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González-Ruibal et al. raise challenging issues that seem frightening in their implications. In both their specificity and their wider theoretical contexts, I had previously given these issues little thought, and some I had not even recognised. I share fully the authors’ concern that archaeologists must seek ways to engage people influenced by ‘reactionary populism’, people who “are diverse, fragmented and complex”, and who may be “greedy, patriarchal, xenophobic or uninterested in the past” (González-Ruibal et al. above). The authors find fault with the multi-vocal, multi-cultural approaches of epistemic populist archaeologies that tend to exclude most of those who fit this description. I could object to some of the details of the authors’ critiques of epistemic populism and heritage studies, but their core arguments are mostly correct and powerful. At the same time, at least within a North American context, I think that archaeologists have generally reacted to the various populist pressures of the past century and that we have already started to do what the authors suggest.
What is the nature of true morality?…[I]t must be a kind of ethics involving letting go of one's own interest on behalf of others, being ready if necessary to sacrifice one's own interests for them, even on behalf of an enemy.
– George Ellis (2004)Yep, son, we have met the enemy, and he is us.
– Walt Kelly (1971)Not letting go of cherished ideas or objects can bring all sorts of trouble and can cause no small amount of pain. In this chapter, I contend that letting go is an important process in the development and application of archaeological ethics. In fact, letting go is an imperative if archaeology is to evolve as a discipline. Letting go of ethics may seem counterintuitive and somehow unethical because many of us think of ethics as morals, values, or principles to which we must hold fast instead of the tools they actually are. These days, especially with so many stakeholders to whom we are said to be accountable, many archaeologists seem to find themselves bogged down in all sorts of ethical quagmires, or they worry that they will be. A quick look at the history of archaeology, however, shows that this really isn't so new.
Our archaeological predecessors struggled hard to become a discipline, which included developing what they thought of as ethical practice. The nineteenth-century shift away from antiquarianism demanded an ethic of systematic excavation and data recording, which forced archaeology toward science, piling on additional strata of ethical practice. A peculiarly Western epistemology, science was a good fit with colonialism, which heaped on another layer of ethics. A key notion was that the Other would eventually disappear, so part of archaeology's growing ethical burden was to salvage what remained of the Others’ pasts. Archaeology became a kind of scientific colonialism (Galtung 1967: 13). Bolstered by technological advances, archaeologists also sought to discover and interpret the past of the Other, and in doing so, they developed an ethic of stewardship in order to protect the Others’ physical remains – sites, artefacts, human remains – for all humanity. By the 1970s, the positivistic truths of processual archaeology eclipsed pasts known using other epistemologies, and cultural heritage management emerged as a sibling to archaeology.
Researchers have increasingly promoted an emerging paradigm of Indigenous archaeology, which includes an array of practices conducted by, for, and with Indigenous communities to challenge the discipline's intellectual breadth and political economy. McGhee (2008) argues that Indigenous archaeology is not viable because it depends upon the essentialist concept of “Aboriginalism.” In this reply, we correct McGhee's description of Indigenous Archaeology and demonstrate why Indigenous rights are not founded on essentialist imaginings. Rather, the legacies of colonialism, sociopolitical context of scientific inquiry, and insights of traditional knowledge provide a strong foundation for collaborative and community-based archaeology projects that include Indigenous peoples.
The most recent opinion in the so-called Kennewick Man or Ancient One (as many American Indians choose to call the skeleton) case by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unfortunately resurrects some very old and contentious issues in America. Indians mostly view the opinion as one more echo of the same old story of Native American property issues raised in the courts, but they also understand that some implications may be broader. The most direct impact of the opinion is that the Umatilla people will not be allowed to return the Ancient One to the earth, but others could be portents of a larger resurgence of anti-Indian sentiment and scientific colonialism in America. Specifically, though not directly stated as such, the court's opinion supports a notion that archaeological materials are a public heritage, no matter their culture of origin. In addition, by affirming the plaintiffs' position, the court essentially declared archaeologists and associated scientists to be the primary stewards of that heritage, much to the chagrin of many American Indian people. Along the way, the court reinforced the idea that scientifically generated evidence has greater validity than oral tradition in court, outright denying oral tradition's validity and undercutting a major intention of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). Worse still, the court reflects—and by its decision supports—an idea that there may be a “white” or European history for the Americas that predates the arrival of Indians. The most damaging and long-term impact is that the decision reinforces fundamentally erroneous definitions and stereotypes about Indians as tribes, which has plagued Indian-white relations for generations.