Just one year into his presidency, George Bush ordered the invasion of Panama, a decision that would have far-reaching implications not just for Panamanians, but also for the US government as it assumed its lone Superpower role. In many respects, this action had more in common with the US invasion of Grenada in 1983 and other Central American incursions than the post-Cold War interventions. The Panama and Grenada operations were allegedly undertaken to restore democracy, yet in neither case were democratic reforms high on the agenda, nor was either sanctioned at the UN. Panama differs, however, from the entanglements in the western hemisphere during the Reagan era because US troops landed just one month after the fall of the Berlin Wall: the Soviet menace could no longer provide the pretext, and even if it could, there were no communists threatening to take over the canal. US policy was about to move in an altogether different direction.

Subsequent large-scale, US military interference in international crises would be labelled interventions, as opposed to another Panama-style invasion, but the mistakes made prior to this operation, during the invasion itself, and in the post-conflict period taught US policy makers valuable lessons, particularly for the reconstruction phase. Some of these lessons would be brought into practice without delay, others would not be applied until Haiti and Bosnia, while still others are yet to be realised.

Operation Uphold Democracy, the misnomer for the US-led military intervention in Haiti, has entered the post-Cold War political lexicon, reflecting the recent prominence enjoyed by advocates of democratisation. Of greater significance is the precedent set when the UN Security Council formally sanctioned the use of force to implant – or ‘uphold’ – democracy by invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter. While the Somalia intervention challenged the non-interventionary norm because of the humanitarian pretext, international approval of the denial-of-democracy excuse in Haiti advanced this process even further. As Thomas Buergenthal explained, ‘Once the rule of law, human rights and democratic pluralism are made the subject of international commitments, there is little left in terms of governmental institutions that is domestic.’ As in Somalia, however, the Security Council recognised the ‘unique character of the present situation in Haiti and its deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an exceptional response’, to protect whatever remained of this norm.

This chapter examines the third post-Cold War military intervention that would become a nation-building operation – and the first in which the motive behind the intervention naturally led to the nation-building component. It explains the manner by which the fundamental elements necessary to establish a democratic state have, in fact, been implanted in Haiti through a bizarre combination of erratic US behaviour prior to the intervention, with considerate and efficient US and UN activity during the operation. The chapter concludes with an analysis of lessons learned and the prospects for upholding democracy in Haiti.

The war in Bosnia persisted for over three years (March 1992–August 1995) before the international community responded in a decisive manner with the right combination of force and diplomacy, even though attempts at the latter began in 1991 and NATO planes first started bombing in April 1994. Once again, the international community, led by the United States and Europe, became entangled in nation-building, this time through an attempt to end the most distressing conflict in Europe since World War II. What happened during the three and a half years it took the international mediators to achieve the fragile peace contrived at Dayton in November 1995? Will Dayton endure?

This chapter addresses these questions in three parts: the first looks at the failure of the European Community (later Union) and the UN to stop the fighting through the application of sanctions, mediation-by-recognition and the establishment of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR); the second part examines the many different peace plans that did not deliver the promised peace, the one that did, and the force that was necessary to secure that peace; and finally, the concluding section analyses Dayton in practice, lessons learned and implications for the future Bosnian state. Although the collapse of Yugoslavia engendered four Balkan wars, this chapter focuses only on that in Bosnia because it was the bloodiest, the longest, attracted the most international attention, and ultimately dragged in the international community, which in turn caused the focus to shift to rebuilding state structures.

The titular evolution in the four cases examined in this book – from Operation Just Cause in Panama to Operation Joint Endeavour in Bosnia – signifies America's increased understanding of its role as international caretaker since the end of the Cold War. The former name implies insecurity through self-justification, and an attempt to forge ahead alone – irrespective of the wishes of international partners – while the latter denotes a more humble personification, and a shared purpose. The nation-building efforts analysed in this book have also progressed along these lines, as this final chapter explains in three parts. First, it examines the common threads linking and leading to the Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia interventions; second, it points to the lessons learned and applied within the military, in civil–military relations, and in peace support operations; while third, it concludes by discussing the overall developments in nation-building, areas of continued concern and how future operations might achieve greater success.

This study examines three issues critical to western policy makers: (1) military intervention and the use of force, which often lead to (2) peace support operations, which in turn can lead to (3) nation-building attempts. The success or failure of each component directly impacts the others. For example, if the military component proceeds smoothly but the peace support operation or nation-building efforts do not, as in Somalia, the chances of overall mission success are reduced considerably.

UNOSOM I, Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM II – which together endured from April 1992 to March 1995 – plunged the international community headlong into its first post-Cold War encounter with a collapsed state. For US President George Bush, still heady from his victories in the Cold and Gulf Wars (and to a lesser extent, in Panama), and UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, eager to test the potential of an organisation that had been in a Superpower stranglehold since its inception, Somalia provided the perfect opportunity. Vietnam was by then a mere after-thought. The intervention in Somalia, however, did not live up to expectations. Much of Somalia today has slipped back into the situation of sporadic lawlessness that prevailed before foreign troops arrived – albeit not the famine – despite the enormous infusion of funds ($2.3 billion spent by the US government, and $1.64 billion by the UN), and invasion of untold numbers of aid workers and foreign soldiers (close to 50,000 troops at its peak).

The Somalia intervention set in motion the recent evolution of the non-interventionary norm and established a pattern in the ‘new world order’, because the decision to use military force was justified purely on humanitarian grounds. There were no strategic, economic or narco-interests that propelled the UN and the United States into action, nor foreign territory that had been invaded or seized by an errant state.

This remark, by former US National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, aptly depicts the policy of cautious engagement embraced by the US administration since the botched Somalia intervention. When US marines landed on the beaches of Mogadishu in December 1992, international euphoria about building a ‘new world order’, led by the lone Superpower, was at its peak due to the demise of communism and the defeat of Saddam Hussein. However much the Somalia debacle may have altered the US approach to nation-building, as Vietnam did to the generation before, it in no way aborted it. The US administration and military have been involved in nation-building and promoting democracy since the middle of the nineteenth century and ‘Manifest Destiny’. Another failed intervention could not reverse over one hundred years of American experience.

Nation-building has indeed evolved from the Cold War days, when it was primarily an American- (or Soviet-) controlled endeavour, to today's occupation jointly run by any combination of the US government, the United Nations, and some member states. The campaign has also progressed, albeit incrementally, due to lessons learned from previous experiences.