Online misinformation endangers the infrastructure of fact essential to public discourse and presents an even greater threat where it is being utilised as a weapon by hostile state actors. In recognition of these dangers, Singapore has implemented legal measures to combat online misinformation, enacting in quick succession the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) and the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA). These statutes open up novel frontiers of development for Singapore's free speech jurisprudence. Indeed, these statutes confer upon government authorities the power to compel the authors of certain material to display notices stating that the material contains falsehoods or originated from a hostile information campaign. Yet, should one accept that the constitutional right to freedom of speech extends to the freedom not to speak, the compulsion of such expressions may well be unconstitutional under Singapore's free speech guarantee. This article will study the theoretical justifications for a prohibition against compelled speech to evaluate whether Singapore free speech jurisprudence ought to recognise such a prohibition, propose a doctrinal framework to analyse compelled expressions by reference to US, UK, and Canadian jurisprudence, and critically assess how the POFMA and FICA would fare under such a doctrine.