Sixty years after the entry into force of the Basic Law the world is much more interdependent. The concepts of statehood and sovereignty have changed. The following contribution examines how the Basic Law, as amended and interpreted by the Federal Constitutional Court, deals with this development. As a foundational matter, the Basic Law contains a commitment towards integration, although sixty years ago integration largely was seen as a promise. Now, 60 years later, the Federal Constitutional Court is developing limits to integration and recently ruled out Germany's participation in a European Federal State and sees itself as the guardian of German sovereignty. A change of paradigms seems to have taken place. For the founding fathers and mothers, a united—possibly even federal—Europe was considered to be the solution to protect against war and relapse towards an undemocratic, terroristic regime. But now the Federal Constitutional Court feels compelled to protect democracy and the core values of the Basic Law against “too much” European integration.

Investment arbitration is based on international agreements and operates in parallel to the EU legal and judicial system. Therefore conflicts between EU law and investment protection are possible. These may result from the substantial investment protection standards, but also from the operation of a parallel system of judicial protection. The EU law position on such conflicts will depend on whether the investment agreement was concluded between Member States, between Member States and other countries, or between the EU and other countries.

A. Racke GMBH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz. Case C-l 62/96.

Court of Justice of the European Communities, June 16, 1998.

The German Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Finance Court) asked the Court of Justice of the European Communities whether an EEC Council regulation suspending the trade concessions provided for by the 1980 Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was valid. The Court answered in the affirmative, holding that, in adopting the regulation, the Council had not acted contrary to the rules of customary international law concerning termination and suspension of treaty relations because of a fundamental change of circumstances.

Opinion 2/94, Accession of the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 17 Hum. Rts. L.J. 51 (1996).

European Court of Justice, March 28, 1996.

On April 26, 1995, die Council of the European Union requested an opinion on whether accession of the European Community to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was compatible with the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Treaty). In its request, the Council of the European Union stated that no decision on opening negotiations could be taken before the Court pronounced on die compatibility of accession with the Treaty. The Council argued that, even though a text of the envisaged agreement did not yet exist, the legal issues regarding accession were sufficientiy clear for the Court to provide an advisory opinion. The Council made clear that accession should not have any effect on the reservations entered by member states, which would “continue to apply in the areas falling within national jurisdiction.” It also explained that the “Community would agree to submit to the machinery for individual petitions and inter-State applications; actions between the Community and its Member States would, however, have to be excluded in recognition of the monopoly conferred in such matters by Art. 219 of the EC Treaty on the Court of Justice.”

Loizidou v. Turkey. 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A).

European Court of Human Rights, March 23, 1995.

The applicant, a Greek Cypriot woman, stated that since July 20, 1974, Turkish troops had prevented her from returning to land in Northern Cyprus that she owned and had intended to use, inter alia, for her family home. Furdiermore, she alleged that her arrest and detention by Turkish Cypriot policemen for ten hours after she had crossed die cease-fire line in 1989, when participating in a women's march aimed at asserting the Greek Cypriot refugees’ right to return to their homes, violated her human rights. Rejecting in part die preliminary objections raised by the respondent Government, die Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that die facts of die case are capable of falling widiin Turkish jurisdiction as a result of die presence of Turkish troops on the territory of Cyprus, so that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) may be applicable to these acts.