Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

21 results

Page 1 of 2

  • Markets, repugnance, and externalities

  • Kimberly D. Krawiec
  • Journal: Journal of Institutional Economics , First View
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 July 2022, pp. 1-12
    • Article
      • You have access
      • Open access
    • PDF
    • HTML
    • Export citation

  • This Article considers one aspect of the ongoing debate about the moral limits of markets – namely, the purported harmful effects of market transactions on particular relations, goods, services, or society at large, due to an inappropriate valuation. In other words, the argument is that some markets are ‘repugnant’ because they degrade and corrupt a variety of nonmarket values and relations, not just to the willing parties to the exchange, but to larger segments of society. This objection contains both a (frequently unacknowledged) empirical component and a moral component. This Article critiques these empirical claims on two grounds. First, market skeptics fail to provide evidence of the negative effects they hypothesize, despite widespread variation over time and across legal regimes. Second, these objections fail to account for the well-documented human tendency to fashion repugnant exchanges in a manner that reinforces – rather than undermines – deeply held values and relationships.

  • 15 - Organ Entrepreneurs

  • from Part III - Legal Incentives Supporting (and Sometimes Discouraging) Entrepreneurial Action
  • Edited by D. Gordon Smith, Brian Broughman, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee, Christine Hurt
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Law and Entrepreneurship in the United States
  • Published online: 07 April 2022
  • Print publication: 14 April 2022, pp 268-282

  • Summary

    The supply of human organs for transplantation might seem an unlikely place to begin thinking about entrepreneurship. After all, there is no production market for human organs. With the surprising exception of Iran, legal rules around the world make the sale of human organs for transplantation a criminal offense. Moreover, at first blush the social organization of the organ supply and the transplant system more generally seem quite far removed from the world of entrepreneurial innovation. In general, organ transplants are strongly regulated, allocation rules are governed mostly by medical criteria rather than supply and demand, and most people’s conception of the system’s organizing principle is based on an understanding of organ donation as a special, even sacred, sort of gift – the “gift of life.” The market seems a long way off. While proposals for creating transplant markets have been made periodically since the 1980s, the casual observer could be forgiven for thinking that entrepreneurship was of little conceptual use in understanding the transplant field, and vice versa.

  • Let’s Talk: What FinReg Can Learn from New Governance (and Vice Versa)

  • Kimberly D. Krawiec
  • Journal: Law & Social Inquiry / Volume 44 / Issue 4 / November 2019
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 October 2019, pp. 1241-1250
  • Print publication: November 2019

  • Lauren Edelman’s Working Law: Courts, Corporation, and Symbolic Civil Rights (2016) is remarkably relevant to the study of financial regulation. In particular, three factors that Edelman identifies as contributing to legal endogeneity and symbolic compliance—ambiguous law, a lack of clear outcome measures, and the presence of legal intermediaries—are especially salient in this context. It has long been recognized that powerful financial institutions and the lawyers, lobbyists, and other agents who serve them have the ability to influence the law ex ante, through political lobbying. Edelman’s work reinforces the point that they may also do so ex post through an endogenous process of interpretation, implementation, and, ultimately, enshrinement of symbolic compliance with ambiguous law.

Policy Shock
  • Recalibrating Risk and Regulation after Oil Spills, Nuclear Accidents and Financial Crises
  • Edited by Edward J. Balleisen, Lori S. Bennear, Kimberly D. Krawiec, Jonathan B. Wiener
  • Published online: 24 October 2017
  • Print publication: 02 November 2017
  • Policy Shock examines how policy-makers in industrialized democracies respond to major crises. After the immediate challenges of disaster management, crises often reveal new evidence or frame new normative perspectives that drive reforms designed to prevent future events of a similar magnitude. Such responses vary widely - from cosmetically masking inaction, to creating stronger incentive systems, requiring greater transparency, reorganizing government institutions and tightening regulatory standards. This book situates post-crisis regulatory policy-making through a set of conceptual essays written by leading scholars from economics, psychology and political science, which probe the latest thinking about risk analysis, risk perceptions, focusing events and narrative politics. It then presents ten historically-rich case studies that engage with crisis events in three policy domains: offshore oil, nuclear power and finance. It considers how governments can prepare to learn from crisis events - by creating standing expert investigative agencies to identify crisis causes and frame policy recommendations.

Page 1 of 2