A quantum algorithm succeeds not because the superposition principle allows ‘the computation of all values of a function at once’ via ‘quantum parallelism’, but rather because the structure of a quantum state space allows new sorts of correlations associated with entanglement, with new possibilities for information-processing transformations between correlations, that are not possible in a classical state space. I illustrate this with an elementary example of a problem for which a quantum algorithm is more efficient than any classical algorithm. I also introduce the notion of ‘pseudotelepathic’ games and show how the difference between classical and quantum correlations plays a similar role here for games that can be won by quantum players exploiting entanglement, but not by classical players whose only allowed common resource consists of shared strings of random numbers (common causes of the players’ correlated responses in a game).

The aim of contemporary cognitive neuropsychology is to articulate the functional architecture underlying normal human cognitive abilities, on the basis of patterns of performance over a variety of cognitive tasks involving subjects with varying degrees of brain-damage. An example of a contemporary functional architecture is the following model for the recognition and production of spoken and written words:

The modular processing components in this ‘box-and-arrow’ functional architecture represent functionally independent subsystems that perform computational transformations on the representations that originate as input along the connecting links, providing a theory of cognition at the algorithmic and representational level (not the implementational or ‘hardware’ level).

Philosophical debate on the measurement problem of quantum mechanics has, for the most part, been confined to the non-relativistic version of the theory. Quantizing quantum field theory, or making quantum mechanics relativistic, yields a conceptual framework capable of dealing with the creation and annihilation of an indefinite number of particles in interaction with fields, i.e. quantum systems with an infinite number of degrees of freedom. I want to show that a solution to the standard measurement problem is available if we exploit the properties of the infinite quantum models available in this broader conceptual framework.

There is a qualitative difference between quantum systems with an infinite number of degrees of freedom and quantum systems with a finite number of degrees of freedom. In the infinite case, there exist many unitarily inequivalent irreducible Hilbert space representations of the algebra of observables of the system. In the finite case, there is only one such representation.

Friedman and Putnam have argued (Friedman and Putnam 1978) that the quantum logical interpretation of quantum mechanics gives us an explanation of interference that the Copenhagen interpretation cannot supply without invoking an additional ad hoc principle, the projection postulate. I show that it is possible to define a notion of equivalence of experimental arrangements relative to a pure state φ, or (correspondingly) equivalence of Boolean subalgebras in the partial Boolean algebra of projection operators of a system, which plays a role in the Copenhagen explanation of interference analogous to the role played by the material equivalence, given φ, of certain propositions in the Friedman-Putnam quantum logical analysis. I also show that the quantum logical interpretation and the Copenhagen interpretation are equally capable of avoiding the paradoxical conclusion of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument (Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 1935). Thus, neither interference phenomena nor the correlations between separated systems provide a test case for distinguishing between the relative acceptability of the Copenhagen interpretation and the quantum logical interpretation as explanations of quantum effects.

The conceptually puzzling features of quantum mechanics as a statistical theory all have their source in the impossibility of relating the probability assignments defined by the quantum state to distributions over determinate values of the physical magnitudes. While some interpretations of quantum mechanics, as well as “hidden variable” modifications of the theory, have proposed several constructions for assigning values to magnitudes (beyond the value assignments defined by the quantum state alone), a variety of theorems exist which impose severe restrictions on such theoretical constructions.

This note will deal with Bell's proof (in [2]), that any hidden variable theory satisfying a physically reasonable locality condition is characterized by an inequality which is inconsistent with the quantum statistics. Bell's result has initiated a series of experiments designed to refute the entire class of local hidden variable theories. We show that Bell's inequality actually characterizes a feature of hidden variable theories which is much weaker than locality in the sense considered physically motivated.