British strategic foreign policy in the Baltic and the Balkans meant dealing with Soviet Russia and Italy. The goals in both cases were similar: first, the war should be localised as much as could be achieved; second, both Moscow and Rome should be persuaded to give as little support to Berlin as possible and, if possible, weaned away from Germany. However, strategic foreign policy had other goals when dealing with Japan and the United States. This fact reflected the differing relationship between Britain and the latter two states.

Since 1931, Tokyo and London had been involved in a shadowy conflict in the Far East. While war had not been declared between them, there was little doubt that Japan was pursuing long-term goals in China that threat-ened the British position in the region. Until 1939, Japan's ambitions had been checked by indirect means: British support for China in the ongoing Sino-Japanese conflict, Japan's intermittent border clashes with Soviet Russia and the confluence of Anglo-American interests in the Far East. What Britain had to avoid was overt conflict with Japan, and, particularly, with that country operating in conjunction with Germany and Italy.

The role of the United States was unique. None of the other neutrals had such diverse and significant impacts on British strategic foreign policy as did Washington. Only the latter was never considered as an enemy; only the latter was thought to be required to ensure victory in any major European war; and only the latter was important in all of the various regions where British interests were threatened. The most obvious example of this, as we have seen, was in the Far East, but the long-term goal of British strategic foreign policy was to defeat Germany by means of blockade and economic pressure. And, to achieve this goal required Britain to have access to American supplies and finances.

The attainment of the aims of strategic foreign policy depended on circumstances. What positions would Japan and the United States adopt should war break out? Would these orientations mean that Tokyo and Washington could (or would) play the roles assigned to them by British planners? How would that other neutral, Soviet Russia, deal with matters in the Far East, particularly its relations with Japan?

With the fall of France, the legacies of the First World War largely ceased to be relevant for both Britain and Soviet Russia. Britain no longer had either a Western front or a Continental ally. Instead, Germany would have to be defeated in other locales and by British efforts alone. Soviet Russia no longer could rely on an exhausting war of attrition in the West to ensure its safety. Instead, that nation would have to defend itself with its own resources and by means of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. For Britain, the situation was more reminiscent of the ‘Great War’ against Napoleon than of the war of 1914–18. Until the Nazi invasion of Soviet Russia, Britain was forced to carry on her struggle by means of a peripheral strategy, just as she had in the Napoleonic War after the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807 had created an uneasy Franco-Russian condominium over the Continent. And there was an extra-European threat to Empire in both wars, with Japan playing the part in the Far East in 1940–41 that the United States had played in the New World in 1807–12. And, in both wars, Britain had to wait until the Continental hegemons fell out before she could do more than simply survive. The ‘Munich’ period of British strategic foreign policy had reached its final phase.

However, the hope that the Nazi-Soviet Pact would prove an ephemeral bond meant that, from June 1940 until June the following year, Moscow continued to play a role, albeit a diminished one, in British strategic foreign policy. In Europe, the British still hoped that the Soviets could be weaned away from Germany, and, in the meanwhile, would help to prevent any German expansion in the Balkans, particularly towards the Straits and into the Middle East. However, at the same time, there were concerns that Stalin might be enticed by Hitler to join in a swoop against Turkey. While the latter did not come to pass, the entry of German troops into Roumania on 7 October, the Italian attack on Greece three weeks later and the German invasion of Yugoslavia on 6 April, all without Soviet response, showed the British that any reliance on Soviet assistance was futile. In the Far East, the situation became increasingly difficult.

British strategic foreign policy did not begin when war broke out on 4 September 1939. As we have seen, broad views of what would become the major neutrals had become established at the Foreign Office throughout the interwar period. However, what needs to be determined is how each of these neutrals was factored into British defence policy, particularly in the eight months before the war began, in order to appreciate what occurred when hostilities broke out.

Throughout the 1930s, Italy was important for British defence planning for a variety of reasons. First, Rome's determination to make the Mediterranean an Italian lake threatened British lines of communication to the Far East. The keys to preventing this were good diplomatic relations with Italy, and, barring the former, a strong British naval presence at Malta and in the Mediterranean generally. Second, Italy's desire to expand her colonial empire in Africa threatened Britain's position in Egypt and acted to destabilise the region. The Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1934 in particular created difficulties for British imperial defence. Finally, beginning in 1936, the Italian participation in the Spanish Civil War not only caused strains in Anglo-Italian diplomatic relations but also caused Rome's relations with Paris to sour further. Therefore, French defence planning had to take Italy as well as Germany into consideration, particularly with respect to naval and imperial matters. For Britain, this French preoccupation meant that any attempt to improve relations with Italy (or to check her by military means) had to be done with thoughts of how this might redound on Anglo- French relations, further complicating strategic foreign policy.

