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Early research suggested that education was a major factor in structuring rates of political participation and social capital. More recent work based on experimental or quasi-experimental evidence offers mixed findings. In this study, we enlist a unique research setting in Romania, where passing the baccalaureate is required for entrance into university, setting up the occasion for a fuzzy RD design. The sample is drawn from a cross section of Romanians whose scores fall just above or below the cutoff. Because the sample is large and the measurement of exam scores are fine-grained, it is plausible to regard the outcome as continuous at the cutoff. Because the number of exam takers is enormous, we are able to focus on a very narrow bandwidth. The assumption of as-if random assignment is, therefore, plausible. We find that university attendance in Romania increases social capital as measured by our composite index, corroborating the main hypothesis.
The traditional process of peer review and publication has come under intense scrutiny in recent years. The time seems propitious for a consideration of alternatives in political science. To that end, we propose a Peer Review and Publication Consortium. The Consortium retains the virtues of the traditional peer-review process (governed by academic journals) while also mitigating some of its vices.
In some polities the exercise of political power is highly concentrated, and in others it is widely dispersed. In Chapter 11, we examine the effects of scale on power concentration, arguing that the degree of horizontal and vertical concentration of power in a polity is affected by the number of people residing within that polity. The larger the polity, the more fragmented its institutional design is likely to be. This is a function of (1) increased heterogeneity, which entails that larger communities are difficult to govern in a concentrated fashion, and (2) lower levels of trust, which call for institutional constraints on the center that cannot be easily overcome. To tackle this vast subject we adopt a variety of country-level indicators of power concentration including subnational regions, federalism, bicameralism, revenue decentralization, capital city size, and checks and balances. We also probe a variety of subnational indicators focused on variation across states and localities within the United States. Most of these analyses support the contention that scale is associated with deconcentrated power.
In Chapter 2, we review prior work on scale, discuss obstacles to reaching inferences about the causal role of scale, and lay out our own approach to this difficult question. After surveying extent work on community size and related subjects, we discuss the concept of a political community, which may be of several sorts and of any size. In the third section, we lay out the measurement of community scale, explaining that we transform population from a linear measure into a logarithmic measure. In the fourth section, we consider the difficulty of treating scale as a causal factor. This is a complicated issue, given that the population of political communities is a slow-moving cause, not directly manipulable, and rarely subject to as-if random perturbations. As such, it falls far from the gold standard of experimental research designs. The fifth section lays out the modeling strategies employed in quantitative analyses to follow. The sixth section discusses various outcomes of theoretical interest, and the final section introduces the data sources that we rely on to measure right- and left-side variables.
In Chapter 15, we consider additional outcomes that have attracted scholarly attention and have immense practical importance. We sequentially consider the effects of scale on regimes, social inequality, economic development, and public services, and we find that the causal relationship of scale to these outcomes is unclear. To test these relationships, we conduct original analyses while relying heavily on extant work. This investigation reveals that there is no aggregate relationship between scale and regime type once geographic factors (or more specifically, island status) are accounted for. Our own analysis of the association between scale and social inequality shows no relationship. In similar fashion, there is no cause to believe that size affects economic growth over the long term. When it comes to the provision of public services, the studies that have undertaken to look at this macro-level relationship report inconsistent findings. While we therefore do not find any evidence of a relationship between scale and the outcomes considered in this chapter, this conclusion must be tempered with the caveat that further research on this subject may unearth important patterns.
In Chapter 12, we explain the course of public policy – specifically, the degree to which governments intervene in citizens’ social and economic affairs. We argue that scale is negatively related to the level of government intervention through decreased social cohesion, representativeness and trust, particularism, and concentration, and through increased economies of scale. We also discuss the role of trade dependence, which we argue likely has ambivalent (countervailing) effects on intervention. In the empirical section, we turn to a variety of empirical terrains including the growth of the American state, the experience of small states (everywhere), and four policy realms – moral, fiscal, personnel, and social. Our results point to a stark contrast between subnational and national-level analyses. While subnational analyses show either a negative relationship between scale and intervention, or no relationship at all, national-level analyses show a strong (negative) relationship between the size of communities and the size of government. This apparent paradox has many possible answers, and so we leave it for future research to tease apart which factor(s) might be responsible.
In Chapter 8, we examine how scale affects contestation, defined as the degree of electoral competition in a political community. We begin by offering a theoretical account of the impact of scale on contestation. This account operates differently at polity and district levels, prompting us to construct separate theoretical accounts. For polities, we surmise that size alters incentives for leaders and masses, both of whom have greater need for an institutionalized mechanism of resolving conflict. In districts, we argue that scale influences contestation through mechanical effects, the supply of challengers, and the degree of social diversity. Next, we introduce our data and a variety of empirical tests, including cross-national and cross-district analyses based on the largest-party index. In addition, we provide an analysis of suffrage reforms and turnover, understood as a change in party control for a particular office. Although the topic has not been extensively researched, most studies that examine the relation – including our own results presented in this chapter – find a positive association between community size and contestation. A short conclusion summarizes the results.
Chapter 7 discusses the relation between scale and various forms of political participation. Why do some political communities elicit higher levels of participation than others? In this chapter, we argue, following a long tradition, that community size has important, and markedly negative, effects on political participation. We begin with a discussion of relevant theory, in which we build on the assumption that political participation is motivated, to some degree, by instrumental rationality. This rationality is affected by a variety of factors, among which are individual power, citizens’ access to relevant policymakers, coordination problems, and social norms, which in turn are affected by the scale of a community. We explore the relationship between scale and participation by looking at work on citizen assemblies, political parties, voting, efficacy, and the results of a recent meta-analysis. Subsequently, we provide our own analyses of voter turnout based on the Multilevel Elections Archive (MLEA) dataset. Virtually all studies corroborate the consensus that participation – including subjective feelings of efficacy – is lower in larger communities, all other things being equal.