To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure firstname.lastname@example.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Like all revolutionary movements that succeed in taking power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was faced with immense challenges in 1949. The more obvious and immediate of these challenges were external: how to take power, quash lingering resistance, restore social order, resettle refugees, and begin the process of restoring a war-ravaged economy. The last of these involved conundrums that the Guomindang had failed miserably at: taming hyperinflation, reopening factories, and ensuring that cities that could not feed themselves had sufficient grain. The internal challenges facing the CCP were no less severe, if not quite as visible; how the CCP was to transform itself from what was, in the words of Kenneth Jowitt, a “party of a new type – a combat party” that had quite literally been engaged in actual combat in the course of a lengthy civil war into a civilian party-state, albeit a still revolutionary one with a mission to fundamentally remake society into a revolutionarily pure one.1 The objective circumstances that the CCP had to work with were at best difficult: thin coverage of an enormous and varied territory, primitive communications, and an indifferent-to-hostile population in much of central and southern China.
After laying out the substantial challenges faced by the young People’s Republic of China in 1949, this chapter focuses on the particular ways in which revolutionary policies were implemented: by an ever shifting mix of bureaucratic and campaign modalities that were supported by a range of public performances. Bureaucracy was characterized by hierarchy, order, precedent, the strengthening of formal state institutions and a mania for classification, thus radically simplifying complex realities through a process of disaggregation; campaigns mobilized moral commitments through a different type of radical simplification – fusion into morally charged narratives and popular mobilization. Both modalities were in evidence in the two signature campaigns of 1951: the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and land reform. While, in the early 1950s, bureaucratic and campaign modalities were co-constitutive, after the mid 1950s, they were more often in stark tension with each other.
In a very influential and frequently cited article published twenty-five years ago, William Kirby compellingly argued that Chinese history before 1949 was defined and shaped by the nature of its foreign interactions.1 This would appear to be all the more true of China under Communist rule in the 1950s. If the Guomindang regime styled itself “Nationalist” in English, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was, from its conception, internationalist in premise and in promise. Indeed, when Mao Zedong declared that the Chinese people had finally “stood up” with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, he made it clear that they would not stand alone but would stand by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies.2 Stalin and Mao may often have been “uncertain partners,”3 but the People’s Republic of China in its formative years would be Moscow’s most faithful and self-sacrificing ally, a distinction earned in blood in Korea and by the fact that, unlike the Eastern European “people’s democracies,” the PRC’s allegiance was not bought at gunpoint.
The history of the People’s Republic of China as a field of study has changed beyond recognition over the last quarter-century. Once covered primarily by political scientists and the occasional sociologist, PRC history now is a recognized area of study in the West, with its own e-journals, Facebook groups, and hires in history departments. A generation of superb historians and their graduate students also have emerged, albeit more cautiously, in the PRC itself. Both Chinese and foreign scholars have produced what has amounted to a remarkable explosion of work in the last two decades, much of it in Chinese, some of it in English or German. The combination of increasingly accessible Chinese archives and individuals within China increasingly willing to speak openly about the post-1949 period created a research environment in which it was not long before thoughtfully edited volumes ensued that confounded old understandings and shed new light on specific periods of PRC history.
Using first-hand material from Chinese archives that are no longer open to researchers, and bringing together a leading team of international scholars, this volume is a major contribution to the study of the People's Republic of China. Calling into question existing narratives on the foundational decade of the PRC, these essays present a nuanced consideration of China in the 1950s by integrating two periods that are often considered separately: the relatively 'happy' years 1949–1956 with the relatively 'unhappy' years from 1957 onwards. Exploring the challenges faced in constructing socialism, the transnational context, and early modes of PRC governance, the contributors highlight the ways in which China was shaped by diversity on all levels and scales in how socialism was enacted and experienced. These essays clearly demonstrate how the unevenness of Party control created discrepancies and variations between different regions and between the center and the locale.
