The present trend toward democratic regimes in Latin American countries raises the issue of their regime-determined capabilities. Democracy is generally defined in procedural terms and supported on moral rather than policy grounds (Schumpeter 1950, 242). Consequently, very little is known about the policy consequences, if any, of the adoption of democratic forms and procedures by Latin American political systems. One way to examine this question is to analyze the policy performance of the three democratic regimes in Latin America that are the most institutionalized: Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela. These three nations, unlike Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, were able to withstand the authoritarian trends of the 1960s and early 1970s. They have been democratic long enough (well over two decades) during a period when development issues were salient to indicate the policy-performance capabilities of democratic regimes operating within the cultural, economic, and political context of Latin America.

The fall of Salvador Allende's government on September 11, 1973, has given rise to debates over many issues, such as the role of the United States in bringing about the conditions that led to a military coup, the feasibility of a peaceful road toward socialism, and the existence or nonexistence of a democratic and national bourgeoisie in Chile (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1975). One issue remains relatively unexplored, however, namely, how much was the Soviet Union willing to aid the Popular Unity (UP) government in its quest for autonomy from the United States? This quest for autonomy was a paramount foreign policy goal because the basic program of Allende's coalition government, approved by the Communist, Socialist, Radical, Social Democratic, Movement for Unitary Popular Action, and Independent Popular Action parties, stated that the basic cause of Chile's poverty and inflation was their intimate economic ties with the United States. The resulting dependence brought about the underdevelopment of Chile and prevented the Chilean bourgeoisie from being truly nationalistic. These dependent ties with the United States would have to be broken for Chile to be capable of autonomous development.

The study of United States foreign policy has recently been invigorated by the introduction of Graham Allison's bureaucratic politics model (BPM). The basic unit of analysis of the BPM is governmental action viewed as political resultant. In Allison's words, the actions of governments are ‘resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence…’. The BPM assumes that different players will have different perspectives toward similar problems, that is, they will each see different ‘faces’ of the same issue. The basic assumption of the BPM as it is applied to United States foreign policy toward Latin America by scholars such as Abraham Lowenthal is that United States decision-makes, who share power in both the formulation and implementation of policy, have differing points of view because of their differing organizational and personal perspectives.

A number of excellent studies of the U.S.-Mexican border have indicated that the border is occasionally a barrier but more often a permeable membrane through which goods, services, and people can filter. Employment practices and reciprocal trade across the border, together with tourism, have increased the need for policy cooperation among the jurisdictionally distinct but functionally integrated border communities. Our study represents an exploratory effort to find out how border cities are responding to this imperative of greater policy cooperation despite the presence of an international boundary. We selected the cities of Laredo and Nuevo Laredo for our first analysis of policy cooperation because our preliminary investigations of twin cities had persuaded us that relations between the Laredos were numerous, complex, and friendly. The two cities were obviously interdependent; the incentives to achieve a cooperative community appeared to be strong.

D-Lysergic acid diethylamide (L.S.D.-25) was first prepared by Stoll and Hoffmann in 1938 (35) as a derivative of rye ergot. Its profound effects in minute doses were discovered accidentally by Hoffmann and reported by Stoll (34) along with additional observations by the latter on 16 healthy controls and six schizophrenic patients. With a dose of 30–130 γ (0.03–0.13 mgm.) Stoll (34) noted motor inco-ordination, disturbances of visual perception with illusions and hallucinations, clouding of consciousness, and affective changes principally in the direction of euphoria and distractibility. Subsequent clinical reports have confirmed these findings (6, 38). Becker (1) using doses of 30–40 γ in healthy controls attempted to predict the quality of the resulting psychosis from the constitutional somatotype of the subject; he contrasted maniacal hyperkinetic states with those showing inhibition and depersonalization and drew attention to the pattern of the visual perceptual disturbances, which were principally those of differences in size, clarity and perspective. Becker's attempts at somatotypological correlation were less successful than those of Condreau (4) who used mentally ill patients as well as healthy subjects and found that L.S.D.-25 did tend to reinforce pre-existing personality characteristics, especially with regard to mood changes. Rinkel and others (30, 7) with doses of 20–90 γ in mixed healthy and psychiatrically disturbed populations stressed the scotopic nature of the hallucinations and the greater frequency of illusions of rippling or wavy lines evolving at times into geometrical designs. Affective blunting with a lack of spontaneity was commoner than the production of major delusions. In epilepsy apparently visual hallucinations are more frequently concomitants of L.S.D.-25 administration than in other mental disorders (31).