The situation was clearer with respect to Japan. Since 1931, Tokyo had been militarily active on the Asian mainland, threatening the British position in the Far East. The failure of the League of Nations to contain Japan had left London in a difficult position. Opinions in Whitehall about how to deal with Japan were varied, with the Treasury favouring an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement and the Foreign Office opposing such a move. Much of this difference centred on naval matters. British defence planning in the Far East was built around the so-called ‘Singapore strategy’.

Members of the American, Central, Eastern, Far Eastern, Northern and Southern Departments, 1939–41

There were two principal reasons to defend the Mediterranean. The first was to safeguard the British line of communication to the Empire east of Suez. The second was to attempt to contain the war by preventing Germany, Italy and Soviet Russia from expanding into the Balkans and threatening the Middle East and Suez. The former was an aspect of the wider question of dealing with Japan and will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter. It is the latter that concerns us now. For the Foreign Office, preventing Germany, Italy and Soviet Russia from extending the war into the Balkans meant attempting to persuade Turkey and the Balkan states to resist the threats and blandishments emanating from Berlin and Moscow at the same time as persuading Italy to remain neutral or abandon the Axis.

Finding a policy to deal with the tangled skein of interests in the region involved answering a number of questions. Could Italy be weaned away from Germany by British actions? Would Italy split from the Axis in the face of the threat of the spread of communism in the Balkans? Would the Nazi-Soviet Pact withstand the conflicting aims of Moscow and Berlin in the region? Could the Balkan states themselves be persuaded to cooperate in their own defence? The answers to these questions had to be found in the context of alliance politics, the possibility of operations in alternative theatres and the military resources available to underpin British strategic foreign policy. The keys to this were Italy and Turkey.

PREMATURE ‘ASSUMPTION OF ITALY's NEUTRALITY’: DEALING WITH MUSSOLINI, AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 1939

In the spring of 1939, as we have seen, Anglo-Turkish relations had undergone a major change. First, there was the signing of the Anglo-Turkish declaration on 12 May; second, there were the negotiations to convert this into a tripartite Anglo-French-Turkish alliance. The negotiations proceeded slowly over the summer. One of the key sticking points was the Turkish demand for a British loan and munitions of war. Nonetheless, the British were determined that the Turks should be brought into a full-fledged agreement. The outbreak of war only intensified this feeling. At the War Cabinet on 4 September, achieving an agreement with Turkey was judged ‘of the utmost importance’ both militarily and politically.

POLITICAL FIGURES

Butler, Richard Austen (1902–82), Baron Butler of Saffron Walden, cr. 1965; ed. Marlborough, Pembroke College, Cambridge; MP (Cons) for Saffron Walden, 1929–65; Parliamentary Under-Secretary for India, 1932–37; to Ministry of Labour, 1937–38; for Foreign Affairs, 1938–41; President of the Board of Education, 1941–45; Minister of Labour, 1945; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1951–55; Lord Privy Seal, 1955–59; Home Secretary, 1957–62; First Secretary of State and Deputy Prime Minister, 1962–63; Foreign Secretary, 1963–64.

Chamberlain, (Arthur) Neville (1869–1940); ed. Rugby School, Mason College, Birmingham; MP (Cons) for Birmingham Ladywood, 1918–29, Birmingham Edgbaston, 1929–40; Minister for National Service, 1916–19; Postmaster-General, 1922–23; Minister of Health, 1923, 1924–29 and 1931; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1923–24 and 1931–37; Prime Minister, 1937– 40; Lord President of the Council, 1940.

Chatfield, Sir (Alfred) Ernle Montacute (1873–1967), 1st Baron Chatfield, cr. 1937; ed. St. Andrew's School, Tenby; entered Royal Navy, 1886; Captain, 1909; Fourth Sea Lord, 1919–20; Rear-Admiral and Naval Aide-de-Camp to the King, 1920; Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, 1920–22; Commander 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, 1922–25; Third Sea Lord and Controller of the Navy, 1925–29 (Vice-Admiral since 1926); Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet, 1929–30 (Admiral since 1930); Mediterranean Fleet, 1930–33; First Sea Lord, 1933–38 (Admiral of the Fleet since 1935); Minister for the Coor¬dination of Defence, 1939–40.

Churchill, Sir Winston Leonard Spencer- (1874–1965); ed. Harrow; MP (Cons) for Oldham, 1900–04, (Lib) 1904–06, for Manchester North West, 1906–08, and Dundee, 1908–22, (Cons) for Epping, 1924–45, Woodford, 1945–64; Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies, 1905–08; Pres¬ident of the Board of Trade, 1908–10; Home Secretary, 1910–11; First Lord of the Admiralty, 1911–15 and 1939–40; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1915; Minister of Munitions, 1917–19; Secretary of State for War and Air, 1919–21; Colonial Secretary, 1921–22; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1924–29; Minister of Defence, 1940–45 and 1951–52; Prime Minister, 1940–45 and 1951–55.

