This chapter examines the “nuts and bolts” of war, including the formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration. Logistics represent a vital element of warfare, indispensable to the operations of armies ever since the emergence of organized warfare. Broadly defined, this concept involves moving, supplying, and maintaining military forces, as well as transportation of material, food and animals, communications, personnel replacement, quarters, depots, and rear administration. The Napoleonic Wars witnessed important developments in the logistics and one of its lasting effects was creation and successful dissemination of bureaucratic reforms that improved state’s ability to mobilize forces and extract resources

The customary chronology in the discussion of war and its causes was that of a decline in ideological factors between the ‘Wars of Religion’ and the outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars in 1792, although bellicosity remained a key factor. However, this is very much an agenda that is set by Western concerns and developments. In that, it focuses not only on the Western interest in Western history, but also on a teleological focus on a state system supposedly created by the ‘Westphalian Settlement’, the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 that brought to an end the Thirty Years War. That settlement is commonly presented as a triumph of reason and restraint, in the shape of an agreement to operate an international system based on the mutual respect of sovereign powers and, in particular, an agreement to accept confessional plurality, at least in the form of different types of Christianity, as sole state religions.

The era from 1650 to 1815 was an enormously important period in the development of sea power; maritime matters were intimately connected with Britain's imperial and commercial ambitions. It would be impossible to overstate the import of affairs at sea to the engine of state. Certainly the battles and endeavours at sea during this time are the stuff of legends – whether that was Nelson's victories or those of the most infamous names in pirate lore. Whether English, and later British, seamen were serving Britannia aboard naval ships or in more self-serving undertakings at sea, the growth in British sea power during this long eighteenth century is apparent.

Prior to this period, a number of changes allowed for European and, consequently, British, expansion. If we were to focus on military technology and operational considerations, we would acknowledge that the prime means of, and reason for, change was the rise in Europe in the sixteenth century of the large, specialised, sailing, cannon-armed warship, built and maintained just for war, rather than also acting as a peacetime trader. These ships, able to take part in sustained artillery duels at close range, were expensive to build, administer and maintain. As a consequence of this cost and the related need for political support and organisational sophistication, the number of potential maritime powers was restricted, and, by the late seventeenth century, the powerful naval state was no longer coterminous, as it had earlier been, with the commercial territory or port.

The growth of English naval power in both the sixteenth century and the early and mid-seventeenth had equipped England with an important navy and a tradition of maritime power that subsequently affected political assumptions and views about the necessary identity and desirable policies of Britain (the correct term after the Parliamentary Union of 1707 with Scotland) as a military power. Thus, Britain became the leading naval power in Europe, and thus the world, in the period 1690–1715, a position it was to sustain until the Second World War.

The significance of naval power to the 21st century can be seen in the range of uses that are pursued and planned. That states have different assessments of what naval power can offer them and how it might threaten them is scarcely new, but these differences have become more prominent due to political, economic and technological developments over the last decade. These developments will be considered first, and then attention will be devoted to the different strategies of individual states. This topic will be linked to the salience of sea power, and not only for major states but also for weaker counterparts. Last, there will be consideration of possible scenarios and changes in the future. Perhaps far more than developments on land or in the air, the future of navies is difficult to predict. There have been more changes in weapon systems and platforms at sea than on land or in the air.

The Workhouse as an ‘Institution’

Although workhouses had been constructed before the eighteenth century some 2,000 were built in England following the enabling legislation of what is often called the Workhouse Test Act of 1723. The workhouse movement in London was particularly vigorous and highly distinctive; most London parishes of any size were operating these establishments by the middle of the eighteenth century. As the geographer David Green emphasizes, the 1834 New Poor Law in London was not followed by a wave of new building, since almost all metropolitan parishes had already integrated indoor relief as part and parcel of their mixed welfare provision. Such workhouses were designed to deter applications for relief, which could be refused if paupers would not enter them. In this sense the Workhouse Test Act anticipated the New Poor Law by over 100 years. The poor were to be subjected to the discipline of work and religious instruction. Lay religious societies, which aimed to reform the manners of the English people, were a further spur to the founding of workhouses in this period.

Tim Hitchcock's doctoral thesis is still the starting point for those interested in the early history of London's workhouses. Green's recent magisterial Pauper Capital (2010) contains the first modern analysis of their role in London's welfare system from the end of the eighteenth century.

In this essay, strategic culture emerges from the complex political situation of mid-eighteenth-century Britain as a key public mythos. This is at variance with its more common use in the literature as the context within which military tasks were “shaped.” The latter usage reflects discussion of distinctive ways of war and draws on the authority of cultural interpretations of warfare. However, the concept of strategic culture also has to address the issue of coherence and consistency in the face of the contested character of actual national interests, the ferocity of debate and the roles of politics and contingency. In short, there is a revenge of history on theory.

The very existence of strategy, strategic culture and strategic policy in the eighteenth century is highly problematic as far as some well-informed scholars are concerned. They hold this delay in the development of the idea of strategy as reflecting the conceptual and institutional limitations of the time. However, such an approach mistakes the absence of an articulated school of strategic thinking for a lack of strategic awareness. For example, as far as the Royal Navy was concerned, there was considerable experience in balancing resources among tasks. One can see this in the detachment of squadrons from home waters for operational tasks in the Baltic and Mediterranean. Moreover, a strategy of commercial interdiction played a major role in British operations against the Dutch in the late seventeenth century, and later, in the Anglo-Spanish crisis of 1725–1727, it included a powerful transoceanic dimension.

Much of the problem in assessing the implications of the Hanoverian relationship comes from the tension between considering short periods and, on the other hand, assessing the relationship over the longer term. The former appears the most desirable approach, because it restricts coverage to a period for which it is simpler to carry out the necessary archival research. It is also flawed, however, both because it limits the experience of contemporaries and because it removes the comparative element, which is valuable for scholarly analysis, just as it was useful for contemporary debate about foreign policy. ‘Walpole and Hanover’ as a topic provides a good instance of this. While it focuses attention on the failure in existing treatments of Walpole to devote much attention to Hanover, this approach underrates the importance of considering Walpole at least in part in the light of developments after his fall from office in 1742. Not only did Walpole, from then 1st earl of Orford, maintain links with George II and also continue to influence the Pelham brothers until his death in 1745, but, in order to assess Walpole it is necessary to consider his policies in the light of the events of subsequent years as they provide a way of probing the alternatives. Hence this chapter closes in 1760.

Writing on international relations frequently makes reference to the use of force, but rarely integrates changes in its nature into a central role in the explanatory model. In particular, force, in the shape of military capability, is often seen as the ‘servant’ of ideas about its appropriate use, and thus of the norms of the international system, rather than as an independent element, let alone playing a central role in affecting the latter. This article addresses the issue with particular reference to relations between the West and the ‘non-West’, arguing that the contested relationship between the different narratives of military history impinge directly on the character of international relations.

Differing narratives of military history

That this issue is directly pertinent today stems most apparently from the crisis in Iraq, but is in no way restricted to it, because differing views on the effectiveness and legitimacy of military capability play a major role in conflicts and confrontations around the world. Indeed, whether war is seen to stem from mistaken assessments of relative power or from bellicosity, these differing views play a key role.

Nevertheless, the Iraq crisis indicates important aspects of the issue. First, a concern about the spread of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ played an important role, at least in the public explanation of American and British policy towards Iraq prior to the conflict; while it has certainly played a major part in the diplomacy focused on particular states, especially North Korea, Libya and Iran.