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14 results

  • The Night Stalin and Churchill Divided Europe: The View from Washington

  • Joseph M. Siracusa
  • Journal:
    The Review of Politics / Volume 43 / Issue 3 / July 1981
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    05 August 2009, pp. 381-409

  • Of the many fascinating episodes that punctuate the diplomatic history of World War II, few have intrigued scholars more than the secret Balkan spheres-of-action agreement worked out by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Marshal Josef Stalin at the Anglo-Soviet conference (British code-named TOLSTOY) held in Moscow in the autumn of 1944. It was late in the evening of 9 October. In his first encounter with Stalin since the meeting of the Big Three at Teheran in 1943, Churchill, believing “the moment … apt for business,” appealed to the Soviet dictator to “Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans.” Specifically, he went on, “We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don't let us get at cross-purposes in small ways.

  • The United States, Viet-Nam, and the Cold War: A Reappraisal*

  • Joseph M. Siracusa
  • Journal:
    Journal of Southeast Asian Studies / Volume 5 / Issue 1 / March 1974
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    07 April 2011, pp. 82-101
    Print publication:
    March 1974

  • The Viet-Nam War was without qualification the most unpopular war in United States history. By May 1971, 61 per cent of the 1,502 persons interviewed by the Gallup Poll thought it had been a mistake for the United States to become involved in Viet-Nam. (The question asked was, “In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Viet-Nam, do you think the United States made a mistake sending troops to fight in Viet-Nam?” 28 per cent answered, “No”, and 11 per cent had no opinion.) The significance of the May poll lay in the fact that it marked a complete reversal of public opinion since Gallup first started asking the question in August 1965.