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  • Confidence in Argument

  • Jonathan E. Adler
  • Journal: Canadian Journal of Philosophy / Volume 36 / Issue 2 / June 2006
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020, pp. 225-257

  • When someone presents an argument on a charged topic and it is (credibly) alleged that the arguer has a strong personal interest and investment in the conclusion, the allegation, directed to the reception or evaluation of the argument, typically gives rise to two seemingly conflicting reactions:

    I. The allegation is an unwarranted diversion (a species of argumentum ad hominem or genetie fallacy). The prejudices or biases of the arguer are irrelevant to the cogency of the argument. ('Cogency’ is used broadly to refer both to correct support relations, validity, in the case of deductive arguments, and to the soundness, warrant, and relevance of the premises.) In particular, it is a distraction from the crucial judgment of whether the argument is cogent to press the question of whether the arguer truly holds his conclusion on the grounds that he offers, or whether he believes it on some illicit or suspect basis (prejudice, ideology, self-interest, wishful thinking, bias).

  • Excursion sets of three classes of stable random fields

  • Part of
  • Robert J. Adler, Gennady Samorodnitsky, Jonathan E. Taylor
  • Journal: Advances in Applied Probability / Volume 42 / Issue 2 / June 2010
  • Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 2016, pp. 293-318
  • Print publication: June 2010
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  • Studying the geometry generated by Gaussian and Gaussian-related random fields via their excursion sets is now a well-developed and well-understood subject. The purely non-Gaussian scenario has, however, not been studied at all. In this paper we look at three classes of stable random fields, and obtain asymptotic formulae for the mean values of various geometric characteristics of their excursion sets over high levels. While the formulae are asymptotic, they contain enough information to show that not only do stable random fields exhibit geometric behaviour very different from that of Gaussian fields, but they also differ significantly among themselves.

  • Preface

  • Edited by Jonathan E. Adler, Brooklyn College, City University of New York, Lance J. Rips, Northwestern University, Illinois
  • Book: Reasoning
  • Published online: 05 June 2012
  • Print publication: 05 May 2008, pp ix-x

  • Summary

    This is a collection of essays on reasoning – deductive, inductive, abductive, belief-revision, defeasible, cross-cultural, conversational, argumentative – oriented toward contemporary empirical research. The study of reasoning is, of course, a major focus of investigation in both philosophy and psychology, and this volume attempts to combine these perspectives. Philosophy, especially logic and philosophy of science, inspired psychology's interest in deduction, induction, and other forms of inference. In the past thirty years, the focus of common interest has greatly enlarged to include causal reasoning, cross-cultural comparisons, moral reasoning, and argumentation. There is increasing attention to reasoning as a response to new information or change of belief (belief-revision or defeasible reasoning), which is a far-reaching concern in epistemology. These advances, along with the more than twenty-year debate on rationality, have made reasoning a focal point of cognitive science research and reflections.

    Three additional paths also are now converging on reasoning as major research interests. The first is a focus on fallacious reasoning and its reduction through education, which usually goes under the banner of informal logic or critical thinking. Second, the development of pragmatics, particularly following Grice's foundational contribution, has given rise to fruitful applications to traditional reasoning tasks. A number of commentators in the rationality debate have suggested connections between performance on those tasks and conversational expectations. These suggestions are coming in for experimental testing and some corroboration.

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