History is the accumulation of human activities over time. Historians have sought ceaselessly to explore changes in, amongst other things, intellectual trends, cultures, materials, races, genders, political systems, and international politics. However, if we change the geographical space in which we examine history, will we reach the same conclusions? During my academic travels in East Asia, Europe, and the United States, the question that came up most often was what can we learn about Cold War history from a maritime perspective? Current scholarship shows us that the Cold War in East Asia took shape as the result of the standoff between the US and the USSR in respect of the military, ideology, political systems, and economic markets, amongst other things. But it cannot answer the question I encountered. This book, accordingly, invites its audience to rethink how the ocean – which was characterised as a geostrategic barrier – functions as a barometer that can allow one to comprehend the untold stories embedded in the interactions between the United States and its East Asian allies and enemies alike during the Cold War.

The collapse of the Japanese Empire in the aftermath of World War II left a power vacuum in maritime East Asia. The United States recognised this opportunity to shape the emerging Cold War and the geopolitical landscape of the western Pacific rim. Despite the lack of consensus among decision-makers in Washington, on-site naval commanders could effectively influence the US strategy in the region. The US Navy selected Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist China as a local partner to assume responsibility for guarding the western Pacific rim. This decision was based not only on Chiang’s good relationship with the US Navy, which allowed it to enter China’s territorial waters and ports, but also on the belief that a pro-US Chinese navy could help secure America’s naval dominance in the region. With US military and financial support, Chiang successfully rebuilt a modern Nationalist navy. However, the ongoing power struggle between the Nationalists and the Communists made the situation unpredictable in maritime East Asia.

The author takes a detailed look at decision-makers’ plans for unified commands in the Pacific from 1947 onwards and elaborates on the debates within the Truman administration over naval deployment in post-war East Asia and its overall international security goals. The author further argues that the wartime competition for leadership in the Pacific between MacArthur and Nimitz did not end with World War II but persisted in the immediate post-war period. The United States regarded the Pacific as its lake, but the United States’ Navy–Army division resulted in it being a divided lake in terms of authority: the Army led the Far East Command and the Navy held the Pacific Command according to the 1947 unified command plan. This chapter also shows the inextricable link between international and regional turbulence and America’s construction of unified commands in the Pacific. Mainland China, which the US Navy chose as a springboard where it could build its maritime order in post-war East Asia, was not included in either the Far East Command or the Pacific Command. Truman administration’s ambiguous China policy and the Navy–Army competition for leadership in the Pacific blurred the contours of America’s maritime East Asia.

By shifting from the military to the legal and economic aspects of this history, it can enrich our understanding of Washington’s maritime policy in Cold War East Asia. Thus, this chapter sketches out the interaction between the United States and its local partners in maritime East Asia, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, from a non-military perspective. These local partners were sheltered under the military umbrella of its system of hub-and-spoke alliances formed by mutual defence treaties. However, between them, the historical twists and turns of sovereignty rendered the international politics of East Asia all but impenetrable. Because these countries are linked by the maritime space, a consideration of the demarcation of internationally accepted maritime boundaries and fishing zones, a matter bound up in issues of sovereignty and local interests that remained controversial over the course of two centuries, provides us with a historical lens through which to examine the political calculations of each American ally in maritime East Asia and how these influenced Washington’s deliberations as it designed its global maritime policies.

This chapter demonstrates how Washington came to appreciate the western Pacific as an indispensable geostrategic space and how American strategy prioritised regulation of the sea routes safeguarding this natural barrier. In addition, the author re-evaluates the current understanding of the 1950s crises in East Asia. The author argues that, following these crises, the United States reappraised the western Pacific rim and came to regard it as the most strategically valuable area of the Pacific. It reshuffled the organisational structure of the Pacific Command once again by strengthening its naval connection with its allies, particularly Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, as these were choke points on the front lines of the Cold War.

The interservice competition for leadership in the Pacific made it impossible for Washington to reach a consensus on strategic deployment in maritime East Asia. What really brought about the US Navy’s renouncement of its mainland-based strategy and its subsequent adoption of an offshore defensive perimeter was not the achievement of a consensus with the other services but the Chinese Communist Party’s occupation of the whole of mainland China in 1949. At this point, the United States had no choice but to withdraw all its naval forces from Qingdao, which had been the emblem of the Navy’s forward-deployed, offensive, and mainland-based strategic thinking in East Asia. China’s split across the Taiwan Strait left the structure of international politics in maritime East Asia indeterminate.

