This chapter establishes the empirical and historical context in which protest data were collected and describes the methods used to collect it. It also provides a first-order analysis of aggregate patterns of protest. Preliminary findings suggest that organization type, party alliance, and electoral cycles all matter for protest strategies.

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS AND PROTEST

In order to test the theoretical hypotheses proposed in Chapter 1, the data must meet several criteria: (1) cover an adequate number and variety of organizations (to measure the impact of organizational type); (2) include a variety of organizational alliances, as well as organizations not allied to political parties; (3) cover periods of at least one alternation in power (to measure the impact of party allies in and out of power); and (4) cover these organizations across a sufficient span of time to determine whether behavior changes according to cyclical patterns (to measure whether electoral, budgetary, or administrative cycles matter).

The choice to focus on municipal governments addresses these criteria admirably. The particular municipal governments I examine administered large urban areas. I do not mean to suggest that rural protest is unimportant; indeed, movements like the Landless Movement (MST) in Brazil and the zapatistas in Mexico have had a significant impact on their respective nations' politics. Nevertheless, large urban areas tend to produce a wider variety of organization types and party alliance choices, permitting maximum variation on two key independent variables. These areas also offer the pragmatic advantage of multiple local media covering protest.

On October 27, 2002, a man who first came to public notice when he led a major wave of protests against Brazil's military regime was chosen as its third democratically elected president. Luis Inácio da Silva, more familiarly known as “Lula,” ran a campaign that downplayed his radical roots and his connections to some of Brazil's most militant and disruptive popular organizations. Beautifully produced and heart-wringing television ads depicted him as a man of the people, emphasizing his working-class background, his struggle for education, and his status as an outsider uncontaminated by the stigma of association with Brazil's often corrupt political class. He formed an electoral alliance with a conservative party, said he had learned to value moderation, and pledged not to renege on promises made to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – promises he had strongly criticized in prior presidential campaigns. Downplayed were references to his militant unionist background, his long-standing support of socialist economic policies, and his role in the formation of Brazil's most powerful Leftist party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party), or PT. He campaigned, in the pungent Brazilian expression, as “Lula Light.”

Yet even as he tried to calm the fears of economic elites and international investors, his electoral success depended on harnessing opposition to their neoliberal economic program – much of it coming from organizations linked to his own party who repeatedly staged general strikes, demonstrations, and land seizures throughout 2001 and 2002.

Among the most difficult roles for Leftist governments to assume is that of employer, particularly when they must juggle this role against the demands of affiliated unions of public employees. In the opposition, Left-leaning parties can feel free to champion the claims of public employees for higher wages, better benefits, and job security. In power, satisfying these demands may conflict with budget constraints and with competing demands for public services. The tension between defending labor and “governing for everyone,” between the representation of one's own base and the requirements of good government, has put many a Leftist mayor between a rock and a hard place. Moreover, unions may expect more from Leftist governments than from conservative governments, compounding the potential for conflict. As a result, “the phenomenon [of conflict with municipal unions] is present in almost all experiences [of Left government in Latin America], despite the different characteristics of the unions.”

The next two chapters examine one arena where we can observe these conflicting expectations closely: municipal employee unions in Mexico City and São Paulo. What makes the comparison particularly compelling is the fact that while municipal employee unions are affiliated with the Left (PT) in São Paulo and Brasilia, they are affiliated with the Left's political rival, the PRI, in Mexico City. If party alliance drives behavior, we should see contrasting reactions to Left electoral victory.