content, if only in certain spatial cases, obscures this distinction. It may also exclude some modular theories, although it is interestingly suggestive of what may be the limits of the phenomenal penetration of the representational mind.

The early evidence pertaining to the development of phonological segmentation abilities and their relation to reading was collected with English-speaking subjects. Although data from other languages have been obtained, explicit cross-language comparisons have not been made. It was considered that since languages vary in their phonological structures, they may also vary in the demands they make on the beginning reader. The present study compared the segmentation abilities of Italian children with those of English-speaking (American) children using the same methods of assessment and the same subject-selection criteria. At the preschool level, though the Italian children manifested a higher level of performance overall, their pattern of performance paralleled that obtained earlier with American children. In both groups, syllable segmentation ability was stronger than phoneme segmentation. After school entrance, this pattern remained unchanged in American children but was reversed in Italian beginning readers. In both language groups, however, phonemic segmentation ability distinguished children of different levels of reading skill. The discrepancies between the language groups were seen as reflecting phonologic and orthographic differences between the languages.

Depue & Morrone-Strupinsky’s (D&M-S’s) language suggests that, unlike Kent Berridge, they may allow that the activity of a largely subcortical system, which is presumably often introspectively and cognitively inaccessible, constitutes affectively felt experience even when so. Such experience would then be phenomenally conscious without being reflexively conscious or cognitively access-conscious, to use distinctions formulated by the philosopher Ned Block.

Rolls's preliminary definitions of emotion and speculative restriction of consciousness, including emotional sentience, to humans, display behaviorist prejudice. Reinforcement and causation are not by themselves sufficient conceptual resources to define either emotion or the directedness of thought and motivated action. For any adequate definition of emotion or delimitation of consciousness, new physiology, such as Rolls is contributing to, and also the resources of other fields, will be required.

Interpreting VTA dopamine activity as a facilitator of affective engagement fits Depue & Collins's agency dimension of extraverted personality and also Watson's and Tellegen's (1985) engagement dimension of state mood. Serotonin, by turning down the gain on dopaminergic affective engagement, would permit already prepotent responses or habits to prevail against the behavior-switching incentive-simulation-driven temptations of the moment facilitated by fickle VTA DA. Intelligent switching between openly responsive affective engagement and constraint by long-term plans, goals, or values presumably involves environment-sensitive balancing of these neuromodulators, such as socially dominant primates may show.

The lesson of this column is: In an emergency, treat first and ask legal questions later. This is both good medicine and good law.

There is no universally recognized definition of an emergency, and the law will generally accept the determination of health care professionals, if consistent with accepted practice, in defining an emergency condition or situation. The most common definition is that an emergency is any injury or acute medical condition liable to cause death, disability, or serious illness if not immediately attended to.

Obvious examples of emergency conditions that require the immediate attention of a physician or properly trained health professional to prevent loss of life include:

• Massive hemorrhage from major vessels

• Cardiac arrest

• Cessation or acute embarrassment of respiration

• Profound shock from any cause

• Rapidly acting poison

• Anaphylactic reactions

• Acute epidural hemorrhage

• Acute overwhelming bacteremia and

• toxemia

• Severe head injuries

• Penetrating wound of the pleura or pericardium

• Rupture of an abdominal viscus

• Acute psychotic states.

The regulation of the use and distribution of drugs in the United States is governed by a complex set of state and federal laws and regulations. These laws and regulations are designed to accomplish a variety of purposes. First, the federal government hopes to exclude from interstate commerce drugs that are not both “safe and effective.” This function is performed by the United States Food and Drug Administration, exercising its authority under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act and involves, for the most part, regulating the manufacturers of drugs. Second, both state and federal laws and regulations exist to keep “controlled substances” out of the hands of individuals who would use (or abuse) such substances for recreational as opposed to therapeutic purposes. The regulation of the use of such substances is primarily accomplished by the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and similar laws that exist at the state level. Third, some drugs, because of their toxicity or habit-forming qualities, are prohibited from public consumption without the guidance of a health care professional. Unlike over-the-counter drugs which may be purchased by anyone, these drugs may only be purchased by a consumer who presents a valid prescription to a pharmacist.