Chapter 2 argues that the perception of a threat from the Soviet Union spurred the US Navy to adopt a forward-deployed posture of defence. This naval strategy sought to deploy US naval forces in strategically valued harbours around the areas surrounding the Soviet Union so as to politically and militarily deter the Kremlin from extending its influence in the western Pacific. Moscow’s control over Port Arthur and Dalian in the northeastern part of China led the US Navy to establish the headquarters of the Seventh Fleet at the port of Qingdao, which it treated as a hub for defending America’s international security in maritime East Asia. The US Navy aimed to establish a balance of power in maritime East Asia by preventing its potential adversary, the Soviet Union, from becoming a regional hegemon. By August 1945, nascent Cold War rivalry was already discernible in the western Pacific rim, and the contours of the Cold War were palpable in maritime East Asia.

The author argues that the policy of non-interference changed when it was suspected that there were oil reserves in the East China Sea. The possible oil reserves under the seabed of the East China Sea indicated in the 1969 Emery report convinced the United States to cooperate with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, but they also led to competition between these countries for ownership of these natural resources. The volatile international situation and the changing nature of great-power politics created a dynamic in maritime East Asia that had far-reaching consequences for both America’s alliance network and Washington’s naval deployment in the western Pacific. The author argues that the United States viewed the sea as a dangerous geographical space that could trigger all-out conflict with China and had thus begun to regard the maritime space of East Asia as a buffer zone that would allow it to maintain a distance from China instead of regarding it as a geostrategic barrier for containment. These political and military contours of maritime East Asia were a product of the interaction between Washington’s domestic and foreign policies and the internal dynamics of the East Asian countries.

The western Pacific has had its share of the international spotlight. In August 2022, Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. China launched the military exercises around Taiwan to express its dissatisfaction. A war across the Taiwan Strait was on the verge. To ease the tension, President Joe Biden had a meeting with Xi Jinping during the G20 Bali Summit in November. While both sides reached nothing, the United States took advantage of this occasion to demonstrate its determination of maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait again. It is because, in addition to chip production and democratic values, Taiwan occupies the position of geostrategic value.

The author argues that the outbreak of the Korean War drove the United States to rethink the geostrategic value of the Navy in the maritime space. The US Navy demonstrated its capability of sea–air warfare to delay Kim II-sung’s pace of occupying the whole Korean Peninsula when the US/UN ground troops underwent tragic setback during the first three months of the war. The Navy’s contributions were not only to save time for the Army to launch Operation Chromite but also to provide logistics support which laid the groundwork to push North Korea back to the 38th parallel. The US Navy successfully lent credence to its indispensable significance in defence of America’s security in maritime East Asia and persuaded Washington to adopt a more sea-oriented approach in its strategic thinking.

The author argues that relations within East Asia also shaped US foreign policy in maritime East Asia by taking fishing resources into account. The author details that the United States made expedient use of fishing resources in the western Pacific to consolidate Japan’s internal order immediately after the war lest it became yet another divided country, which would undermine America’s international security order in East Asia. Accordingly, the United States unilaterally took command of some of the bountiful fishery resources to help Japan along towards its post-war economic revival. The end of the occupation of Japan marked a watershed in America’s natural resource policy for the western Pacific. After 1952, the United States gradually took a backseat in natural resource management. When Japan turned to China to negotiate over fishing rights, it was a sign that the Cold War on the seas was not absolutely black and white. This also provides a way of understanding America’s multiplicity and flexibility in its East Asian policy.

This chapter argues that US maritime policy was not limited to the construction of geostrategic space but also extended to the international political arena. The author analyses how the United Nations Conferences on the International Law of the Sea in 1958 and 1960, intended for legal discussion, became embroiled in the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The chapter explores how the United States sought a legal basis for its maritime dominance at these conferences and how its hub-and-spoke allies in East Asia responded to these efforts. Despite the support of its allies, the United States faced challenges in obtaining their backing in confronting Soviet challenges to the international law of the seas, due to issues of local sovereignty and interest. The author also examines the reasons behind Washington’s decision to change its stance on the breadth of territorial waters and how its East Asian allies responded to this shift. Overall, the chapter provides insight into the complex dynamics of US maritime policy in East Asia and its impact on international relations.