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Because horsenettle and tall ironweed are difficult to control in cool-season grass pastures, research was conducted in Tennessee and Kentucky in 2010 and 2011 to examine the efficacy of aminocyclopyrachlor on these weeds. Aminocyclopyrachlor was evaluated at 49 and 98 g ai ha−1 alone and in mixtures with 2,4-D amine at 371 and 742 g ae ha−1. Aminopyralid was also included as a comparison treatment at 88 g ai ha−1. Treatments were applied at three POST timings to horsenettle and two POST timings to tall ironweed. By 1 yr after treatment (YAT) horsenettle was controlled 74% with aminocyclopyrachlor plus 2,4-D applied late POST (LPOST) at 98 + 742 g ha−1. By 1 YAT, tall ironweed was controlled ≥ 93% by aminocyclopyrachlor applied early POST (EPOST) or LPOST, at rates as low as 49 g ha−1. Similar control was achieved with aminopyralid applied LPOST. Both aminocyclopyrachlor and aminopyralid were found to reduce horsenettle and tall ironweed biomass the following year. Moreover, all LPOST applications of aminocyclopyrachlor alone or in mixtures with 2,4-D prevented regrowth of tall ironweed at 1 YAT. Based on these studies, a LPOST herbicide application in August or September when soil moisture is adequate is recommended for control of horsenettle and tall ironweed in cool-season grass pastures.
Whereas during the first half of the eighteenth century the expression ‘oświecony’ in Polish was nearly always a religious metaphor, between the 1760s and the early nineteenth century the noun ‘oświeconie’ became secularized, broadened and given a quite revolutionary new meaning, denoting an intellectually grounded, rational and true understanding of things in contrast to how traditional religious authority understood things. This is well known to scholars and students alike. But the question now arises, with the rise over the last 20 to 30 years of ‘Radical Enlightenment’ as a fundamental new category in the humanities, how much has this category applicability in the Central European context? Studying book history and print culture, I shall argue, helps us to determine that in fact it does.
Using the Herschel PACS and SPIRE FIR/submm data, we investigate variations in the dust spectral index β in the nearby spiral galaxy M33 at a linear resolution of 160 pc. We use an iteration method in two different approaches, single and two-component modified black body models. In both approaches, β is higher in the central disk than in the outer disk similar to the dust temperature. There is a positive correlation between β and Hα as well as with the molecular gas traced by CO(2-1). A Monte-Carlo simulation shows that the physical parameters are better constrained when using the two-component model.
Many comments by intellectual historians and historians of philosophy about the early impact of Spinoza's thought suggest there prevailed more or less everywhere a fairly uniform pattern of rejection, denunciation, and repudiation. Even the earliest reactions in Holland and Germany demonstrate many conflicting responses which were indeed in part confessional, much depending on whether the critic was a Calvinist, Lutheran, Arminian, or Socinian-Collegiant but which were even more varied from the standpoint of philosophy and the question of the status of reason. A high proportion of the early antagonists were perfectly willing to embrace this or that slice of Spinoza's argument such as his plea for toleration. In the light of this, it is hardly surprising that the early Dutch and German reactions to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus turn out to have foreshadowed the wide variety of positions surrounding Spinoza's philosophical challenge characteristic of the Enlightenment as a whole.
We showed in the previous chapter that the divine law which makes men truly happy and teaches the true life, is universal to all men. We also deduced that law from human nature in such a way that it must itself be deemed innate to the human mind and, so to speak, inscribed upon it. As for ceremonies, or those at least which are narrated in the Old Testament, these were instituted for the Hebrews alone and were so closely accommodated to their state that in the main they could be practised not by individuals but only by the community as a whole. It is certain, therefore, that they do not belong to the divine law and hence contribute nothing to happiness and virtue. They are relevant only to the election of the Hebrews, that is (as we showed in chapter 3), to the temporal and material prosperity and peace of their state, and therefore could have relevance only so long as that state survived. If in the Old Testament they are ascribed to the law of God, that is only because they were instituted as the result of a revelation or on revealed foundations. But since reasoning, no matter how sound, carries little weight with ordinary theologians, I propose now to adduce the authority of the Bible to confirm what I have just proved. Then, for yet greater clarity, I will show why and how these ceremonies served to establish and preserve the Jewish state.
 In the previous chapter we dealt with the foundations and principles of knowledge of Scripture, and proved that these amount to nothing more than assembling an accurate history of it. We also showed that the ancients neglected this form of enquiry, essential though it is, or if they did write anything about it and handed it down, it has perished through the injury of time, and thus most of the foundations and principles of this knowledge have disappeared. Now we could live with this if later writers had kept within proper limits and faithfully passed on to their successors what little they had received or discovered and not contrived novelties out of their own heads. For this is how it has come about that the history of the Bible has remained not only incomplete but also rather unreliable, that is, the existing basis of our knowledge of the Scriptures is not just too sparse for us to construct an adequate history, it also teems with errors.
