To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure email@example.com
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
We present here a hierarchical model for the evolution of compositional language. The model has the structure of a two-sender/one-receiver Lewis signaling game augmented with executive agents who may learn to influence the behavior of the basic senders and receiver. The model shows how functional agents might coevolve representational roles even as they evolve a reliable compositional language in the context of costly signaling. When successful, the evolved language captures both the compositional structure of properties in the world and the compositional structure of successful actions involving those properties.
We consider the nature of quantum randomness and how one might have empirical evidence for it. We will see why, depending on one’s computational resources, it may be impossible to determine whether a particular notion of randomness properly characterizes one’s empirical data. Indeed, we will see why even an ideal observer under ideal epistemic conditions may never have any empirical evidence whatsoever for believing that the results of one’s quantum-mechanical experiments are randomly determined. This illustrates a radical sort of empirical underdetermination faced by fundamentally stochastic theories like quantum mechanics.
Seven half-day regional listening sessions were held between December 2016 and April 2017 with groups of diverse stakeholders on the issues and potential solutions for herbicide-resistance management. The objective of the listening sessions was to connect with stakeholders and hear their challenges and recommendations for addressing herbicide resistance. The coordinating team hired Strategic Conservation Solutions, LLC, to facilitate all the sessions. They and the coordinating team used in-person meetings, teleconferences, and email to communicate and coordinate the activities leading up to each regional listening session. The agenda was the same across all sessions and included small-group discussions followed by reporting to the full group for discussion. The planning process was the same across all the sessions, although the selection of venue, time of day, and stakeholder participants differed to accommodate the differences among regions. The listening-session format required a great deal of work and flexibility on the part of the coordinating team and regional coordinators. Overall, the participant evaluations from the sessions were positive, with participants expressing appreciation that they were asked for their thoughts on the subject of herbicide resistance. This paper details the methods and processes used to conduct these regional listening sessions and provides an assessment of the strengths and limitations of those processes.
Herbicide resistance is ‘wicked’ in nature; therefore, results of the many educational efforts to encourage diversification of weed control practices in the United States have been mixed. It is clear that we do not sufficiently understand the totality of the grassroots obstacles, concerns, challenges, and specific solutions needed for varied crop production systems. Weed management issues and solutions vary with such variables as management styles, regions, cropping systems, and available or affordable technologies. Therefore, to help the weed science community better understand the needs and ideas of those directly dealing with herbicide resistance, seven half-day regional listening sessions were held across the United States between December 2016 and April 2017 with groups of diverse stakeholders on the issues and potential solutions for herbicide resistance management. The major goals of the sessions were to gain an understanding of stakeholders and their goals and concerns related to herbicide resistance management, to become familiar with regional differences, and to identify decision maker needs to address herbicide resistance. The messages shared by listening-session participants could be summarized by six themes: we need new herbicides; there is no need for more regulation; there is a need for more education, especially for others who were not present; diversity is hard; the agricultural economy makes it difficult to make changes; and we are aware of herbicide resistance but are managing it. The authors concluded that more work is needed to bring a community-wide, interdisciplinary approach to understanding the complexity of managing weeds within the context of the whole farm operation and for communicating the need to address herbicide resistance.
Firestone & Scholl (F&S) rely on three problematic assumptions about the mind (modularity, reflexiveness, and context-insensitivity) to argue cognition does not fundamentally influence perception. We highlight evidence indicating that perception, cognition, and emotion are constructed through overlapping, distributed brain networks characterized by top-down activity and context-sensitivity. This evidence undermines F&S's ability to generalize from case studies to the nature of perception.
In the standard Prisoner's Dilemma there are two players A and B. Each player has the option of cooperating or defecting in a single-shot play of the game; each decides what to do without interacting with the other, and their decisions are revealed simultaneously. Suppose that if both players choose to cooperate, they each spend one year in prison; if both choose to defect, they each spend two years in prison; and if one chooses to cooperate and the other to defect, the defector goes free and the cooperator spends three years in prison. Finally, suppose that each player is ideally rational and has perfect and complete knowledge concerning the precise nature of the game being played.
Player A reasons as follows. Player B might cooperate or defect. If B cooperates, then I would do better by defecting than by cooperating. And if B defects, then I would do better by defecting than by cooperating. So regardless of what B does, I would do better by defecting. Player B reasons similarly. So both players defect. And since neither player can benefit by changing strategies when the other defects, mutual defection is a Nash equilibrium of the game, and the only such equilibrium.
The curious feature of the Prisoner's Dilemma is that by defecting each player does worse than had they both cooperated. Here, perfect rationality with perfect and complete knowledge leads to behavior that is suboptimal for both players, both individually and jointly. Perfect rationality and perfect and complete knowledge are hence not necessarily virtues in the context of social interaction, at least not on this analysis.