On the outbreak of war, it was vital that the conflict be contained as much as possible. In Europe, one of the most important regions was the Baltic. The key to limiting the war in that area was Soviet Russia. The Soviet invasion of Poland on 17 September and subsequent attack on Finland on 30 November made the Baltic an area of concern for British strategic foreign policy, and a knowledge of Soviet intentions an important issue in British policy. But that was not the limit of Soviet influence. Soviet Russia was also important with regard to British plans for blockade. The British desire to strangle the German economic war effort threatened to be vitiated by the steady flow of vital raw materials into the Reich from Soviet Russia. Much of British policy with regard to Moscow was designed to limit the extent of the breach as much as possible. Underlying all of the British desires was the hope that Soviet Russia could be weaned away from Germany, obviating the worst effects of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

THIS ‘RUSSIAN MONSTROSITY’: THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT AND ITS AFTERMATH, AUGUST–OCTOBER 1939

This latter was important. In the aftermath of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and before the war itself began, the ‘world’, Halifax remarked, ‘looks very black’. In this darkened Europe, the Foreign Office attempted to discover just what that agreement portended. Its Far Eastern ramifications will be discussed in a later chapter, but there was immediate speculation as to its impact on Europe. A conversation with a well-informed Czech journalist spurred concerns about the future of Eastern Europe. The belief was that the Nazi-Soviet Pact adumbrated the formation of a ‘Congress Poland’, which would serve as an ‘uneasy buffer’ between the two aggrandising states. In the absence of any definitive knowledge of the secret protocols of the Pact, it was assumed that Latvia and Estonia were to be allocated to Soviet Russia and that Moscow would be given a ‘free hand’ in Finland.

In its retrospective analysis of the reasons behind Soviet Russia's signing of the agreement with Germany, the Foreign Office was convinced that Moscow had made a bad bargain. Explaining why the Foreign Office had not anticipated the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, Laurence Collier's view reflected long-standing beliefs in the Foreign Office.

BOOKS

(with T.G. Otte), The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854–1946 (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Settlement, 1919–1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006; pb. ed. 2009).

(with Zara Steiner), Britain and the Origins of the First World War (London: Palgrave, 2003).

Britain and the Last Tsar. The Russian Factor in British Policy, 1894–1917 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

Strategy and Supply. The Anglo-Russian Alliance 1914–1917 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984; repr. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2014).

EDITED BOOKS

(with Greg Kennedy), eds., The British Way in Warfare: Power and the International System, 1856–1956: Essays in Honour of David French (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010).

(with T.G. Otte), eds., Railways and International Politics. Paths of Empire, 1848– 1945 (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).

(with Greg Kennedy), eds., Military Education: Past, Present and Future (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002; Chinese translation, 2007).

(with Greg Kennedy), eds., Incidents and International Relations: Personalities, Perceptions and Power (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).

(with Greg Kennedy), eds., Far Flung Lines. Studies in Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

(with A. Hamish Ion), eds., Elite Formations in War and Peace (New York: Praeger, 1996).

(with E.J. Errington), eds., Navies and Global Defense (New York: Praeger, 1995).

(with B.J.C. McKercher), eds., Go Spy the Land. Military Intelligence in History (New York: Praeger, 1992).

(with Ronald G. Haycock), eds., The Cold War and Defense (New York: Praeger, 1990).

(with Ronald G. Haycock), eds., Men, Machines, and War (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1988).

(with Roy A. Prete), eds., Coalition Warfare. An Uneasy Accord (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1983).

ARTICLES AND CHAPTERS IN BOOKS

(posthumously), ‘Anglo-Russian Relations in the First World War’, in David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Oleg Budnitskii, Michael Hughes and David MacLaren McDonald, eds., Russian International Relations in War and Revo¬lution, 1914–22, vol. 8, 1, Origins and War (Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2021), 147–70.

(posthumously), ‘The Foundations of British War Aims in the First World War’, in Andreas Gestrich and Hartmut Pogge-von Strandmann, eds., Bid for World Power? New Research on the Outbreak of the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 313–34.

It is problematic, and perhaps misleading, to speak of British war plans before 1914. War plans conjure up images of well-oiled machinery automatically and inexorably committing armies to what the historian A.J.P. Taylor has called “war by timetable.” War plans also tend to suggest that a state has worked out provisions to take aggressive action against its foes, is obliged by alliances to take up arms in support of an ally, or, at the very least, has strategies to defend itself against its enemies. Only the last of these applies to Britain before 1914. Britain had no intention of committing aggression against anyone and was not bound by treaties, secret or otherwise, to go to war. Nor were British war plans by any means automatic responses to events. Instead, British prewar plans were contingent upon circumstances, something reflecting its peculiar position in Great Power politics.

Although the decade before 1914 is often characterized as an era when the Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia faced the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, this was not the case. Although the Anglo-French entente cordiale of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 had improved Britain's relations with its two long-standing foes, and had created in many minds (a substantial number of them German) the impression that there existed a solid bloc opposing the Triple Alliance, there was no substance to this belief. No commitment, “moral” or otherwise, existed that would force Britain to intervene in any continental quarrel.