 My aim is to correct this situation and remove our prevailing theological prejudices. But my attempt, I am afraid, may be too late. For the situation has now almost reached the point that men will not allow themselves to be corrected on these questions but rather obstinately defend whatever position they have taken up, in the name of religion.
 Hitherto our concern has been to separate philosophy from theology and to establish the freedom to philosophize which this separation allows to everyone. The time has now come to enquire how far this freedom to think and to say what one thinks extends in the best kind of state. To consider this in an orderly fashion, we must first discuss the foundations of the state but, before we do that, we must explain, without reference to the state and religion, the natural right (jus) which everyone possesses.
 By the right and order of nature I merely mean the rules determining the nature of each individual thing by which we conceive it is determined naturally to exist and to behave in a certain way. For example fish are determined by nature to swim and big fish to eat little ones, and therefore it is by sovereign natural right that fish have possession of the water and that big fish eat small fish. For it is certain that nature, considered wholly in itself, has a sovereign right to do everything that it can do, i.e., the right of nature extends as far as its power extends. For the power of nature is the very power of God who has supreme right to [do] all things. However, since the universal power of the whole of nature is nothing but the power of all individual things together, it follows that each individual thing has the sovereign right to do everything that it can do, or the right of each thing extends so far as its determined power extends.
 We proved in chapter 2 of this treatise that the prophets possessed extraordinary powers of imagination but not of understanding, and that it was not the deeper points of philosophy that God revealed to them but only some very simple matters, adapting Himself to their preconceived beliefs. We then showed in chapter 5 that Scripture explains and teaches things in such a way that anyone may grasp them. It does not deduce and derive them from axioms and definitions, but speaks simply, and to secure belief in its pronouncements, it confirms them by experience alone, that is, by miracles and histories narrated in a language and style designed to influence the minds of the common people: on this see chapter 6 (point 3). Finally, we demonstrated in chapter 7 that the difficulty of comprehending the Bible lies solely in the language and not in the sublimity of its content. There is the further problem, though, that the prophets were not addressing the learned among the Jews but the entire people without exception, and the Apostles likewise were accustomed to proclaim the Gospel teaching in churches where there was a miscellaneous congregation of all types of people. From all this it follows that biblical teaching contains no elevated theories or philosophical doctrines but only the simplest matters comprehensible to even the very slowest.
Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise (1670) is one of the most important philosophical works of the early modern period. In it Spinoza discusses at length the historical circumstances of the composition and transmission of the Bible, demonstrating the fallibility of both its authors and its interpreters. He argues that free enquiry is not only consistent with the security and prosperity of a state but actually essential to them, and that such freedom flourishes best in a democratic and republican state in which individuals are left free while religious organizations are subordinated to the secular power. His Treatise has profoundly influenced the subsequent history of political thought, Enlightenment 'clandestine' or radical philosophy, Bible hermeneutics, and textual criticism more generally. It is presented here in a translation of great clarity and accuracy by Michael Silverthorne and Jonathan Israel, with a substantial historical and philosophical introduction by Jonathan Israel.
 When I said above that only those who hold sovereign power have jurisdiction over everything, and that all authority depends on their decree alone, I had in mind not just civil jurisdiction but also that over sacred matters. For they must be both the interpreters and guardians of things sacred. I want to put a particular emphasis on this point concentrating on it in this chapter, because very many people vigorously deny that this right (i.e. jurisdiction over sacred matters) belongs to the sovereign authorities, and refuse to recognize them as interpreters of divine law. From this they also arrogate to themselves licence to accuse and condemn sovereigns and even to excommunicate them from the church (as Ambrose long ago excommunicated the emperor Theodosius). We shall see below in this present chapter that what they are in effect doing is dividing the sovereign power and attempting to devise a path to power for themselves.
 I intend first to show that religion has the power of law only by decree of those who exercise the right of government and that God has no special kingdom among men except through those who exercise sovereignty. I also wish to demonstrate that religious worship and pious conduct must be accommodated to the peace and interests of the state and consequently must be determined by the sovereign authorities alone.
 The word law (lex) in an absolute sense signifies that, in accordance with which, each individual thing, or all things, or all things of the same kind, behave in one and the same fixed and determined way, depending upon either natural necessity or a human decision. A law that depends upon natural necessity is one that necessarily follows from the very nature or definition of a thing. A law that depends upon a human decision, which is more properly called a decree (jus), is one that men prescribe to themselves and to others in order to achieve a better and safer life, or for other reasons. For example, the fact that when one body strikes a smaller body, it only loses as much of its own motion as it communicates to the other, is a universal law of all bodies which follows from natural necessity. So too the fact that when a man recalls one thing he immediately remembers another which is similar or which he had seen along with the first thing, is a law which necessarily follows from human nature.
But the fact that men give up their right which they receive from nature, or are compelled to give it up, and commit themselves to a particular rule of life depends on human decision. And while I entirely agree that all things are determined by the universal laws of nature to exist and act in a fixed and determined manner, I insist that these decrees depend on willed human decision, and I do so for two reasons.