Human agents, however, often cooperate in situations that at least look very like versions of the Prisoner's Dilemma. There are a number of explanatory options at hand. An interaction that looks like a Prisoner's Dilemma might in fact be a very different game. Indeed, as we will see, it might be a game with features that are not well characterized by classical game theory at all. Further, it is clearly inappropriate to assume that human agents are even typically rational or well-informed.
This article concerns how rule-following behavior might evolve, how an old evolved rule might come to be appropriated to a new context, and how simple concepts might coevolve with rule-following behavior. In particular, we consider how the transitive inferential rule-following behavior exhibited by pinyon and scrub jays might evolve in the context of a variety of the Skyrms-Lewis signaling game, then how such a rule might come to be appropriated to carry out inferences regarding stimuli different from those involved in the original evolution of the rule, and how this appropriation involves a step toward the evolution of basic ordinal concepts.
Systems linking people and nature, known as social-ecological systems, are increasingly understood as complex adaptive systems. Essential features of these complex adaptive systems – such as nonlinear feedbacks, strategic interactions, individual and spatial heterogeneity, and varying time scales – pose substantial challenges for modeling. However, ignoring these characteristics can distort our picture of how these systems work, causing policies to be less effective or even counterproductive. In this paper we present recent developments in modeling social-ecological systems, illustrate some of these challenges with examples related to coral reefs and grasslands, and identify the implications for economic and policy analysis.
The degree to which genes and environment determine variations in brain structure and function is fundamentally important to understanding normal and disease-related patterns of neural organization and activity. We studied genetic contributions to the midsagittal area of the corpus callosum (CC) in pedigreed baboons (68 males, 112 females) to replicate findings of high genetic contribution to that area of the CC reported in humans, and to determine if the heritability of the CC midsagittal area in adults was modulated by fetal development rate. Measurements of callosal area were obtained from high-resolution MRI scans. Heritability was estimated from pedigree-based maximum likelihood estimation of genetic and non-genetic variance components as implemented in Sequential Oligogenic Linkage Analysis Routines (SOLAR). Our analyses revealed significant heritability for the total area of the CC and all of its subdivisions, with h2 = .46 for the total CC, and h2 = .54, .37, .62, .56, and .29 for genu, anterior midbody, medial midbody, posterior midbody and splenium, respectively. Genetic correlation analysis demonstrated that the individual subdivisions shared between 41% and 98% of genetic variability. Combined with previous research reporting high heritability of other brain structures in baboons, these results reveal a consistent pattern of high heritability for brain morphometric measures in baboons.
Lewis sender-receiver games illustrate how a meaningful term language might evolve from initially meaningless random signals (Lewis 1969; Skyrms 2006). Here we consider how a meaningful language with a primitive grammar might evolve in a somewhat more subtle sort of game. The evolution of such a language involves the co-evolution of partitions of the physical world into what may seem, at least from the perspective of someone using the language, to correspond to canonical natural kinds. While the evolved language may allow for the sort of precise representation that is required for successful coordinated action and prediction, the apparent natural kinds reflected in its structure may be purely conventional. This has both positive and negative implications for the limits of naturalized metaphysics.
This paper is concerned with the possibility and nature of relativistic hidden-variable formulations of quantum mechanics. Both ad hoc teleological constructions and frame-dependent constructions of spacetime maps are considered. While frame-dependent constructions are clearly preferable, a many-maps theory based on such constructions fails to provide dynamical explanations for local quantum events. Here the hidden-variable dynamics used in the frame-dependent constructions is just a rule that serves to characterize the set of all possible spacetime maps. While not having dynamical explanations of the values of quantum-mechanical measurement records is a significant cost, it may prove too much to ask for dynamical explanations in relativistic quantum mechanics.
There is good reason to suppose that our best physical theories are false: In addition to its own internal problems, the standard formulation of quantum mechanics is logically incompatible with special relativity. I will also argue that we have no concrete idea what it means to claim that these theories are approximately true.
In this paper I describe the history of the surreal trajectories problem and argue that in fact it is not a problem for Bohm's theory. More specifically, I argue that one can take the particle trajectories predicted by Bohm's theory to be the actual trajectories that particles follow and that there is no reason to suppose that good particle detectors are somehow fooled in the context of the surreal trajectories experiments. Rather than showing that Bohm's theory predicts the wrong particle trajectories or that it somehow prevents one from making reliable measurements, such experiments ultimately reveal the special role played by position and the fundamental incompatibility between Bohm's theory and relativity. They also provide a striking example of the theory-ladenness of observation.
In order to judge whether a theory is empirically adequate one must have epistemic access to reliable records of past measurement results that can be compared against the predictions of the theory. Some formulations of quantum mechanics fail to satisfy this condition. The standard theory without the collapse postulate is an example. Bell's reading of Everett's relative-state formulation is another. Furthermore, there are formulations of quantum mechanics that only satisfy this condition for a special class of observers, formulations whose empirical adequacy could only be judged by an observer who records her measurement results in a special way. Bohm's theory is an example. It is possible to formulate hidden-variable theories that do not suffer from such a restriction, but these encounter other problems.