In a very interesting note on Eels and Eel-catching in Bedfordshire, Mr. Steele Elliott has criticised my suggested identification of these two manors, on the ground that the mill at Chainhalle paid as part rent in Domesday Book thirty shillings and a hundred eels:

“judging from its comparatively high rental [this mill] must have been one of the most important in the county. Therefore we can reasonably presume the position of this Manor was adjoining the Ouse, and not remote from any important stream.” The actual money rent is no doubt high, but we cannot now gauge the factors which produced that (accessibility, water-power, population, area under grain, etc.). As regards the eels, I venture to think that the criticism is not destructive. In the first place, a hundred eels was not an exceptional number, but about the average paid by eel-rented mills in Beds. (2610 eels ÷ 25 mills); nine out of the twenty-five mills paid less, six paid more. Again, Mr. Elliott does not seem to have made sufficient allowance for the general lowering of the water level all over the county due to the ‘ drayning and imbanking ‘ of the fens. What is now the inconsiderable stream on which presumably the Ravensden Mill stood, would be larger, and the area of which it can be said today “the ground is swampy and often covered by water from the overflow of the streams,” would then offer harbourage enough for eels.

That there was a mill at Ravensden in early times is shown by the inquisition post mortem of William de Beauchamp (II B) in 1262. To clinch the matter, the manor of Putenehou (Putnoe in Goldington), the position of which is not disputed, lay just on the other side of the stream from Ravensden, and similarly paid a rent of a hundred eels. The probable position of these mills is less than three miles from the Ouse.

This chapter provides a discussion of the conclusions and implications of this research. In many respects, the assumption of initial state interest and resources sufficiency has not been met, although many states have been able to overcome their initial deficiencies in the intervening years. While most observers conclude that the Water Quality Act has served to improve water quality in the nation, the lack of a valid, reliable, and agreed-upon measure of state water quality hampers the ability to reach specific conclusions about the overall effects of the Water Quality Act. The conclusions also highlight the tensions between the financial and environmental elements of the Clean Water State Revolving Fund program, as well as tensions between national environmental goals and state choice in program implementation.

The Water Quality Act of 1987 is a product of the ideas of federalism in place at the time of its development and passage. Driven by the "Reagan revolution," the 1980s was a time of substantial policy change as new imperatives such as states' rights, a smaller national government, an expanded role for the private sector, and deregulation came into vogue. The WQA is an expression of this policy environment, and represents several of these imperatives in the form of a revised infrastructure program to provide clean water. With a switch from a categorical grant to a block grant, the WQA exemplified a policy instrument consistent with the underlying tenets of the "Reagan revolution." This chapter examines the underlying elements of Reagan's philosophy of federalism, and details the ways in which the mechanisms and structure of the WQA reflect this philosophy. Finally, this chapter serves to lay the foundation for context of the development, implementation, and administration of the Water Quality Act.

This chapter introduces the major components of the Water Quality Act of 1987. The chapter guides the reader through the six major titles included in the Water Quality Act, and describes the various programs and functions. The chapter also provides in-depth discussion of the elements of the Clean Water State Revolving Fund program, including the use of leveraging, the reporting and accountability elements of the program, and mechanisms such as the Letter of Credit and the importance of state primacy.

The period of initial state implementation of the Water Quality Act was a critical period in the development of the Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF). This chapter tests the propositions inherent in the CWSRF that states possessed the administrative, budgetary, political, and organizational resources necessary to implement the program successfully. Drawing on data from EPA and the states, combined with data from a 1990 survey of state program coordinators, this chapter examines the factors critical to state program design and implementation in the early years of the program. The findings from the 50-state analysis suggest that while some states had adequate resources available, many states struggled to balance the environmental and financial elements of the program. The data indicate that some states turned to the private sector for financial assistance, particularly states that chose to leverage their CWSRF capitalization grants. Some states moved quickly with program implementation, while other states proceeded more slowly. The findings highlight the differences in state resources available, and their willingness and ability to implement the program.