Studying phenotypic and genetic characteristics of age at onset (AAO) and polarity at onset (PAO) in bipolar disorder can provide new insights into disease pathology and facilitate the development of screening tools.
To examine the genetic architecture of AAO and PAO and their association with bipolar disorder disease characteristics.
Genome-wide association studies (GWASs) and polygenic score (PGS) analyses of AAO (n = 12 977) and PAO (n = 6773) were conducted in patients with bipolar disorder from 34 cohorts and a replication sample (n = 2237). The association of onset with disease characteristics was investigated in two of these cohorts.
Earlier AAO was associated with a higher probability of psychotic symptoms, suicidality, lower educational attainment, not living together and fewer episodes. Depressive onset correlated with suicidality and manic onset correlated with delusions and manic episodes. Systematic differences in AAO between cohorts and continents of origin were observed. This was also reflected in single-nucleotide variant-based heritability estimates, with higher heritabilities for stricter onset definitions. Increased PGS for autism spectrum disorder (β = −0.34 years, s.e. = 0.08), major depression (β = −0.34 years, s.e. = 0.08), schizophrenia (β = −0.39 years, s.e. = 0.08), and educational attainment (β = −0.31 years, s.e. = 0.08) were associated with an earlier AAO. The AAO GWAS identified one significant locus, but this finding did not replicate. Neither GWAS nor PGS analyses yielded significant associations with PAO.
AAO and PAO are associated with indicators of bipolar disorder severity. Individuals with an earlier onset show an increased polygenic liability for a broad spectrum of psychiatric traits. Systematic differences in AAO across cohorts, continents and phenotype definitions introduce significant heterogeneity, affecting analyses.
We aimed to evaluate the prevalence, clinical determinants, and consequences (falls and hospitalization) of frailty in older adults with mental illness.
Retrospective clinical cohort study.
We collected the data in a specialized psychogeriatric ward, in Boston, USA, between July 2018 and June 2019.
Two hundred and fourty-four inpatients aged 65 years old and over.
Psychiatric diagnosis was based on a multi-professional consensus meeting according to DSM-5 criteria. Frailty was assessed according to two common instruments, that is, the FRAIL questionnaire and the deficit accumulation model (aka Frailty Index [FI]). Multiple linear regression analyses were conducted to evaluate the association between frailty and sample demographics (age, female sex, and non-Caucasian ethnicity) and clinical characteristics (dementia, number of clinical diseases, current infection, number of psychotropic, and non-psychotropic medications in use). Multiple regression between frailty assessments and either falls or number of hospital admissions in the last 6 and 12 months, respectively, were analyzed and adjusted for covariates.
Prevalence of frailty was high, that is, 83.6% according to the FI and 55.3% according to the FRAIL questionnaire. Age, the number of clinical (somatic) diseases, and the number of non-psychotropic medications were independently associated with frailty identified by the FRAIL. Dementia, current infection, the number of clinical (somatic) diseases, and the number of non-psychotropic medications were independently associated with frailty according to the FI. Falls were significantly associated with both frailty instruments. However, we found only a significant association for the number of hospital admissions with the FI.
Frailty is highly prevalent among geriatric psychiatry inpatients. The FRAIL questionnaire and the FI may capture different forms of frailty dimensions, being the former probably more associated with the phenotype model and the latter more associated with multimorbidity.
In Sunan and Taiwan land reform was implementd by campaign, and in both the early to middle stages of the campaign were remarkably similar. Both conducted training, temporarily expanded the state bureaucracy with young recruits, and engaged in massive propaganda to convince the public of the desirability and necessity of land reform. Both also desired active rural participation in land reform. The ways in which land reform was publicly performed and rural participation invited in were very different: in Sunan participation was a mass public event that vilified targets and concluded with the merging of state and crowd while in Taiwan public participation was solicited through the procedural drama of limited public elections to Farm Tenancy Committees.